Raymond E. Echevarria v. Darrin Jackson

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1271
R AYMOND E. ECHEVARRIA ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D ARRIN J ACKSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cv-05271 — LaShonda A. Hunt, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED MAY 14, 2026 — D ECIDED J UNE 16, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE , SCUDDER , and ST . EVE , Circuit Judges.
R IPPLE , Circuit Judge. Raymond Echevarria filed this 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action against Officer Darrin Jackson, Sergeant
Cynthia Spina, and the Forest Preserve District of Cook
County, Illinois (“Forest Preserve”). He claims that the de-
fendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights, as made

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2 No. 25-1271
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,1
when the officers detained and cited him for public inde-
cency. The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm
the judgment of the district court.
I
BACKGROUND
A
On September 30, 2019, a person, giving the name “Ca-
mille,” called the Forest Preserve police to report that some-
one had exposed himself in the Busse North area of the Forest
Preserve. The caller described the suspect to the dispatcher,
who recorded the description as “M/W ABOUT 30–40’s Dark
Hair, 6ft tall …. DRIVING GRY HONDA CRV … LSW
BLU/WHITE STRIPED TANK TOP, GRAY SWEAT PANTS
…. PULLED HIS PANTS DOWN.”2 Officer Darrin Jackson re-
ceived the dispatch call containing this description.
When Officer Jackson arrived at Busse North, he noticed a
man staring at him and pulled up next to him to ask if he was
the person who had made the call. The man (referred to as
“complainant” hereinafter) responded that he was the caller
and that he would be willing sign a complaint. The complain-
ant also told Officer Jackson that “[the suspect]’s still back
there.”3
1 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
2 R.89 at ¶ 8; R.94 at ¶ 1.
3 R.89 at ¶ 13.

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No. 25-1271 3
Officer Jackson moved to the location identified by the
complainant. The Busse North area is known to be a location
with frequent public indecency activity.4 As Mr. Echevarria
admits, when Officer Jackson saw him, he substantially
matched the description received by Officer Jackson;
Mr. Echevarria is a white male with dark hair, approximately
six feet and two inches tall, and, on that day, was wearing a
blue and white striped tank top and gray sweatpants or
shorts.5 Mr. Echevarria also admits that he was driving a gray
Honda CRV on that day.6
Officer Jackson approached Mr. Echevarria and asked for
his identification. Mr. Echevarria asked if there was a prob-
lem, to which Officer Jackson responded “you bet your ass
there’s a problem.”7 Mr. Echevarria told Officer Jackson that
he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and that it
was “hurting” him to not know why he was being stopped.8
Officer Jackson noticed that Mr. Echevarria was sweating and
shaking and attributed this condition to Mr. Echevarria being
nervous.
Officer Jackson detained Mr. Echevarria and issued an or-
dinance ticket violation for public indecency under Cook
County Forest Preserve District Code § 3-3-5(D)(2), but he did
not place Mr. Echevarria under arrest. After issuing the ticket,
Officer Jackson requested permission from his supervisor,
4 Id. at ¶ 17.
5 R.94 at ¶ 15.
6 R.89-4 at 47:18–22.
7 R.89 at ¶ 70.
8 Id. at ¶ 71.

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4 No. 25-1271
Sergeant Cynthia Spina, to have Mr. Echevarria’s vehicle
towed pursuant to § 3-4-1(B). That ordinance provides:
The owner of record of any motor vehicle that is
used during the commission of any of the qual-
ified violations as set forth in Section 3-4-2 shall
be liable to the District for an administrative
penalty of $500.00 plus any towing and storage
fees applicable under Section 3-4-2. Any such
vehicle shall be subject to seizure and impound-
ment pursuant to this chapter.
C OOK C NTY . FOREST P RES. D IST . C ODE § 3-4-1(B) (citation mod-
ified). Public indecency under § 3-3-5(D)(2) is a “qualified vi-
olation” under § 3-4-2. Id. at § 3-4-2.
To tow a vehicle under § 3-4-1(B), the officer must have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle is subject to the or-
dinance—that is, he must have probable cause to believe that
the vehicle was used “during the commission” of a qualified
violation. Id. at § 3-4-1(B), (C). Officer Jackson informed Ser-
geant Spina that Mr. Echevarria matched the description
given by the complainant and that the complainant had
agreed to sign a complaint. Based on this information, Ser-
geant Spina approved the towing.
Mr. Echevarria testified that, before Officer Jackson left the
scene, he referred to Mr. Echevarria as a “sicko” and a “per-
vert.”9 He also testified that at some point in the interaction,
Officer Jackson had told him that if he ran, he would send his
K9 after him. Mr. Echevarria had been detained for approxi-
mately forty-five minutes when Officer Jackson attempted to
9 Id. at ¶¶ 73–74.

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No. 25-1271 5
find the complainant again to sign a complaint. By this time,
the complainant was gone. Therefore, the only evidence of the
alleged violation was the audio of the complainant’s call to
the police, and, consequently, the ordinance violation ticket
against Mr. Echevarria was dismissed for lack of evidence.
This civil rights suit followed.
B
Mr. Echevarria’s complaint set forth five counts against
Officer Jackson, Sergeant Spina, and the Forest Preserve. He
alleged unreasonable seizure of property in violation of the
Fourth Amendment against all defendants (Count I); unrea-
sonable seizure of property in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment under a Monell theory against the Forest Preserve
(Count II); unreasonable seizure of person in violation of the
Fourth Amendment against Officer Jackson and the Forest
Preserve (Count III); intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress under Illinois law against Officer Jackson and the Forest
Preserve (Count IV); and malicious prosecution under Illinois
law against Officer Jackson and the Forest Preserve (Count V).
The district court granted summary judgment to the de-
fendants on all counts.10 At the outset, because Mr. Echevarria
10 While it does not form the basis of our ruling, we note that both parties
have failed to fully comply with the briefing requirements of Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 28 by omitting required components from their
briefs. Both parties failed to include a Summary of Argument section as
required. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7), 28(b). Additionally, Mr. Echevarria
failed to provide the court with an appendix containing the relevant
docket entries from the district court—omitting even a copy of the district
court decision being appealed. Fed. R. App. 30(a)(1). “Noncompliance
with appellate rules wastes time and resources and frustrates the review
process.” McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir.
2019). To that end, we must “insist on meticulous compliance with rules

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6 No. 25-1271
had failed to file a response to the defendants’ Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 statement, the district court
held that the defendants’ facts were deemed admitted. The
court further determined that it would consider the facts in
Mr. Echevarria’s statement of additional material facts to the
extent that they were supported by evidence. Turning to each
of the counts, it found that Mr. Echevarria’s admission that he
matched the suspect’s description to be decisive on the unrea-
sonable seizure claims (Count I and Count III), and the mali-
cious prosecution claim (Count V). Mr. Echevarria’s shaking
and sweating, which Officer Jackson interpreted as a nervous
reaction betraying guilt, further supported probable cause. It
rejected Mr. Echevarria’s characterization of the complain-
ant’s initial call as “anonymous” because Officer Jackson had
spoken directly with the complainant, and at the time he de-
tained Mr. Echevarria, he reasonably believed that he had a
witness willing to sign a complaint. As to the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim (Count IV), the court con-
cluded that Officer Jackson’s comments to Mr. Echevarria
were not sufficient under Illinois law because “mere insults
[and] indignities” are not enough.11 Finally, the district court
concluded that Mr. Echevarria’s Monell claim (Count II) failed
because he could not show that the seizure of his vehicle was
unconstitutional.
sensibly designed to make appellate briefs as valuable an aid to the deci-
sional process as they can be.” Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d
1219, 1224 (7th Cir. 1995). Future appellants, appellees, and counsel would
be wise to keep this in mind in all future appeals.
11 R.105 at 14 (quoting Shamim v. Siemens Indus., Inc., 854 F.Supp. 2d 496,
511 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).

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No. 25-1271 7
II
DISCUSSION
As a general rule, we review de novo the district court’s
grant of summary judgment, taking the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Russell v. Comstock, 167 F.4th 984, 988
(7th Cir. 2026). Here, however, because Mr. Echevarria failed
to comply with Local Rule 56.1, the district court held that the
defendants’ facts were admitted, and Mr. Echevarria does not
challenge that ruling on appeal. We therefore consider the de-
fendants’ facts admitted. See Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442
F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that, where Local Rule
56.1 is correctly applied, summary judgment is correctly de-
termined only on facts compliant with the rule).
A
Mr. Echevarria’s complaint contains three claims that
hinge on the issue of probable cause: claims under § 1983 al-
leging violation of the Fourth Amendment for unlawful sei-
zure of person and property, and a malicious prosecution
claim. “Probable cause is an absolute defense to any claim un-
der § 1983 for wrongful arrest ….” Bailey v. City of Chicago, 779
F.3d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 2015). Under Illinois law, a malicious
prosecution claim requires a showing that there was no prob-
able cause. Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 784 N.E.2d 258, 265
(Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
1
We turn first to Mr. Echevarria’s claim of unlawful seizure
of his person. Here, the district court correctly held that no
reasonable jury could find that Officer Jackson lacked proba-
ble cause to detain Mr. Echevarria. Probable cause exists
when a police officer has a reasonable belief that the person

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8 No. 25-1271
to be detained has committed a crime. Abbott v. Sangamon
County, 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). In assessing whether
probable cause existed, we examine the totality of circum-
stances, Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), and we
focus on the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge at the moment the decision to detain is made, Qian
v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999). The information re-
lied upon by the officer must be “reasonably trustworthy,”
the sort of information that would lead a reasonably prudent
individual to believe that the suspect had committed an of-
fense. Id. To support probable cause, the information must
contain sufficient indicia of reliability. See United States v.
Groves, 559 F.3d 637, 640–41 (7th Cir. 2009). In making this as-
sessment, the officer may draw inferences based on his expe-
rience. Ornelas et al. v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996).
Here, Mr. Echevarria admits that he matched the descrip-
tion of the suspect almost exactly.12 Additionally, the com-
plainant told dispatch that the suspect exposed himself “just
now,” allowing a reasonable inference that the complainant
was an eyewitness to the alleged illegal activity.13 That infer-
ence was further supported upon Officer Jackson finding
Mr. Echevarria where the complainant said he would be. Cf.
United States v. Drake, 456 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting
that courts typically presume that eyewitness 911 call reports
are reliable). Moreover, the Busse North area, where the
12 The only possible discrepancy is whether he was wearing shorts or
pants, see R.94 at ¶ 15, and that discrepancy is not material to the witness’s
identification in light of the many similarities. Muhammad v. Pearson, 900
F.3d 898, 909 (7th Cir. 2018).
13 R.89 at ¶ 10.

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No. 25-1271 9
alleged indecent exposure took place, was known by the of-
ficers to be a common site for that type of activity.14
Contrary to Mr. Echevarria’s characterization, this witness
was not truly “anonymous” because Officer Jackson spoke di-
rectly to him. While a witness’s disappearance after the fact
can indicate a lack of reliability where the information is un-
corroborated, see United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 483 (7th
Cir. 2018), much of the information here was corroborated by
Officer Jackson’s own observations. Further, Officer Jackson
observed Mr. Echevarria sweating and shaking, which has
been “frequently recognized as a sign that a suspect has some-
thing to hide ….” United States v. Patton, 705 F.3d 734, 740 (7th
Cir. 2013); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)
(“[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion.”).
Because Officer Jackson’s decision to seize Mr. Echevarria
was supported by probable cause, Counts III and V were
properly dismissed on summary judgment.
2
Mr. Echevarria’s claim for unlawful seizure of property
must meet the same fate as his claim alleging the unlawful
seizure of his person. Here, Mr. Echevarria submits that be-
cause there was no specific evidence linking his vehicle to the
alleged offense, there was no probable cause to seize the ve-
hicle.
Even if a local ordinance allows a seizure, the seizure still
must meet constitutional standards, see Soldal v. Cook County,
506 U.S. 56, 69 (1992), and the Fourth Amendment standard
14 Id. at ¶ 18.

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10 No. 25-1271
for such seizures is reasonableness, Bell v. City of Chicago, 835
F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2016). Police can seize a vehicle under
a seizure ordinance only if they have probable cause to be-
lieve that the vehicle is subject to seizure. Id. at 740 (discussing
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 564 (1999) and G.M. Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351–52 (1977)).15
The seizure ordinance here permits the seizure of “any
motor vehicle that is used during the commission” of an in-
decent exposure violation. C OOK C NTY. FOREST P RES. D IST .
C ODE § 3-4-1(B). The officers had probable cause to believe
that Mr. Echevarria had committed the offense of indecent ex-
posure in a public area and that he had used his personal ve-
hicle to transport himself to that public area. Accordingly, a
reasonable officer could conclude that the vehicle was used
“during the commission” of the offense, and the seizure of his
vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651, 653–54 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a vehicle used to transport a suspect
to the location where a drug offense was committed was used
“to facilitate” a drug offense, making it subject to forfeiture).
Summary judgment was properly granted as to Count I and
Count II.16
15 The ordinance at issue explicitly provides that officers must have “prob-
able cause to believe that a vehicle is subject to a seizure and impound-
ment pursuant to this chapter ….” C OOK CNTY . F OREST P RES . DIST . CODE
§ 3-4-1(C).
16 Mr. Echevarria’s Monell claim fails because there is no underlying con-
stitutional violation. O’Donnell v. City of Chicago, 163 F.4th 411, 415 (7th
Cir. 2025).

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No. 25-1271 11
B
We now turn to Mr. Echevarria’s claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress (Count IV). Under Illinois law,
conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency” to
create liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. 1976) (citation
modified). It is not enough that the defendant acted with the
intent to cause emotional distress, “or even that his conduct
has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation
which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for an-
other tort.” Id. (citation modified). This standard is an objec-
tive one. Harriston v. Chicago Trib. Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th
Cir. 1993). We consider the power and influence wielded by
the harassing party, the likelihood that the threatened action
could be carried out, the legitimate reasons one might have
for making the offensive statements, and the defendant’s
awareness of the plaintiff’s susceptibility to physical or men-
tal stress. Lopacich v. Falk, 5 F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1993).
Mr. Echevarria submits that the conduct was extreme and
outrageous because Officer Jackson became aware that
Mr. Echevarria had PTSD after Mr. Echevarria told him about
his condition. “Behavior that might otherwise be considered
merely rude, abrasive or inconsiderate, may be deemed out-
rageous if the defendant knows that the plaintiff is particu-
larly susceptible to emotional distress.” Kolegas v. Heftel Broad.
Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill. 1992). But, even taking this con-
sideration into account, the behavior at issue here cannot be
characterized as “so extreme as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as intolerable in a civ-
ilized community.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 83 (Ill.

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12 No. 25-1271
2003). These comments, while unprofessional, crude, and in-
sulting,17 would not be considered under Illinois law as “be-
yond the bounds of human decency ….” Lewis v. Sch. Dist.
# 70, 523 F.3d 730, 747 (7th Cir. 2008); see also R ESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF T ORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). Accordingly, they can-
not sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
17 Because we are reviewing this case on the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, we must assume that these statements
were made.

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