Jumar A. House v. Jeffrey Wehking

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 23, 2026*
Decided June 24, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1702
JUMAR A. HOUSE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY WEHKING,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:24-cv-1169-JEH
Jonathan E. Hawley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jumar House, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his petition because
House’s claims—involving ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ex parte
communications after trial, waiver of his right to a jury trial, and actual innocence—
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1702 Page 2
were procedurally defaulted, and his evidence of actual innocence was not enough to
overcome that default. We agree and affirm.
I
In 2012, Norman Gates was shot outside a nightclub in Peoria, Illinois. Gates was
leaving the club with his friend Nicholas Pannell (and another friend) when a man
walked up to speak with them. The man then walked away. Just over a minute later, the
man returned and shot at Gates and his friends. Gates was wounded but survived.
Although Gates did not see the shooter, Pannell did. In an interview with police days
later, he said he recognized House as the man who shot Gates. He recognized House
because he had known him for nearly a decade. House was arrested and charged with
attempted murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a
felon. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), 5/8-4(a), 5/12-3.05(e)(1), 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2012).
House waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial. There,
Pannell testified that he recognized House as the shooter but was impeached on three
fronts: He (1) was a convicted felon awaiting sentencing; (2) did not like House; and (3)
made inconsistent statements to police, having first told officers that he was not at the
club the night of the shooting. To support Pannell’s testimony, the prosecution
presented two videos: surveillance video from a bar next to the night club and dash-
cam video of House during an (unrelated) traffic stop from the night of the shooting.
The surveillance video showed the shooter wearing a nondescript black coat and black
hat, and the dash-cam video showed House wearing the same.
The trial judge found House guilty on all charges. He explained that Pannell’s
credibility issues were overcome by the video evidence showing House wearing similar
clothing to the shooter and, in the judge’s view, having a similar stature and hair length.
Before sentencing, the lead detective approached the judge and thanked him for
convicting House. The judge responded that the comment was inappropriate and
informed both parties of the encounter. The judge retired soon after, so a different judge
handled House’s sentencing. That judge sentenced House to 33 years in prison.
House then sought review of his convictions and sentence. He first directly
appealed but was unsuccessful. People v. House, No. 3–13–0312, 2014 WL 3401109, at *1
(Ill. App. Ct. July 9, 2014) (House I). He did not seek review from the Illinois Supreme
Court. House then filed a state post-conviction petition, later supplemented by counsel,
asserting that he was actually innocent of the shooting and that Pannell had lied about

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No. 25-1702 Page 3
seeing him shoot Gates. His petition was summarily dismissed, but on appeal that
dismissal was reversed with instructions to hold a hearing on House’s claims. People v.
House, 152 N.E.3d 574, 580–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (House II).
At the hearing, House had three witnesses testify to his innocence: Kenwaun
Murray, Corey Hunter, and Mario Davis. After hearing their testimony, the
postconviction court concluded that they were not credible and rejected House’s claim
of innocence. The state appellate court affirmed. People v. House, 229 N.E.3d 945, 951
(Ill. App. Ct. 2023) (House III).
We detail the portions of the state courts’ reasoning that are relevant to this
appeal. Murray testified at the hearing that he spoke with Pannell two times after the
shooting. The first time, he and Pannell got into a fight at a bar, and the second time he
asked Pannell “why he lie[d]” about House’s involvement in the shooting. Pannell then
admitted to falsely accusing House to obtain a more lenient sentence in a then-pending
case. The state courts found Murray not credible because he is a felon and because “it is
not believable that Pannell would openly confess to Murray that Pannell had framed
Murray’s friend for attempted murder” when their first encounter was a bar fight.
Hunter testified at the hearing that he was outside the nightclub when the
shooting happened. He recounted that the shooter pulled up in a car next to him before
opening fire, so he was close enough to see the shooter’s face, but that he did not
recognize the shooter despite being “acquaintance[s]” with House. Hunter also testified
that he knew Pannell but did not see him during the shooting. The state courts found
Hunter not credible because the surveillance video showed the shooter on foot (never in
a car) and because he did not see Pannell (suggesting an “unconvincing” and
“selective” identification).
Davis testified at the hearing that he also was outside the nightclub when the
shooting happened. He said that he saw the shooter’s face and it was not House, who
he had seen around before. The state courts found Davis not credible because he
admitted to having a “few” beers and smoking marijuana before the shooting; failed to
come forward for over two years despite knowing of House’s conviction; and gave a
“panicky, stuttering answer” when asked about the delay on direct examination.
After the state appellate court affirmed the denial of his postconviction petition,
House sought review from the Illinois Supreme Court. He raised only a freestanding
claim of actual innocence. The court declined to review his case. People v. House,
232 N.E.3d 22 (Ill. 2024) (Table).

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II
House then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. In his pro se petition, he raised four claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for
not investigating and cross-examining Pannell about his pending plea agreement; (2)
the trial judge’s communication with the detective after trial violated House’s right to
due process; (3) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial; and
(4) he is actually innocent of the shooting.
The district court received a response from the state and denied House’s petition.
It concluded that House’s first three claims were procedurally defaulted because he had
not sought review of those claims in the Illinois Supreme Court. The court continued
that House’s evidence of actual innocence was not enough to overcome that default.
The court explained that House’s innocence turned on the credibility of his three
witnesses but that the state courts had reasonably determined their testimony was not
credible. Thus, House failed to show that it was more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have convicted him. Because House’s evidence of actual innocence was not
enough to overcome procedural default, the court determined that his standalone claim
of actual innocence also failed.
Despite denying House’s petition, the district court concluded that reasonable
jurists could debate whether he had satisfied the actual innocence exception and
whether a freestanding actual innocence claim could proceed. So it granted House a
certificate of appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and House appealed.
III
House first challenges the district court’s determination that he has not presented
evidence of actual innocence sufficient to excuse his procedural default. A state
prisoner’s procedural default may be excused if he presents evidence that he is actually
innocent, meaning “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). To satisfy this standard, he must
present “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Id. at 324. Because the
Illinois courts’ assessments of the credibility of House’s eyewitnesses are entitled to
deference, House must demonstrate that those assessments were wrong by clear and
convincing evidence. See Coleman v. Lemke, 739 F.3d 342, 349, 351 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)); Nichols v. Wiersma, 108 F.4th 545, 557 (7th Cir. 2024). After that,

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we review de novo whether House’s credible evidence proves actual innocence. Wilson
v. Cromwell, 69 F.4th 410, 418 (7th Cir. 2023).
We agree with the district court that House has not presented evidence of actual
innocence sufficient to overcome his procedural default. House insists that the state
courts’ credibility determinations were wrong, but he has presented no clear and
convincing evidence that the assessments were erroneous. The state courts reasonably
concluded that Murray was not credible when he testified that Pannell admitted that he
had falsely accused House. This was a significant confession and purportedly made to a
man who Pannell had previously gotten into a bar fight with, not a trusted confidant.
For Hunter, jurors could readily find that he was mistaken about the car—the video was
inconclusive—and doubt his view or recollection because he did not see Pannell. And
Davis was intoxicated when he witnessed the shooting and failed to come forward with
his purportedly exonerating evidence for years.
House argues that despite any problems with the eyewitness testimony,
Pannell’s testimony also was not credible. To be sure, Panell admitted that he disliked
House and was facing sentencing on felony charges. But Pannell’s testimony was not
incredible. See Dixon v. Williams, 93 F.4th 394, 405 (7th Cir. 2024) (jury may still believe
key witness despite significant credibility issues). He saw the shooting, and his
identification of House was corroborated, to some degree, by the videos, showing the
shooter wearing similar clothes to House and with a similar stature and hair length.
House makes much of Pannell’s undisclosed plea deal but this changes little in our
view. See McDowell v. Lemke, 737 F.3d 476, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[L]atter-day
impeachment evidence seldom, if ever, makes a clear and convincing showing that no
reasonable juror would have believed the heart of the witness’s account.” (cleaned up)
(citation omitted)). The transcript of Pannell’s plea hearing does not suggest that he was
offered leniency for testifying against House. Moreover, Pannell testified at trial that he
was awaiting sentencing, and from that a factfinder could infer that he might want to
curry favor with the prosecution.
House urges that some of the state courts’ reasons for disbelieving his witnesses
and crediting Pannell rest on flimsy logic. If Murray was not a credible witness of
House’s innocence because of his felon status, House argues, then Pannell—a felon
himself—cannot be a credible witness of House’s guilt. For Hunter, House identifies
that the surveillance video captures only one side of the street and does not show where
the shooter came from or went after the shooting. Thus, House insists, it is possible that
a car was not captured by the video. Davis’s nervousness while testifying, House

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continues, is not evidence of deceit but rather the natural response of someone
intimidated by the court system and interrogated by a prosecutor.
Despite these criticisms, a state court’s factual determination is not unworthy of
deference merely because we could have viewed the evidence differently in the first
instance. Nichols, 108 F.4th at 557 (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013)). For the
reasons already explained, there was enough reason to doubt House’s witnesses such
that the state courts’ credibility determinations were not beyond “the boundaries of
permissible differences of opinion.” See Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 800 (7th Cir.
2011) (affirming denial of habeas petition where state court rejected “more plausible”
factual account in favor of less plausible but still reasonable account) (quoting
Starkweather v. Smith, 574 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Without credible testimony from eyewitnesses contradicting Pannell’s testimony,
House has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no juror would have
convicted him. He would need something more, like “exonerating DNA evidence,
record of incarceration at the time of the crime, video evidence of [House] in a faraway
location, or other evidence.” See Dixon, 93 F.4th at 405. But that does not exist here to
overcome this swearing match between witnesses. See id.
We next turn to House’s freestanding claim of actual innocence. Although the
Supreme Court has never recognized a freestanding claim of actual innocence, if such a
claim were recognized it would require a more compelling demonstration of innocence
than we require to overcome procedural default. See Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S.
____, 146 S. Ct. 1292, 1306 (2026) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993));
Dixon, 93 F.4th at 406. Because House has not sufficiently proven his innocence to
bypass default, his freestanding claim also fails.
Finally, we note that House raises two new claims on appeal. He asserts that the
state violated his rights by not disclosing Pannell’s plea deal, see Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). But House did not raise these claims in
the district court, so they are waived on appeal. See Jannke v. Gierach, 159 F.4th 517, 522
(7th Cir. 2025).
AFFIRMED

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