United States of America v. Brian Johnson

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
BRIAN J OHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 19-cr-00405 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED MAY 14, 2026 — D ECIDED J UNE 26, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE , SCUDDER , and ST . EVE , Circuit Judges.
S T . EVE , Circuit Judge. Brian Johnson fraudulently prom-
ised at least 128 women future compensation and lucrative
work opportunities. His lies tricked these women into meet-
ing with him, posing for nude photographs, and having sex
with him. One of his victims was underage. Based on this con-
duct, a jury convicted Johnson of seven sex trafficking counts
and three child pornography counts. After trial, Johnson
moved for acquittal, which the district court denied as to the

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2 Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
sex trafficking convictions but granted as to the child pornog-
raphy convictions. It then sentenced Johnson to 420 months’
imprisonment. Johnson and the government filed cross-ap-
peals from the district court’s decision, and Johnson also ap-
peals his sentence. We affirm the district court’s decision
denying Johnson’s motion for acquittal as to the sex traffick-
ing convictions and reverse its decision granting his motion
for acquittal as to the child pornography convictions. Accord-
ingly, we remand so the district court may conduct a full re-
sentencing consistent with our decision.
I. Background
In 2019, a grand jury indicted Brian Johnson on sex traf-
ficking and child pornography charges. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591,
2252A. The charges stemmed from a yearslong scheme John-
son began in 2010 in which he posed as the CEO and several
employees of a fake adult film, photography, and art studio.
Johnson posted advertisements on Craigslist, soliciting adult
women to “audition” for opportunities to appear in adult
films. When women responded to his advertisements, John-
son communicated with them as both the male CEO of the
company and separately as a fake female employee. Through
these communications, Johnson would require the women to
“audition” by meeting with him in person. In return, he
promised financial compensation, long-term lucrative model-
ing contracts, exposure to adult film companies, and other
work opportunities.
At these “auditions,” Johnson gave the women alcohol, en-
couraged them to “follow his lead,” took nude photographs
and videos of them, and had sex with them. Following the
“auditions,” Johnson would tell the women he had submitted
their photographs and videos to a distributor for review.

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Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887 3
Later, he would inform them that the distributor had “re-
jected” their work and that they would have to re-shoot the
photographs and videos with him. If they refused, he threat-
ened to post their photographs and videos on the internet;
and, if they confronted Johnson, he denied wrongdoing,
threatened them, and cut contact.
This was all a lie. In fact, Johnson’s entire operation was
fraudulent. There were no future payments, no potential
work opportunities, and no modeling contracts. Instead,
Johnson kept the photographs he took for his “pleasure,”
posted them on the internet, and continued to email and har-
ass his victims.
One of Johnson’s victims, “Jami,”1 was sixteen when she
and Johnson met. After seeing Johnson’s online advertise-
ment, Jami emailed Johnson under the name “Mari.” She ex-
pressed interest in the work opportunities and told Johnson
she was twenty-three years old. Johnson emailed Jami, posing
as a fake female employee at his fake company, informing
Jami that she would need to interview with “David Burton”—
another of Johnson’s aliases. Then, as Burton, Johnson
emailed Jami with information about the possible financial
opportunity she could receive and explained that she would
have to “audition” with him. Johnson also encouraged Jami
to send explicit photographs of herself, which she did.
Johnson and Jami met several times. During these meet-
ings he touched her breasts, kissed her neck, showed her por-
nography, and took nude photographs of her. In between
meetings, Johnson, posing as the female employee, emailed
1 “Jami” is this victim’s pseudonym, as used at trial.

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4 Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
Jami, encouraging her to engage in various sexual acts with
Johnson. At later meetings, Johnson instructed Jami to per-
form various sex acts on video, attempted anal sex with her,
and performed simulated sex and oral sex on her. And, after
each meeting, Johnson, as Burton, would tell Jami his “distrib-
utor” was “unhappy” and that if she reshot the photographs
and videos, she would be compensated.
Jami started to question the truth of Johnson’s promises,
and in response Johnson told Jami he was negotiating the sale
of her photographs to pay for the time Jami had “wasted.” Af-
ter Johnson threatened several times to post the nude photo-
graphs of Jami online, Jami informed Johnson she was actu-
ally sixteen years old and asked him to delete the photo-
graphs. Johnson disclaimed believing Jami, telling her to
“prove” she was underage. Jami again emailed Johnson that
she was underage, and, eventually sent Johnson a photograph
of her driver’s license, which showed she was sixteen at the
time the two had met and Johnson had taken the nude photo-
graphs of her.
Johnson, however, continued to claim he did not believe
Jami was underage. And, for years after, he continued to post
Jami’s underage photographs online, including when he
posted the nude images of Jami on his Tumblr account, with
the caption “[t]his is 18-year-old Mary,” and when he sent
Jami an anonymous email with a link to a website that had the
nude photographs of her and a caption advertising “teen”
girls. Later, as part of the government’s investigation into
Johnson, the FBI searched his house and found the nude im-
ages of Jami.
The United States first charged Johnson with four sex traf-
ficking counts under § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1), one count of

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Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887 5
knowingly transporting and causing to be transported child
pornography, § 2252A(a)(1), and one count of possessing
child pornography, § 2252A(a)(5)(B). In 2022, by superseding
indictment, the government added one more transportation
of child pornography count and three additional sex traffick-
ing counts (for a total of seven sex trafficking counts, reflect-
ing seven of his victims). In 2023, while on a three-hour fur-
lough granted by the district court to attend his mother’s fu-
neral, Johnson escaped and law enforcement arrested him
three days later. When they arrested him, law enforcement of-
ficials found more child pornography in Johnson’s posses-
sion—specifically, the nude photographs of Jami. Following
his escape and re-arrest, a second superseding indictment
added one more possession of child pornography count and
a count of escape, 18 U.S.C. §§ 751(a), 4082(a), 3147(1).
In April 2024, Johnson pleaded guilty to the escape count
and the final possession of child pornography count. He pro-
ceeded to trial on the remaining ten counts. Over the course
of the nine-day trial, the government called seven of John-
son’s victims to testify. Each described Johnson’s scheme, his
promises of future financial compensation and work oppor-
tunities, their meetings with him, and the sexual assault they
experienced during these meetings. And, they all testified
both that it was Johnson’s promises of financial compensation
and lucrative work opportunities that caused them to meet
with him, and that he never paid them, nor did he deliver on
his promises of finding work opportunities. Jami testified to
her encounters with Johnson, explaining that she eventually
told Johnson she was underage and sent him a photograph of
her driver’s license. At the end of trial, the jury convicted John-
son on all ten counts.

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6 Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
Johnson moved for acquittal and for a new trial, which the
district court granted as to his child pornography convictions
and denied as to his sex trafficking convictions. The district
court then sentenced Johnson to 420 months’ imprisonment,
a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range of 360
months to life. When sentencing Johnson, the court consid-
ered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and pointed to the seri-
ousness of his conduct, the impact his crimes had on his vic-
tims, the fraudulent nature of his promises, and the need for
deterrence and incapacitation, particularly given Johnson’s
escape.
Johnson and the government cross-appeal.
II. Discussion
Johnson’s appeal challenges both the district court’s denial
of his motion for acquittal as to the sex trafficking convictions
and the district court’s 420 month sentence. The government’s
cross-appeal challenges the district court’s grant of Johnson’s
motion for acquittal as to the child pornography convictions.
We start with the issues raised by Johnson’s appeal, then turn
to the government’s cross-appeal.
A. Sex Trafficking Convictions
We review de novo the district court’s denial of Johnson’s
motion for acquittal, United States v. Courtright, 155 F.4th 941,
947 (7th Cir. 2025), and ask “whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt,” United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.3d 856,
859 (7th Cir. 2020). “[P]ractically speaking, … the standard of
review is that for sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v.
Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016). When reviewing
a challenge based on the sufficiency of the evidence, we take

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Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887 7
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
United States v. Watkins, 107 F.4th 607, 626 (7th Cir. 2024), and
“overturn a jury verdict … only if the record is devoid of evi-
dence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt,” United States v. Beechler, 68 F.4th 358, 368
(7th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).
The government charged Johnson with “[s]ex trafficking
… by force, fraud, or coercion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Sec-
tion 1591(a), in relevant part, provides:
Whoever knowingly… in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce, … entices … a person …
knowing … that … fraud … will be used to
cause the person to engage in a commercial sex
act … shall be punished as provided in subsec-
tion (b).
Section 1591(b)(1) sets out a mandatory fifteen-year minimum
sentence “if the offense was effected by means of … fraud.”
Section 1591(e)(3) defines a “commercial sex act” as “any sex
act, on account of which anything of value is given to or re-
ceived by any person.”
Johnson’s appeal turns on the definition of a commercial
sex act and, specifically, whether his fraudulent promises of
future compensation and work opportunities satisfy
§ 1591(e)(3)’s requirement that “anything of value” was
“given to or received by any person.” Johnson concedes that
he “enticed” his victims and that he used “fraud,” but dis-
putes that the government proved the existence of “commer-
cial sex act[s],” contending his fraudulent promises cannot be
“things of value.” Johnson questions: How could he “know”
his victims would engage in “commercial sex acts” if he knew

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8 Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
his promises of future compensation and work opportunities
were false and, thus, valueless? In other words, while he and
his victims engaged in sex acts, he contends they were not
“commercial” because he never gave “anything of value” nor
did his victims receive “anything of value.”
The problem for Johnson is the text of § 1591 does not limit
its reach in this way. Section 1591(e)(3)’s definition of a “com-
mercial sex act” is broad: “[A]ny sex act, on account of which
anything of value is given to or received by any person.” John-
son’s argument requires accepting that we must examine
whether he gave or whether his victims received “anything of
value” from his perspective—i.e., only if he believed his
promises had value. But § 1591(e)(3) does not address from
whose perspective we determine whether those promises had
“value.” And, that § 1591(e)(3) contemplates both whether
“anything of value” is “given to” or “received by” “any per-
son” suggests a more expansive view. Even if Johnson knew
his promises were false, each one of his victims testified they
believed his promises to be true. From his victims’ perspec-
tives, they “received” a “thing of value”—the promises of fu-
ture compensation and work opportunities.
This understanding of whether something has “value” for
purposes of § 1591 accords with how other courts approach
this issue. The Second Circuit, for example, “interpret[s] the
word ‘value’ to refer to a subjective, rather than objective, con-
cept,” and has explained that “the word ‘value’ … focus[es]
… on the value which the recipient subjectively attaches to
what is … received.” United States v. Raniere, 55 F.4th 354, 361–
62 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation modified); see also United States v.
Cook, 782 F.3d 983, 988–89 (8th Cir. 2015); cf. United States v.
Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 858 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing United States

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Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887 9
v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th Cir. 1986)). While Johnson
may have known his promises were empty, each one of his
victims testified that but for his promises they would not have
met with him, allowed him to take nude photographs of them,
or had sex with him. Evidently, each one of his victims “sub-
jectively attache[d]” value to his false promises.
Our approach to § 1591(a) as a whole bolsters this conclu-
sion. We have said that the “logical reading of the phrase
‘knowing … the person … will be caused to engage in a com-
mercial sex act’ is that it describes the acts that the defendant
intends to take—that is, that he means to ‘cause’ [his victims]
to engage in commercial sex acts. That is the interpretation
other circuits have adopted; they have concluded that the stat-
ute uses the future tense to describe the defendant’s plan for
the victim at the time he recruits her.” United States v. Wearing,
865 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting § 1591 and collecting
cases). Here, the government presented evidence that Johnson
posted his false advertisements online, each victim saw those
advertisements, each victim believed those advertisements
were true, and each victim met with Johnson only because of
his promises. On these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude
that the government proved the sex acts were “commercial”
under § 1591(e)(3). Johnson knew both that his countless vic-
tims would take his fraudulent promises as true and that his
victims would see those promises as a “thing of value” re-
ceived in exchange for sex. Johnson’s promises may have been
false, but his “plan for [his] victim[s] at the time he [enticed
them],” id., was for them to take his promises as true and val-
uable—indeed, valuable enough to have sex with him.
Johnson warns that we would broaden the statute’s reach
beyond Congress’s intent by affirming his convictions.

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10 Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
Perhaps there are other cases, with the facts Johnson raises in
his briefs, where the government would not be able to satisfy
the many elements of sex trafficking. But those cases are not
this case, and we do not need to go beyond the facts before us
to affirm his convictions. Johnson’s entire operation was
fraudulent. He knew his “fraud” would cause his significant
number of victims to engage in commercial sex acts as his vic-
tims subjectively believed they had received a “thing of
value” in the form of his promises of future compensation.
Congress wrote § 1591 broadly and a jury could conclude that
the facts the government established here satisfy its elements.
That is enough to affirm Johnson’s convictions.
B. Sentencing
Next, we turn to Johnson’s substantive reasonableness
challenge to the district court’s sentence, which we review for
abuse of discretion.2 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
“[S]ubstantive reasonableness occupies a range, not a point,
and … the sentencing judge is in the best position to apply the
§ 3553(a) factors to the individual defendant.” United States v.
Morgan, 987 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States
v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 2015)). When a defendant
challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence,
“[w]e do not ask what sentence we would impose; we ask
whether the district judge imposed a sentence for logical rea-
sons that are consistent with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”
2 At times in his opening brief, Johnson suggests the district court also
procedurally erred in imposing the sentence. But Johnson backed away
from those arguments on reply, explaining his “primary challenge” is one
of “substantive error.” At oral argument, counsel clarified Johnson is only
advancing his substantive challenge.

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Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887 11
United States v. Campbell, 37 F.4th 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 2022).
“[W]e will ‘uphold a sentence so long as the judge offers an
adequate statement of h[er] reasons consistent with the sen-
tencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” United
States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384–85 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting
United States v. Porraz, 943 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2019)). And
we “presume that a within-guidelines sentence is reasona-
ble.” Id. at 379 (citation modified).
The 420 month sentence the district court imposed was
substantively reasonable. Putting aside that the sentence is
presumptively reasonable because the district court sen-
tenced Johnson to the low end of the applicable Guidelines
range, the district court more than satisfied the burden
§ 3553(a) imposes. It weighed the seriousness of Johnson’s
crimes, the need for the punishment to reflect the impact of
his conduct on his victims, the need for deterrence, and the
need to incapacitate him, particularly given his escape. This
reasoning accounted for many of the § 3553(a) factors and cer-
tainly reflected “an adequate statement” of the district court’s
reasons for the sentence it imposed. Id.
The district court’s brief comparison of Johnson’s sex traf-
ficking crimes to prostitution at sentencing did not render its
sentence unreasonable. First, that comparison was not inap-
propriate and seemingly went to the district court’s consider-
ation of the seriousness of Johnson’s conduct. Second, nothing
obligated the district court to also consider that Johnson’s con-
duct was less egregious than “typical” sex trafficking cases,
assuming, as Johnson suggests, that is true. Third, the district
court still sentenced Johnson to a within-Guidelines sentence
and at the lower end of the applicable range. Our review is
deferential and asks only whether the district court’s

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12 Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
reasoning comported with § 3553(a). See id. at 379, 384–85;
Campbell, 37 F.4th at 1352. Reviewing the sentencing tran-
script, we have no concerns the district court departed from
§ 3553(a) by comparing Johnson’s crimes to prostitution.
Nor did the district court err in imposing a “de facto” life
sentence. We routinely uphold such sentences where the dis-
trict court properly reasoned through § 3553(a) in the sentence
it imposed, as the district court did here. See, e.g., United States
v. McDonald, 981 F.3d 579, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2020); United States
v. Fitzpatrick, 32 F.4th 644, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2022); United States
v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 299 (7th Cir. 2014).3
C. Child Pornography Convictions
We review a grant of a judgment of acquittal de novo.
United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691, 704 (7th Cir. 2009);
United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1013 (7th Cir. 2012). As
with Johnson’s challenge to his sex trafficking convictions,
“we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov-
ernment and ask whether any rational jury could have found
the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reason-
able doubt.” Presbitero, 569 F.3d at 704.
The jury convicted Johnson of both “knowingly …
transport[ing] … child pornography,” § 2252A(a)(1), and
“knowingly possess[ing] an image of child pornography,”
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). “[K]nowingly” in these subsections “ex-
tends both to the sexually explicit nature of the material and
to the age of the [subjects in the images or videos].” United
3 Because below we reverse the district court’s grant of Johnson’s mo-
tion for acquittal as to the child pornography charges, we ultimately va-
cate the sentence the district court imposed.

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Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887 13
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994); see also
United States v. Dean, 705 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2013). The stat-
ute thus required the government to prove Johnson’s
knowledge of Jami’s underage status. United States v. Peel, 595
F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2010). The government can satisfy its
burden by presenting evidence that, when taken as a whole,
demonstrates this knowledge. Cf. United States v. Brown, 135
F.4th 1102, 1107 (7th Cir. 2025) (“No single piece of evidence
is a smoking gun, but the entire case presented to the jury was
sufficient to support the verdict [that defendant knowingly
possessed child pornography].”).
Taken as a whole, the government presented sufficient ev-
idence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Johnson
knew Jami’s underage status after she sent him the emails in-
forming him she was sixteen and included the image of her
driver’s license reflecting she was sixteen. Not only did Jami
email Johnson’s male alias, but she also emailed this infor-
mation to Johnson’s female alias—an alias with whom Jami
had developed a more trusting relationship. From that point,
Johnson knew Jami’s underage status and yet still possessed
her nude images and repeatedly posted them online. Indeed,
despite claiming to believe Jami was twenty-three, Johnson
posted the images of Jami on a website under a banner adver-
tising “teen” girls.
True, the government did not introduce expert testimony
that Jami’s appearance should have put Johnson on notice of
Jami’s underage status. While in some child pornography
cases expert testimony may be “all but require[d]” to prove
the knowledge element, evidence in the form of “other con-
textual factors” can be sufficient as well. United States v.
Dewitt, 943 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (7th Cir. 2019). And, here, these

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14 Nos. 25-1021 & 24-2887
“other contextual factors” allowed the jury to reasonably infer
Johnson’s knowledge of Jami’s underage status.
Johnson makes much of the fact that his sexual preferences
were for “adult” women—pointing out that his victims were
all otherwise adults and he, at least initially, believed Jami
was an adult as well. While a defendant’s sexual preferences
can be relevant, id., our role is not to reweigh the competing
evidence at trial, White, 698 F.3d at 1013. Given the govern-
ment’s evidence, a “rational jury could have found the
[knowledge] element[] of the charged crime[s] beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” Presbitero, 569 F.3d at 704. Overcoming a con-
viction by a jury on a motion for acquittal is a “nearly insur-
mountable” burden, United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420,
424 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation modified), and Johnson’s argu-
ments do not meet that burden. Because it appears the district
court reweighed evidence in concluding Johnson did not have
knowledge of Jami’s underage status, it lowered Johnson’s
burden—an error leading us to reverse its decision.
* * *
For these reasons, we A FFIRM Johnson’s convictions as to
his sex trafficking charges and R EVERSE the district court’s
judgments of acquittal as to his child pornography charges.
“Because a criminal sentence is a package composed of
several parts, when one part of the package is disturbed, we
prefer to give the district court the opportunity to reconsider
the sentence as a whole so as to effectuate its sentencing in-
tent.” United States v. Litos, 847 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2017)
(citation modified). Accordingly, we VACATE Johnson’s sen-
tence and R EMAND for the district court to reinstate the jury’s
child pornography convictions and to resentence Johnson.

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