United States of America v. Nirav Patel

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 2, 2026
Decided June 17, 2026
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1936
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
NIRAV PATEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 23-CR-30076-SPM
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
ORDER
Nirav Patel was convicted after a jury trial of wire fraud and conspiracy to
commit wire fraud. Fearing that a jury would be biased against him, he requested a
bench trial, but the government did not consent, so the district court conducted a jury
trial. At trial, Patel objected to a jury instruction that he contended incorrectly stated the
law concerning vicarious liability. On appeal, Patel maintains that he was entitled to a
bench trial despite the government’s objection and that the jury instruction was
misleading. We affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1936 Page 2
In late 2022 and early 2023, Patel participated in a scheme to defraud at least
three elderly women in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. In each charged instance of the
scheme, an unknown person contacted the intended victim, identified himself as a
federal official, and told the victim that her money was being stolen and that to protect
it, she must deliver it into the temporary custody of federal agents. In some of the
fraudulent transactions, the purported official told the victim to gather cash or gold,
package it, and place the package inside a car driven by Patel. Patel was apprehended
twice during two separate sting operations. Both times, police extracted data from
Patel’s cell phone and found communications in which he and coconspirators discussed
plans for Patel to retrieve packages from the victims, and in which he received
directions to each of the victims’ homes.
Patel was then indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, see
18 U.S.C § 1349; three counts of wire fraud, see id. § 1343; and one count of illegal entry,
see 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2).*
At the outset of trial, Patel requested a bench trial pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “[i]f the defendant is entitled
to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless: (1) the defendant waives a jury trial in
writing; (2) the government consents; and (3) the court approves.” Patel notified the
district court that he intended to waive his right to a jury trial but the government had
withheld its consent. The district court noted the potential for Patel to be prejudiced if
he were tried by a jury, particularly because he would be testifying through a translator
and because he had “not followed the rules of decorum.” (The court did not specify
what conduct it was referring to.) After noting these concerns, the court asked the
government to provide a reasoned basis for withholding its consent to a bench trial. The
government expressed a desire to allow the victims to testify in front of a jury and
declined to elaborate further. Despite the court’s apparent misgivings, it found no
“extraordinary circumstances that would justify allowing the defendant to proceed to a
bench trial without the consent of the [g]overnment.”
Patel also objected to one of the government’s proffered jury instructions.
Instruction 26 was the final instruction concerning the conspiracy count:
A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit or
facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense. If conspirators have
* Patel, a noncitizen and Indian national, entered the country without inspection
in or around January 2022.

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No. 25-1936 Page 3
a plan that calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to
provide support, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.
Patel argued that this was an incomplete Pinkerton instruction that did not sufficiently
define the elements of vicarious liability for substantive offenses. The court overruled
the objection. The jury then convicted Patel of all counts.
On appeal, Patel first argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying him a bench trial. He contends that there was an unavoidable risk of prejudice
from a jury trial because key evidence—his communications with coconspirators and
his own testimony—were relayed to the jury through interpreters; because the
complexity of the case’s facts and the law of conspiracy made the case difficult for a
jury; and because the jury might be biased against him based on his ethnicity or their
sympathies toward the victims. Patel further suggests that because he made a showing
of unavoidable prejudice, the government had a burden to present a compelling reason
to withhold its consent, which it failed to do.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Patel’s request for a
bench trial. As Patel acknowledges, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to a
bench trial over the government’s objection. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36
(1965).
Nonetheless, Patel contends that, under his circumstances, a bench trial was
required. But there is no precedential authority identifying circumstances in which a
statute or the Constitution requires a bench trial rather than a jury trial. And this court
has rejected such a claim in the past. See United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 784 (7th Cir.
1991).
Although Patel argues that he faced a risk of bias, he does not argue that the jury
was actually biased. Patel also had the opportunity to probe the jurors for bias during
voir dire and, along with the court and the government, he asked the venire about most
of the anticipated risks of bias he discusses on appeal: prejudice against undocumented
immigrants; confusion from the use of interpreters; prejudice against scammers or
undue sympathy for the victims; and an inability to apply the law of conspiracy. There
was no dispute over which venirepersons should be struck for cause, and Patel did not
object to the composition of the jury.
Patel correctly notes that one unanticipated potential source of bias arose during
trial: news coverage of the arrest of a different man with Patel’s surname who

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No. 25-1936 Page 4
committed a similar crime. Patel brought that news to the court’s attention, and the
court agreed to modify its admonishments if defense counsel provided additional
instructions. But the record does not reflect that Patel asked for any additional
instructions, and he later agreed to the pattern jury instruction to disregard facts heard
outside of court.
As to Patel’s suggestion that that the government had a burden to justify denying
its consent, he is incorrect: the government has no obligation to “articulate its reasons
for demanding a jury trial at the time it refuses to consent to a defendant’s proffered
waiver.” Singer, 380 U.S. at 37.
Patel next argues that Instruction 26, concerning the conspiracy count, was
improper because the jury might have understood the instruction to explain how he
could be found vicariously liable for fraud based on the acts of his coconspirators. If
that were the case, he contends, the instruction would have been misleading because it
omitted the rule under Pinkerton v. United States that vicarious liability for substantive
offenses is limited to acts that were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant while he
was a member of a conspiracy. See 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946).
But this instruction did not create a risk of misleading the jury into finding him
vicariously liable for fraud. When reviewing whether an instruction is misleading, this
court assesses the instructions as a whole, affording the district court “substantial
discretion with respect to the precise wording.” See United States v. Christophel, 92 F.4th
723, 726–27 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Instruction 26 explicitly said it was defining the conditions for the existence of a
conspiracy. It also preceded an instruction that announced the court was turning to the
fraud counts. The context, therefore, makes clear that Instruction 26 applied to the
conspiracy count, not to the fraud counts. Patel does not contend that this instruction
misstated conspiracy law, so there is no basis to conclude that the district court erred by
including it.
AFFIRMED

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