United States of America v. Laci Lindsey

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 2, 2026
Decided August 3, 2026
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2086
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LACI LINDSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:22cr52 DRL
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
Laci Lindsey, a federal prisoner convicted of distributing methamphetamine,
directly appeals her sentence on the basis that her counsel was ineffective at sentencing.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Lindsey asserts that counsel failed
adequately to argue two sentencing guidelines issues or present a mitigating defense.
With the deferential standard of Strickland in mind, and a barren record before us on
direct appeal, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2086 Page 2
I
From May 2021 through April 2022, Lindsey made six sales of methamphetamine
to a confidential informant in Winamac, Indiana. Three sales took place across 36 days
between May and June of 2021, with Lindsey inviting the informant to her family home
and selling him 86 grams, 58 grams, and 61 grams of methamphetamine. Nine months
passed without further sales. Then, across 35 days between March and April of 2022,
Lindsey twice more sold the informant 86.7 grams and 4 grams of methamphetamine
from her home. The sixth sale took place on April 28, 2022, where Lindsey and her
supplier, Michael Snyder, met the informant at a local motorcycle shop and sold him
451 grams of methamphetamine. State police later searched Lindsey’s home where they
found a ledger, scales, and baggies, as well as 11 grams of methamphetamine.
Based on the April 28 sale, Lindsey and Synder were indicted on one count of
distributing methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Lindsey pleaded
guilty and waived her right to appeal on any ground other than ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Ahead of sentencing, a probation officer drafted a presentence report. The PSR
calculated a base offense level of 34 based on a total drug weight of 746.7 grams, which
included the methamphetamine from each sale and the methamphetamine found in
Lindsey’s home. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(3). The PSR, concluding that Lindsey had
maintained her home “for [a primary] purpose of … distributing a controlled
substance,” applied a premises enhancement that increased the offense level by two
points. See id. § 2D1.1(b)(12) & cmt. n.17. After other adjustments not at issue, the PSR
calculated a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of I.1 Consequently,
Lindsey faced a guidelines range of 108–135 months. See id. ch. 5, pt. A.
Lindsey’s counsel failed to timely file a sentencing memorandum, and the
district court denied his belated motion for an extension. Counsel did, however, submit
written objections to the drug-weight calculation and the premises enhancement. But
the objections were perfunctory, stating merely that the base offense level should be 32
and that the premises enhancement was inapplicable.
1 The PSR also noted that Lindsey was eligible for the safety valve under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5) and so was not subject to the otherwise-mandatory minimum
sentence of 120 months. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a).

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No. 25-2086 Page 3
At the sentencing hearing, Lindsey told the district court that she had not
received the PSR for review. The court allowed Lindsey time to review it, and after a
break, Lindsey confirmed under oath that she had sufficient time to review the PSR.
Counsel then expanded on his written objections to the PSR. He argued that it
was unfair to use the uncharged sales as a basis for either the drug-weight calculation
or the premises enhancement because Lindsey had not pleaded guilty to them, and they
were not used against Snyder.
The district court overruled the objections and adopted the PSR’s guidelines
calculation. For the drug weight, it explained that the PSR proved Lindsey’s connection
to the uncharged sales, and it was irrelevant what the government “could or couldn’t
prove” about Snyder’s involvement in those sales. The court applied the premises
enhancement because Lindsey kept tools of the drug trade in her home and made
nearly all of the sales there.
Lindsey then argued for a sentence of less than 63 months. Counsel highlighted
Lindsey’s tragic background, lack of criminal history, post-arrest cooperation with law
enforcement, and more limited role in the charged sale. Lindsey also spoke, apologizing
to her family, the court, and her community. The district court imposed a below-
guidelines sentence of 80 months’ imprisonment. Lindsey did not appeal.
II
Lindsey, acting pro se, timely moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Relevant
here, she alleged that counsel was ineffective for ignoring her express command to
appeal her sentence. She also alleged that counsel was ineffective at sentencing for
failing to develop objections to the drug weight calculation and premises enhancement,
submit 15 letters that Lindsey had collected speaking to her character, and provide her
with the PSR for review before sentencing.
The district court agreed that counsel was ineffective for not filing a notice of
appeal but disagreed that counsel was ineffective in all other respects. The court
granted Lindsey time to file a direct appeal and denied her sentencing-related claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also denied a certificate of appealability.
Lindsey then filed a notice of appeal listing only the criminal judgment—not the
judgment on her § 2255 motion.

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No. 25-2086 Page 4
III
On appeal, Lindsey asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to
argue that her guidelines base offense level was calculated using an excessive drug
weight, and that the offense level was improperly enhanced for selling drugs from her
house.2 She also argues that counsel did not properly present a mitigating case or
submit relevant character letters.
As we have previously observed, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
typically are poorly suited for direct appeal. When arguing that counsel was ineffective,
it is nearly always necessary to expand the record with information about why counsel
did or did not make a particular decision. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–
05 (2003). Without that information, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel has but a “trifling prospect of success.” United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341
(7th Cir. 2014).
Nonetheless, Lindsey is permitted to raise such claims on direct appeal.
See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508. And, consistent with the criminal judgment named in her
notice of appeal, counsel affirmed at oral argument that this is Linsdey’s intent.3 As a
result, we are limited to the direct appeal record. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504–05. But
even if we were to consider the § 2255 proceeding, it would not change the outcome
here because her allegations mirror the arguments that she now presses on direct
appeal, and she developed no evidence to support them.
IV
To show that counsel was ineffective at sentencing, Lindsey must present
evidence that counsel performed deficiently and that she was prejudiced by that
deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The performance prong requires Lindsey to prove
that counsel not only failed to make a “potentially meritorious argument” but that the
2 We appointed counsel for Lindsey on appeal. Stephen Judge accepted the
appointment in conjunction with his position as an adjunct professor of law at the
University of Notre Dame Law School. Mr. Judge was assisted by law student Jack
Yenni, who argued the case. They have ably discharged their duties, and we thank them
for their service.
3 The audio recording of the oral argument for this case may be found on the
court’s website. The relevant discussion begins at 18:05.

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No. 25-2086 Page 5
failure to do so was “egregious” or “appalling.” See Elion v. United States, 155 F.4th 889,
900 (7th Cir. 2025). And the prejudice prong requires Lindsey to show that there was a
“substantial, not just conceivable” likelihood of a different sentence if her preferred
argument had been made. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).
A. Premises Enhancement
Lindsey argues that counsel was deficient in his objection to the premises
enhancement for invoking general notions of fairness rather than arguing factors
specifically relevant to its application. We disagree. Lindsey’s preferred arguments are
not so strong that counsel’s failure to raise them was egregious or appalling enough to
be constitutionally deficient. See Elion, 155 F.4th at 900.
The premises enhancement applies where distributing substances was a
“primary or principal” use of the premises. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) & cmt. n.17. In
making that determination, a sentencing court should consider “both the frequency and
significance of the illicit activities, including factors such as quantities dealt, customer
interactions, keeping ‘tools of the trade’ and business records, and accepting payment.”
United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Lindsey first avers that counsel should have argued that the premises
enhancement did not apply because her family home was primarily used as a residence,
and her sales were merely incidental to that lawful purpose. But the “amount of lawful
activity in a [residential] home is all but certain to exceed the amount of illegal activity”;
therefore, a court should not limit its inquiry to simply weighing “the amount of legal
activity against the illegal activity” but also consider the above-listed factors. Contreras,
874 F.3d at 284.
Lindsey also maintains that counsel could have succeeded with an argument that
the gap between the 2021 and 2022 sales weighed against application of the
enhancement. She points out that the two sets of sales, each taking place over a month-
long period, were separated by nine months without sales.
This argument is not so obviously a winner that counsel was deficient for not
raising it. To be sure, only a few months of sales can weigh against application of the
enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2022) (describing
four months of sales, with the specific number of sales unknown, as “closer to the outer
limits” of what the premises enhancement encompasses). And here, there was also a

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No. 25-2086 Page 6
substantial gap between sales. But the other factors weigh strongly against Lindsey. She
conducted nearly all of her sales at the home, see Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284; stored drugs
there, see id.; sold large quantities out of the home, see id.; and kept tools of the drug
trade there (notably scales and a sales ledger), see United States v. Zamudio, 18 F.4th 557,
563 (7th Cir. 2021). And on similar facts, where a defendant merely stored drugs in the
home for two or three months but had large quantities of drugs, a scale, and a gun, we
have affirmed application of the enhancement. See id.
B. Drug Weight
Lindsey next argues that counsel should have more aggressively contested the
drug weight calculation, again faulting counsel for generally objecting on fairness
grounds instead of drawing on factors our caselaw has identified as relevant. In
Lindsey’s view, the uncharged sales at her home were not relevant conduct to the
charged sale at the motorcycle shop, whether as “part of the same course of conduct” or
part of a “common scheme or plan.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). So, Lindsey argues, she
should be held accountable only for the 441 grams sold during the charged encounter,
and her base offense level should have been 32 instead of 34. See id. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(4).
But, here too, Lindsey does not overcome the substantial hurdle of Strickland.
Whether the sales were part of the “same course of conduct” or part of a
“common scheme or plan” are “closely related” but not identical inquiries. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt. n.5(B). Offenses are part of a “common scheme or plan” if they share
at least one common factor, such as “common victims, common accomplices, common
purpose, or similar modus operandi,” and they are part of the same “course of conduct” if
they are “part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” United States v.
Zehm, 217 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). For drug cases, this means
that “where the uncharged conduct involved the same principal, the same location, and
the same drug as the offense of conviction, those comparisons render it similar enough
to be relevant—even if the charged and uncharged offenses involved different
participants and different amounts.” United States v. Brasher, 105 F.4th 1002, 1007–08
(7th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).
Lindsey first presses that her home and the motorcycle shop were in different
locations, separated by one mile, and that this should weigh against viewing the home
sales as relevant conduct. But we have interpreted “same location” to include a broader
geographic area, such the same city, United States v. Singleton, 548 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
2008), or even towns located twenty minutes from one another, Brasher, 105 F.4th
at 1008.

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No. 25-2086 Page 7
Lindsey also argues that the motorcycle-shop sale was different in kind from the
sales at her home. In the charged sale, she brought in Snyder as an accomplice, her role
changed from seller to middle-woman, and the sale involved a larger quantity of
methamphetamine than previous sales. See United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1042
(7th Cir. 2005) (finding similar differences relevant). And she also argues that the nine-
month gap between the 2021 and 2022 sales cuts against finding the earlier sales
relevant conduct. See United States v. McGowan, 478 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 2007)
(explaining eight-month gap between sales was “long enough to cast doubt on the
relevance of the earlier [sales]”).
But the sales at the motorcycle shop and Lindsey’s home share enough in
common that Lindsey cannot show counsel was constitutionally deficient for not raising
her preferred argument. The government can overcome a lack of temporal proximity by
making a “stronger showing” on the other factors. Id. (quoting Ortiz, 431 F.3d at 1041).
And that strong showing is arguably present here: the sales all involved the same
purchaser (the confidential informant), the same location (Winamac, Indiana), and the
same drug (methamphetamine). See Singleton, 548 F.3d at 592 (concluding sales were
part of same course of conduct where they involved the “same principal, the same
[city], and the same drug”); United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 964 (7th Cir. 2015)
(same for common scheme). Accordingly, counsel’s failure to raise Lindsey’s preferred
argument was not constitutionally deficient.
C. Mitigating Case
Lindsey also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide her with a
copy of the PSR before sentencing and failing to present a mitigating case.
But Lindsey cannot show that she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to provide
her with a copy of the PSR before sentencing. The court gave Lindsey time at the
sentencing hearing to review the PSR, and she swore under oath that she had sufficient
time to review it. We have previously relied on such assertions to reject a claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to fully review the PSR with a defendant. See United
States v. Trussel, 961 F.2d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1992). Moreover, to establish that she was
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to provide her earlier with the PSR, Lindsey would need
to show that the probability of a different sentence is “substantial, not just conceivable.”
See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. But Lindsey does not allege what she would have done with
more time, so she has not established that she was prejudiced by counsel’s action.

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No. 25-2086 Page 8
Further, Lindsey’s counsel did present a case in mitigation, and Lindsey cannot
show that she was prejudiced by that presentation. Counsel argued that Lindsey should
receive a below-guidelines sentence, pointing out Lindsey’s tragic background and
productive life until her arrest. Lindsey’s allusion to a superior mitigation defense,
without specifics of what counsel or Lindsey herself would have said, is too nebulous
and conclusory to show a substantial likelihood of a different sentence. See id.
D. Sentencing Materials
Finally, Lindsey argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to submit a
sentencing memorandum and file character letters.
But again, Lindsey cannot show that she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
submit a written memorandum. Counsel argued at the sentencing hearing for a below-
guidelines sentence, highlighting mitigating factors. Lindsey does not explain why a
written memorandum would have resulted in a substantially different sentence. See id.
Similarly, Lindsey cannot show prejudice from counsel’s failure to submit
character letters. The record does not contain any information about the letters’
contents, and Lindsey’s bare assertion that the letters were “relevant” to her sentencing
is insufficient to show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel’s failure to present them. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
534–35 (2003).
AFFIRMED

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