Russia Brown v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY and AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION , LOCAL 241

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1750
R USSIA BROWN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C HICAGO TRANSIT A UTHORITY and A MALGAMATED TRANSIT
U NION , LOCAL 241,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22-cv-675 — Georgia N. Alexakis, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 14, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 24, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE, SCUDDER , and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. E VE, Circuit Judge. Russia Brown took leave from work
on two dozen occasions without properly informing his em-
ployer, the Chicago Transit Authority (the “CTA”). The CTA
then terminated Brown notwithstanding his union’s objec-
tions. Brown subsequently filed suit against the CTA and the
union, alleging transgender discrimination and retaliation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as well as violations of

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2 No. 25-1750
the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Because Brown
failed to show evidence supporting his claims, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the CTA and to
the union.
I. Background
The CTA hired Russia Brown in 2016 as a bus operator,
and Brown enjoyed representation by a union, Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 241.1 Brown historically identified as a
woman, but by 2017 he began identifying as a man. During
his transition, he asked a union representative to clarify the
CTA’s bathroom policy. That union representative referred
him to a CTA manager, Gregory Middleton. Brown met with
CTA management and learned he could use whichever bath-
room he wanted. According to Middleton, union president
Keith Hill spoke to Middleton and compared Brown’s request
to an employee seeking accommodation for a disability.
The following year, Brown asked a union representative
about insurance coverage for a procedure relevant to his tran-
sition that his CTA insurance plan denied. The union repre-
sentative rebuffed Brown’s request for help. Brown then en-
gaged the American Civil Liberties Union to pressure the CTA
to expand its insurance coverage, and shortly thereafter the
CTA expanded its insurance coverage to include the proce-
dures Brown needed.
Also in 2018, Brown experienced online harassment from
fellow employees. The harassment did not explicitly reference
Brown’s transgender identity, but Brown reported the
1 As the summary judgment standard requires, we recount these facts
in the light most favorable to Brown, the non-moving party.

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No. 25-1750 3
harassment to a union representative. Brown related the inci-
dent to the CTA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Unit, but
he did not file a grievance with the union.
Two years later, in June 2020, Brown began reporting to a
new work location at a garage on the south side of Chicago.
Shortly after this transfer, Brown encountered Hill, the union
president, at the garage. In comments Hill recalled as warning
Brown that passengers on the south side of Chicago can be
more aggressive, Hill told Brown, “all that bitchin you been
doing ain’t going to cut it down here. You’re out south now.”
Around that period, on June 9, Brown applied for inter-
mittent leave under the FMLA for “random back pains” not
related to his gender identity. The FMLA entitles qualifying
employees up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year, see 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a), and an employee may use leave intermit-
tently when medically necessary, see § 2612(b)(1).
The CTA uses a third-party, ReedGroup, to administer
FMLA leave for its employees. ReedGroup both manages the
FMLA application process and tracks employees’ use of their
allotment of intermittent leave. Because ReedGroup tracks
employees’ use of leave, an employee who wants to use his
leave on a given day is required to first request that leave
through ReedGroup. An employee may afterwards inform his
work location of his absence and use of FMLA leave. The CTA
and the union related this requirement to employees, and
when Brown had previously enjoyed FMLA leave he com-
plied with this reporting requirement. If an employee only re-
ported his use of FMLA leave to his work location, the em-
ployee would enjoy an absence from work without detracting
from his available leave—conduct the CTA considers falsifi-
cation of FMLA leave. To ensure compliance, the CTA asked

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4 No. 25-1750
managers to cross-reference ReedGroup records with work
location records.
Brown heard back from ReedGroup the same day he ap-
plied for leave. Specifically, ReedGroup requested medical
certification to support Brown’s application. Brown could ob-
tain this initial medical certification from a healthcare profes-
sional of his choosing. Depending on the certification the ap-
plicant provides, ReedGroup sometimes requires a second
medical opinion from a medical provider it selects. And if the
first and second medical opinions disagree, ReedGroup may
require a third medical opinion from a specialist jointly ap-
proved by the employee and the CTA. The FMLA outlines this
process. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c)–(d).
Brown submitted a medical certification from a chiroprac-
tor attesting to Brown’s qualification for intermittent FMLA
leave. ReedGroup was familiar with the chiropractor, because
he had submitted FMLA certifications for CTA employees
with unusual frequency and often opined outside of his spe-
cialty. Consistent with its general practice when it received
certifications from that chiropractor, ReedGroup requested
Brown obtain a second medical opinion.
In July 2020, Brown met with an orthopedist to obtain a
second medical opinion. The orthopedist concluded that
Brown was not qualified for FMLA leave.
To resolve the disagreement between the two medical
opinions, ReedGroup’s vendor sent Brown a letter with in-
structions on scheduling an appointment to obtain a third
medical opinion. The vendor also called Brown to set up the
appointment. Brown did not respond. If an employee is unco-
operative in obtaining a third opinion, ReedGroup relies on

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No. 25-1750 5
the second opinion. Eventually, in December 2020, Reed-
Group deferred to the second medical opinion and denied
Brown’s application for FMLA leave.
As Brown’s FMLA application languished, Brown called
in FMLA absences to his work location without reporting
them to ReedGroup. By October 2020, Brown had accumu-
lated twenty-four days in which he reported FMLA leave to
his work location without contacting ReedGroup. That
month, a business manager at Brown’s work location, Wilmer
DeJesus, noticed the discrepancy between CTA and Reed-
Group records on Brown’s FMLA-related absences and con-
tacted ReedGroup to confirm Brown failed to properly report
his use of FMLA leave. DeJesus also noted that when Brown
previously used FMLA leave he had properly reported his ab-
sences. A CTA manager took Brown out of service, and, in a
meeting with DeJesus the following day, Brown could not ex-
plain why he had failed to report his FMLA leave to Reed-
Group. DeJesus therefore recommended to his supervisor
that Brown be discharged for falsification.
Brown worked with the union to stave off discharge. He
spoke multiple times with Hill and union representatives
about keeping his job. Brown sought extra time to contest his
dismissal and asked a union representative to request a “no-
tice of further investigation,” which suspends the general re-
quirement that the CTA take disciplinary action within ten
days of notifying an employee of misconduct. After union
representatives met with CTA management, the CTA agreed
to issue such a notice for Brown.
Brown also sought a “last chance agreement,” which per-
mits an employee to avoid discharge by instead entering a
form of probationary reinstatement. Hill requested CTA

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6 No. 25-1750
management grant Brown such an agreement. The CTA re-
buffed this request.
A CTA official recalled that in a conversation with Hill
during this period, Hill mentioned Brown had come to the
union’s offices and acted “braggartly” by expressing “that he
wasn’t working and that CTA couldn’t do anything to him as
a result.”
On January 7, 2021, DeJesus’s supervisor, Arlana Johnson,
discharged Brown for falsification; her letter recited Brown’s
twenty-four absences and his failure to report them to Reed-
Group. Around that time, CTA management at Brown’s gar-
age discharged four other bus operators for FMLA falsifica-
tion, none of whom were transgender. Hill was similarly un-
successful in persuading the CTA to offer those employees a
last chance agreement.
Brown worked with the union to challenge his termina-
tion. Union officials helped Brown submit to the CTA a griev-
ance for wrongful discharge. Hill, unaware of the grievance,
wrote in an email to Brown two days later, “Can you come in
or meet with your Rep to file a grievance that is your next step
and you can add all your supporting information to the griev-
ances.” After the CTA denied Brown’s grievance, the union
sent a letter signed by Hill requesting arbitration for Brown’s
grievance, along with twenty-six others. The union also filed
a class action grievance challenging the FMLA-related sus-
pension and discharge of employees, including Brown.
Brown’s grievance has remained in a backlog of griev-
ances pending arbitration that are addressed chronologically,
with 184 pending discharge grievances as of January 2023.
Grievances preceding Brown’s include those from seven

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No. 25-1750 7
employees discharged for FMLA falsification in the months
preceding Brown’s termination. The union’s class action
grievance is also pending arbitration.
In April 2021, Brown filed discrimination charges against
the union and the CTA with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission. After receiving notice of his right to sue,
Brown brought suit against the CTA and the union. Against
both parties, he claimed gender identity-based discrimination
and retaliation under Title VII. Against the CTA alone, he
brought interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA
as well as a claim for municipal liability on the grounds that
the CTA’s sex-based discrimination violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
Ultimately, the district court granted the defendants’ mo-
tions for summary judgment and entered judgment in their
favor in two separate opinions. The court concluded Brown
failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find in his favor on any of his claims. Brown’s lack
of evidence, the court noted, stemmed in part from his fail-
ure to properly present supporting evidence through filings
under Local Rule 56.1. Brown appeals.
II. Discussion
Before we reach the merits of the district court’s summary
judgment rulings, we resolve Brown’s challenges to the scope
of evidence the court considered. These concern the court’s
conclusions that Brown violated Local Rule 56.1 and that
some evidence Brown advanced was inadmissible. We review
both rulings for an abuse of discretion. Cracco v. Vitran Ex-
press, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2009).

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8 No. 25-1750
We begin with Brown’s violations of the local rules. Brown
asserted facts in summary judgment filings without support-
ive, on-point citations, and claims the district court should
have reviewed the record itself for proper substantiating evi-
dence rather than ignore his factual assertions. We disagree.
Properly substantiating assertions is a basic legal obliga-
tion. Doing so takes on a particular form and importance for
the plaintiff at summary judgement. “Summary judgment is
the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in litigation.” Delapaz v. Rich-
ardson, 634 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Goodman v. Nat’l
Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010)). This stage
asks a court to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof
in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial,”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s
note to 1963 amendment). As part of this inquiry, Brown had
the burden to “designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586
(2009) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986)).
Federal and local rules enforce a substantiation require-
ment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that on a
motion for summary judgment, a party asserting a fact “must
support the assertion” with citation “to particular parts of ma-
terials in the record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), without which
the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of
the motion,” id. (e)(2). The relevant local rule echoes this re-
quirement. It instructs that absent a citation to “specific evi-
dentiary material,” the court may “disregard” a factual asser-
tion or “deem[] admitted” the fact the party purports to dis-
pute. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(d)(2), (e)(3).

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No. 25-1750 9
Brown does not contest his citation practices violated the
local rules. Instead, Brown argues the court used minor cita-
tion errors as a “technical trap” to justify ignoring the eviden-
tiary record. These contentions misunderstand the court’s de-
cision and Brown’s own responsibility to properly present
facts negating summary judgment.
First, Brown asserts the district court’s order was dispro-
portionate because it “declared global non-compliance” so as
to disregard any record evidence supporting his claims, in-
cluding evidence to which he properly cited.
This is wrong. The district court disregarded Brown’s re-
sponses and assertions only “where Brown has failed to com-
ply with the[] rules.” Contrary to the “global” exclusion
Brown claims, the district court addressed each instance in
which it would not accept Brown’s dispute of a factual asser-
tion and provided a sound explanation for its decision. Nor
did the district court disregard his properly substantiated fac-
tual assertions. In fact, the court incorporated Brown’s sup-
ported facts into its analysis and at one point sua sponte lo-
cated possible record evidence that might support Brown’s
factual assertion notwithstanding his failure to provide a rel-
evant citation. The district court’s response was tailored, not
disproportionate.
Brown misunderstands his burden to properly present ev-
idence in arguing the district court ignored supportive record
evidence to which he did not cite. As we have explained, “[i]t
is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of
evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather,
the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying
the evidence upon which he relies.” Harney v. Speedway Super-
America, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing

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10 No. 25-1750
Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th
Cir. 1996)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect this
allocation of responsibility by providing that “[t]he court
need consider only the cited materials ….” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3).
This principle is particularly salient in employment dis-
crimination cases, where litigation is “extremely fact-inten-
sive,” and the court cannot be made to play “a game of hunt
the peanut.” Burton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851
F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of
Chi., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001)). Or to draw on another
metaphor we have frequently invoked, “[j]udges are not like
pigs, hunting for truffles buried [in the record].” Gross v. Cic-
ero, 619 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2010) (second alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
With Brown’s misunderstandings resolved, what remains
is Brown’s recognition his filings violated Local Rule 56.1 and
that district courts have the discretion to strictly enforce local
rules. See Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d
948, 956 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880,
886–87 (7th Cir. 2011)). The court’s enforcement of Local Rule
56.1 was well within its discretion.
We next turn to the court’s more conventional evidentiary
ruling. Brown argues the court erred by excluding as hearsay
three statements that he argues were admissible as statements
of a party-opponent. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). The three
statements are: 1) Middleton’s testimony he heard Hill com-
pare Brown to a disabled driver, 2) Lunde’s testimony Hill
told her Brown had acted “braggartly,” and 3) Hill’s com-
ments on health insurance in an online video.

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No. 25-1750 11
Brown’s argument cannot succeed because he challenges
a phantom ruling. The three statements he identifies were not
at issue in the district court’s evidentiary ruling, which con-
cerned other statements Brown does not reference in his
opening brief. In fact, the court discussed the first two state-
ments Brown identifies in its assessment of whether Brown’s
evidence showed a genuine dispute for trial. And Brown did
not raise the third statement he identifies in his briefing op-
posing summary judgment.
True, even if the district court did not exclude Hill’s com-
ments in the online video, it did exclude testimony from Mid-
dleton characterizing Hill’s comments. Yet Brown made clear
in his opening brief that he sought the admission of Hill’s
statement itself—the statement the district court never ex-
cluded. Nor is Brown able to overcome this error by raising
the court’s exclusion of Middleton’s testimony in his reply
brief, as Brown waived the claim by failing to raise it in his
opening brief. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th
887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
With the evidentiary issues aside, we now turn to the dis-
trict court’s entry of judgment on Brown’s claims. “We review
a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, view-
ing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Tackett v. Dauss, 132 F.4th 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2025)
(citing Trahanas v. Northwestern Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 852 (7th
Cir. 2023)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Trahanas,
64 F.4th at 852). “[T]he moving party may succeed by show-
ing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s
claims.” Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 597 (7th Cir.

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12 No. 25-1750
2020) (quoting Parkey v. Sample, 623 F.3d 1163, 1165 (7th Cir.
2010)). Additionally, “generalized and unsupported allega-
tions cannot create a genuine dispute.” Anderson v. Mott St.,
104 F.4th 646, 651 (7th Cir. 2024).
A. Claims Against the CTA
We first address Brown’s claims against the CTA, begin-
ning with his Title VII claims.
1. Title VII Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is “un-
lawful … for an employer … to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual … because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Title VII’s scope covers an
employer’s discriminatory action against a transgender em-
ployee because sex plays a “necessary and undisguisable role
in th[at] decision.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 652
(2020).
At summary judgment, the court ultimately considers
whether the evidence as a whole “would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s … sex … caused the
discharge or other adverse employment action.” Ortiz v. Wer-
ner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016); accord Lewis
v. Indiana Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2022). “To
help answer this question, a plaintiff may,” as Brown does
here, “invoke the well-known McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework.” Saud v. DePaul Univ., 154 F.4th 563, 567
(7th Cir. 2025); see Anderson, 104 F.4th at 652 (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Brown must
make out the four elements of a prima facie case: “(1) he is a

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No. 25-1750 13
member of a protected class; (2) he met his employer’s legiti-
mate job expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of the
protected class were treated more favorably.” Wince v. CBRE,
Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Dunlevy v.
Langfelder, 52 F.4th 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2022)). If a plaintiff sup-
ports a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the ad-
verse employment action,” after which “[t]he burden then
shifts back to the employee to show why the employer’s ex-
planation is pretextual.” Saud, 154 F.4th at 567 (quoting Lewis,
36 F.4th at 760). Given the potential for issues across stages to
overlap, we may, as we do here, “run through that analysis
only once,” with our “true goal” in mind of determining
whether the evidence as a whole would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude Brown’s gender identity caused his ter-
mination. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d
565, 574 (7th Cir. 2021); see Upchurch v. Indiana, 146 F.4th 579,
587–88 (7th Cir. 2025).
The district court concluded Brown failed to show a valid
comparator and that the CTA had legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory, and nonpretextual reasons for terminating Brown.
Brown presses his showing of a valid comparator and pretext
on appeal, but his arguments do nothing to undermine the
district court’s sound reasoning.
We begin with the valid comparator. Under that prong, a
plaintiff must produce evidence from which a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude “another similarly situated employee
who wasn’t in the protected class was treated better by the
[employer].” Marshall v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 789,
791–92 (7th Cir. 2020). That comparator “must be directly

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14 No. 25-1750
comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects,” Anderson,
104 F.4th at 653 (quoting Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846
(7th Cir. 2012)), something a plaintiff typically shows through
evidence the comparator fell under the same supervisor, was
subject to the same standards, and engaged in similar conduct
without differentiating circumstances, id. (quoting Coleman,
667 F.3d at 847).
Brown claims he identified other bus operators accused of
FMLA reporting violations who were not discharged. Yet, as
below, he never identifies those comparators or shows they
qualify as comparable. Instead, he cites the same statement of
fact the district court deemed inadequate. All that statement
provided to support a valid comparator was: “Alisha Latham
Hill issued a last chance agreement for Operator Winston.” As
the district court noted, this was insufficient because it omits
critical information required for a jury to find “Operator Win-
ston” as a valid comparator, including whether Winston is
transgender and whether Winston committed FMLA report-
ing violations.
We also agree with the district court’s finding that the CTA
had legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual rea-
sons for terminating Brown. Brown argues that the CTA used
his twenty-four absences as pretext to conceal its discrimina-
tory motive for firing him. To support this, he claims the CTA
“cancelled” his third medical examination and that DeJesus
flouted a CTA policy requiring he reconcile FMLA absences
on a weekly basis. But the district court correctly rejected both
claims right out of the gate because Brown failed to point to
record material supporting either assertion. Specifically, his
assertions either failed to cite to the record at all or pointed to

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No. 25-1750 15
irrelevant testimony. Nor does Brown remedy this deficiency
on appeal.
Brown marshals some record evidence, but it does not
support a reasonable inference that the CTA’s “explanations
are a pretext for the prohibited animus.” Chatman v. Bd. of
Educ. of Chi., 5 F.4th 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Hitchcock
v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 740 (7th Cir. 2013)). “Pretext
is ‘[a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some action….’’” Up-
church, 146 F.4th at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Napier
v. Orchard Sch. Found., 137 F.4th 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2025)).
Brown notes that CTA guidelines included as examples of
conduct supporting serious discipline, “making untrue, dis-
honest or misleading reports (falsification).” Brown claims
this sets out an intent requirement the CTA failed to meet in
discharging him. But this presents an argument merely assert-
ing “faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the
employer,” id. (quoting Napier, 137 F.4th at 892), not an argu-
ment the CTA’s reasoning was disingenuous, as required to
support pretext. The pretext standard similarly disposes of
Brown’s attention to DeJesus transcribing the twenty-four
dates on which Brown violated CTA policies on an outdated
FMLA form. Brown does not explain how DeJesus’s use of
this form undermines those violations as sincerely motivating
the CTA’s decision to discharge him.
Brown’s case fails under McDonnell Douglas, and though
he claims the result is different if we assess his evidence in
aggregate, we disagree. Brown fails to provide evidence sup-
porting a reasonable inference the CTA fired him because of
his gender identity.
Sex-based discrimination also forms the basis of Brown’s
claim for municipal liability under the Equal Protection

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16 No. 25-1750
Clause, which is subject to the same standard as his Title VII
claim. See Word v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 391, 397 n.4 (7th Cir.
2020). Therefore, Brown’s failure to support a discrimination
claim under Title VII disposes of his claim for municipal lia-
bility based on the CTA’s actions.
2. Title VII Retaliation
Brown also claims that the CTA fired him because of his
advocacy for transgender employees. “Title VII prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating against an employee ‘because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter ….’” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959 (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). To survive summary judgment,
Brown must show evidence of “(1) a statutorily protected ac-
tivity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the employer;
and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Abebe v. Health
and Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., 35 F.4th 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 404 (7th
Cir. 2007)).
Ultimately, we consider the evidence as a whole and the
“inquiry comes down to one question: ‘Does the record con-
tain sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable fact finder to
conclude that retaliatory motive caused’ the materially ad-
verse action?” Lesiv v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 39 F.4th 903, 911 (7th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d
556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016)).
The parties do not dispute Brown satisfied the first ele-
ment through his bathroom inquiry in 2017 and his campaign
for broader insurance coverage in 2018. Nor do they dispute
Brown’s 2021 discharge constituted a materially adverse ac-
tion. In ruling against Brown, the district court found he

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No. 25-1750 17
lacked evidence of a causal connection between his advocacy
and his discharge, and in doing so noted the long temporal
gap and undisputed evidence the decisionmaker over
Brown’s discharge, Arlana Johnson, was not aware of his past
advocacy. See Anderson, 104 F.4th at 655 (“The decisionmaker
… must be aware of the protected activity to establish a causal
connection.”).
Brown attempts to dispute Johnson’s status as the relevant
decisionmaker and instead asserts that the same people who
opposed his protected activity participated in the investiga-
tion leading to his discharge. But Brown never identifies those
people and provides no citations to substantiate his assertion.
So, like the district court, we reject empty assertions offered
to support a triable issue of fact.2 See id. at 651.
What remains is Brown’s claim that the timing of events
creates a reasonable inference the CTA fired him because of
his protected activity. Recognizing the difficulty of this infer-
ence from a multi-year gap, Brown seeks to shrink this period
to six months given comments from union president Hill at
the CTA garage warning Brown that he had to stop “bitchin.”
How this relates to an inference the CTA acted with a retalia-
tory motive, however, Brown does not explain—a critical link.
See Scaife v. Cook County, 446 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“When a plaintiff offers an employer‘s stray remark in a
2 We note that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure impose on
Brown an obligation to include in his brief “citations to the authorities and
parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(8)(A). Counsel’s citation practices on appeal and before the district
court should serve as a reminder of the importance of adequately substan-
tiating assertions made to a court.

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18 No. 25-1750
discrimination case, it is necessary to demonstrate ‘some
nexus’ between the remark and the challenged employment
decision.”), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. Tangherlini, 724
F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013).
In any event, Brown ventures on weak ground in relying
on timing alone. We have indicated suspicious timing alone
as either “rarely enough to create a triable issue,” Igasaki, 988
F.3d at 959 (quoting Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420,
427 (7th Cir. 2009)), or as simply “not enough,” Abebe, 35 F.4th
at 608.
But we need not resolve any tension in our caselaw on this
point because Brown is far from benefitting from even the
more permissive rule. Where we have accepted the possibility
of timing in supporting an inference of causation, we indi-
cated this extends to “no more than a few days … between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at
959 (quoting Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir.
2012)). Even if we considered a six-month gap, that would be
far from “a few days.”
Here, the multi-year gap between Brown’s protected ac-
tivity and his firing is far from “suspicious,” and the “substan-
tial time lapse between [the] protected activity and the ad-
verse action is counter-evidence of any causal connection.”
Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Johnson v. Univ. of Wis.–Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir.
1995)). This temporal gap alone does not provide a reasonable
inference of causation. Brown fails to present any additional
evidence that could support a causal link. As we have ex-
plained, “[i]f the best a plaintiff can do is allege that he en-
gaged in protected activity and then, years later, the employer
took an adverse action against him, the claim may not be

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No. 25-1750 19
permitted to proceed.” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d
819, 828 (7th Cir. 2014).
3. FMLA Interference and Retaliation
We next turn to Brown’s claims that the CTA interfered
with the exercise of his rights under the FMLA and retaliated
against him for exercising those rights. We affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the CTA on both claims
because, as above, Brown fails to show any error in the district
court’s reasoning.
We begin with FMLA interference. Under the FMLA, it is
“unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or
deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right pro-
vided.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The district court rested its de-
cision on Brown’s failure to show needed evidence he “was
entitled to leave under the FMLA,” Hickey v. Protective Life
Corp., 988 F.3d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Burnett v. LFW
Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006)), because Brown did not
complete the required third medical assessment. And federal
regulations provide that “[i]f the employee does not attempt
in good faith to reach agreement [on a third health care pro-
vider], the employee will be bound by the second certifica-
tion.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(c) (2026).
Brown claims this was wrong because the CTA “ob-
structed” him from obtaining the third medical opinion by
ceasing communication with him before ultimately cancelling
his appointment. The district court addressed Brown’s claim
he repeatedly communicated his difficulty scheduling the
third appointment, but found the statements inconsistent
with the evidentiary material Brown cited. And because those
assertions were responses to the CTA’s properly

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20 No. 25-1750
substantiated assertions that it had informed Brown by mail
and telephone of the procedures for scheduling a third medi-
cal appointment, communications to which Brown failed to
timely respond, the court deemed those statements admitted.
On appeal, Brown provides no substantiation for most of
his assertions, including that the CTA cancelled his appoint-
ment. He therefore does not show that he produced the evi-
dence he describes. And the two assertions for which Brown
does include citations make no difference. One references a
statement of fact indicating Brown called to schedule a third
appointment after his months of inaction led to the CTA’s use
of the second opinion finding Brown did not qualify for inter-
mittent leave. The other relies on a statement of fact the court
deemed admitted indicating Brown had not responded to ef-
forts to schedule a third appointment.
Brown also argues on appeal that the CTA retaliated
against him for exercising his rights under the FMLA. In do-
ing so, he ignores the district court’s ruling that he forfeited
this claim by failing to develop it in his briefing. Therefore,
Brown presents no grounds for upsetting the district court’s
ruling. See Anderson v. United Airlines, Inc., 140 F.4th 385, 389
(7th Cir. 2025) (“Because Plaintiffs’ appeal does not engage
with the district court’s finding of forfeiture, we affirm the
reasoning of the district court.”).
B. Claims Against the Union
Having resolved Brown’s claims against the CTA, we now
turn to Brown’s claims against the union. He contends that
the union discriminated against him because of his
transgender identity and that the union retaliated against him
for protected activity. He brings both claims under Title VII.

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No. 25-1750 21
1. Title VII Discrimination
Title VII “applies to unions as well as to employers.” Green
v. Am. Fed’n of Tchrs./Illinois Fed’n of Tchrs. Loc. 604, 740 F.3d
1104, 1104 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)). A un-
ion violates Title VII’s bar on discrimination when “it discrim-
inates in the performance of its agency function.” E.E.O.C. v.
Pipefitters Ass’n Loc. Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir.
2003); accord Maalik v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, Loc.
2, 437 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2006); see Green, 740 F.3d at 1107.
The district court found Brown failed to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the union treated Brown
differently. See Bostock, 590 U.S. at 681 (“As used in Title VII,
the term ‘”discriminate against”’ refers to ‘distinctions or dif-
ferences in treatment that injure protected individuals.’”
(quoting Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 59 (2006))). The court therefore did not reach whether the
union’s actions were materially adverse or were motivated by
Brown’s gender identity.
Brown claims the union took adverse action against him
by failing to request a last chance agreement or file a griev-
ance. But Brown makes the same error on appeal he made be-
low: none of the citations he provides indicate the union de-
clined to file a grievance or request a last chance agreement.
Brown seems to argue that Hill’s description of him as
“braggartly” constituted an adverse action insofar as it “rein-
forced” the CTA’s prior decision to terminate him. This theory
impliedly asks us to recognize both that a comment itself can
constitute an adverse action and conclude that the comment
was “materially harmful” to Brown. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at
68. But we need not reach these issues because Brown never

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22 No. 25-1750
raised this comment in advancing his Title VII discrimination
claim against the union below, much less identified the com-
ment as an adverse action. Brown thereby waived his argu-
ment. See Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897.
2. Title VII Retaliation
Brown also claims that Hill’s description of him as “brag-
gartly” to a CTA official constituted unlawful retaliation for
his past advocacy.
Title VII makes it unlawful “for a labor organization to dis-
criminate against any member … because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub-
chapter.” § 2000e–3(a). To survive summary judgment on a
Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff “must show evidence of
‘(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse ac-
tion taken by the [labor organization]; and (3) a causal con-
nection between the two.’” Abebe, 35 F.4th at 607 (quoting
Humphries, 474 F.3d at 404). To meet the causation prong, a
plaintiff must show “that his or her protected activity was a
but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
The district court rested its rejection of this claim mainly
on the basis that Brown failed to show evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer Hill would not have made the
“braggartly” comment but-for Brown’s prior advocacy. We
agree.
Brown argues on appeal that the “close temporal proxim-
ity and coordinated conduct” of Hill’s comments and De-
Jesus’s October 2020 audit “link[] the Union’s president di-
rectly to the employer’s adverse action.” Brown thus switches
to identifying CTA actions rather than Hill’s “braggartly”

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No. 25-1750 23
comment as the retaliatory conduct by the union. But even if
this claim were cognizable and not waived, Brown points to
no evidence of “coordinated conduct” supporting this infer-
ence. And even if Brown could shrink a two- to three-year gap
between protected activity and the allegedly adverse action to
months, the monthslong gaps persists; Brown still would not
present a gap close to “no more than a few days.” Igasaki, 988
F.3d at 959 (quoting Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966). We agree with
the district court that this was not enough to support a rea-
sonable inference of causation.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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