Heidi Erickson v. State of Illinois

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 14, 2026*
Decided July 15, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
Nos. 25-3004, 25-3191, & 25-3192
HEIDI ERICKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 1:25-cv-11263 & 1:25-cv-13488
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
In this consolidated appeal, Heidi Erickson, a resident at a nursing facility,
challenges two district court judgments in separate proceedings that dismissed her
claims brought under the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, among other laws. The
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in these
appeals. We have agreed to decide the cases without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

Nos. 25-3004, 25-3191, & 25-3192 Page 2
district court dismissed the first complaint for failure to state a claim and the second as
barred by claim preclusion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
We draw the following facts from Erickson’s operative complaint and its
attached exhibits, accepting her allegations as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to her. See Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 639, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2018). In July 2025,
Erickson was admitted to the Warren Barr nursing facility in Chicago, Illinois, to
undergo rehabilitation for cardiovascular disease. Warren Barr is owned and operated
by Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC. In early August, Legacy told Erickson
that she could not leave the facility without being escorted by a staff member.
Two weeks later, Erickson refused to provide fingerprints as part of her
application process for Warren Barr. Legacy’s Vice President Rani Stutz told her that
her noncooperation required that she be discharged. Stutz also gave Erickson a “Notice
of Involuntary Transfer or Discharge and Opportunity for Hearing for Nursing Home
Residents,” which informed her of her right to appeal the discharge. The next week,
Erickson filed an administrative appeal with the Illinois Department of Public Health.
Erickson remained at Warren Barr pending that appeal. Her later requests to visit
nearby outside services were turned down because staff members were unavailable to
escort her. She filed multiple complaints with the Illinois Department of Public Health
over these restrictions.
In September, Erickson filed with the district court a notice of removal
concerning her state administrative proceedings. Erickson v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No.
1:25-cv-11263 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2025). The district court treated the submission as a
complaint, screened it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed it for failure to
state a claim. The court explained that she did not plead any facts that could plausibly
state a federal or constitutional claim, and it saw no basis for removal because there was
no record of any case filed in state court. The court gave Erickson leave to file an
amended complaint.
Erickson then filed an amended complaint, alleging that the State of Illinois, the
Illinois Department of Public Health, Legacy, and Stutz violated her rights under the
Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (as actionable through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, see Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 172 (2023)); the

-- 2 of 4 --

Nos. 25-3004, 25-3191, & 25-3192 Page 3
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; as well as several Illinois laws. The court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that Erickson had not provided
facts sufficient to allege that Legacy and Stutz were state actors suable under § 1983,
and that none of her allegations concerned conduct by the State of Illinois or the Illinois
Department of Public Health. The court promptly entered judgment.
That same day, Erickson filed both a notice of appeal in case No. 1:25-cv-11263,
as well as a complaint in a new case, Erickson v. Illinois Department of Public Health,
No. 1:25-cv-13488 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2025), which included the same factual basis and
claims as the first. This suit was assigned to the same district judge, who dismissed it
two days later on claim-preclusion grounds.
Four days later, Erickson moved for reconsideration in her first case, now
contending that she also wanted to raise claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The court denied the motion because she did not allege any facts suggesting
how the defendants may have violated the ADA, and because claim preclusion would
bar consideration of any matters that were being litigated in an Illinois Department of
Public Health administrative proceeding.
Two weeks later Erickson filed a second motion to reconsider, seeking leave to
submit a proposed second amended complaint, which alleged additional facts and
claims of disability discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title III of the ADA,
42 U.S.C. § 12182; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3604. The district court also denied this motion, saying that (1) the proposed
complaint raised new allegations not present in Erickson’s prior filings; (2) the court did
not appear to have jurisdiction over Erickson’s complaint, which purported to remove
an action that she initiated with the Illinois Department of Public Health; and (3) claim
preclusion would bar consideration of any claims being litigated in an Illinois
Department of Public Health administrative proceeding.
Erickson filed notices of appeal in both cases, and we consolidated her appeals.
DISCUSSION
A. Erickson’s First Suit
We begin our analysis of these appeals with Erickson’s first suit, No. 1:25-cv-
11263. She first argues that the court incorrectly dismissed her claims under the Federal

-- 3 of 4 --

Nos. 25-3004, 25-3191, & 25-3192 Page 4
Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, maintaining generally that Legacy’s
actions violated the statute. But Erickson says nothing to dispute the court’s
determination that Legacy is not a state actor and thus not suable under § 1983.
Erickson next challenges the district court’s denial of her second motion for
reconsideration, and specifically the court’s reasons for denying her leave to amend her
complaint. She says that the court speculated about the preclusive effect from
administrative proceedings, which did not give rise to any final judgment. She also
contends that her proposed second amended complaint adequately stated claims of
discrimination based on disability and retaliation in violation of the ADA.
The court acted well within its discretion to deny reconsideration a second time.
A district court has broad discretion to deny leave to amend when the “plaintiff
repeatedly fails to cure deficiencies,” particularly when she also fails to identify how
amendment could cure those deficiencies and state a claim. Lewis v. AbbVie Inc.,
152 F.4th 807, 816 (7th Cir. 2025). Erickson failed both in her motion and in her appellate
brief to explain how she could state a claim under the ADA.
B. Erickson’s Second Suit
Erickson also contests the district court’s application of claim preclusion in case
No. 1:25-cv-13488 and insists that her complaint raised claims that were not disposed of
in her first suit. But the district court resolved the suit properly. Under the federal
doctrine of claim preclusion, a plaintiff is barred from filing a suit if there is “(1) an
identity of the parties or their privies in the first and second lawsuits; (2) an identity of
the cause of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.” Adams v. City
of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l
Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 649 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011)). The cause of action is identical if
“the claims comprise the same core of operative facts that give rise to a remedy.” Id. at
736 (quoting Matrix IV, Inc., 649 F.3d at 547). That is the case here: The complaints name
the same set of defendants; their operative facts were materially identical, thus
presenting identical causes of action; and there was a final judgment on the merits in
the first suit.
We have considered Erickson’s remaining arguments, but none merits
discussion.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment in both suits.

-- 4 of 4 --