Shawn Montgomery v. Caribe Transport Ii, LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
ON R EMAND FROM THE SUPREME C OURT OF THE U NITED STATES
Submitted June 15, 2026
Decided July 8, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1192
SHAWN MONTGOMERY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 19-CV-1300
Staci M. Yandle,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
On January 3, 2025, we affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the
pleadings to the defendants as to the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claims. Montgomery v.
Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 124 F.4th 1053, 1058 (7th Cir. 2025). We did so based on our
decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023), which held that the
preemption provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act
(FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), bars state-law claims against freight brokers for the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1192 Page 2
negligent hiring of motor carriers and their drivers. Ye, 74 F.4th at 466. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and on May 14, 2026, held that the FAAAA’s safety exception,
which provides that the preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory
authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” permits negligent hiring claims
against brokers. Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 146 S. Ct. 1199, 1203–04 (2026)
(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)); see also id. at 1204 n.2 (assuming without deciding
that § 14501(c)(1) would otherwise preempt such claims). The Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of this court and remanded for further proceedings. Pursuant to Circuit
Rule 54, the parties asked that we remand for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s
negligent hiring claims (Counts V and VI) in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.
We agree with the assessment of the parties. We thus VACATE the judgment of
the district court as to Counts V and VI and R EMAND to the district court for the
Southern District of Illinois for further proceedings on those counts.

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