24-3258 | Omnilex

Gesamter Gesetzestext

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-3258
PUBLIC I NTEREST LEGAL F OUNDATION , I NC .,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M EAGAN WOLFE, Administrator of the
Wisconsin Elections Commission, and
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-285-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 25, 2025 — DECIDED A UGUST 19, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and S YKES ,
Circuit Judges.
SYKES, Circuit Judge. The National Voter Registration Act
requires each state to adopt streamlined procedures for citi-
zens to register to vote in federal elections. See generally,
52 U.S.C. § 20503(a). As relevant here, the Act also requires
states to “make available for public inspection” and

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2 No. 24-3258
“photocopying at a reasonable cost” all records pertaining to
“programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensur-
ing ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȬ
ers.” Id. § 20507(i)(1).
Some states are exempt from the Act—namely, those that
have Ĵed same-day polling-place registration or have
not required registration at all since August 1, 1994. Id.
§ 20503(b). Only a few states qualify for the exemption.
Wisconsin is one: It ȱěȱ-day polling-place regis-
tration continuously since at least that date.
The Public Interest Legal Foundation asked the Wisconsin
Elections Commission for a copy of the state’s voter registra-
tion list. Because Wisconsin is exempt from the Act, the
Commission processed the request under the state public-
records law. See W IS. STAT. §§ 6.36(1)(b)(1), 19.35(1). Wisconsin
requires the redaction of voters’ birth information and
charges a fee to produce the record, up to a maximum of
$12,500. Because the statewide voter list is lengthy, the maxi-
mum fee applied.
The Foundation objected to the fee and redaction, so it
sued to invalidate Wisconsin’s exemption and compel the
Commission to produce the registration list in accordance
with federal law. The suit rests on two novel legal theories.
The primary claim is that the Act’s exemption violates the
principle of equal state sovereignty as recognized in Shelby
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Alternatively, the
Foundation alleges that the exemption violates the “congru-
ence and proportionality” requirement for legislation enacted
pursuant to Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment against the states. See City of Boerne v. Flores,

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No. 24-3258 3
521 U.S. 507 (1997). The district judge rejected these theories
and dismissed the case.
We Ĝ. ȱȱȱĴǰȱboth legal theories con-
cern the rights of the states. But the Foundation isn’t trying to
vindicate states’ rights. Quite the contrary: It has deployed
these legal theories against Wisconsin’s interests. We doubt
that the prudential doctrine of third-party standing is mallea-
ble enough to support this maneuver. But we can bypass that
question because the suit is Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯ Shelby
County involved a provision in the Voting Rights Act that sin-
gled out certain states for onerous regulatory burdens. The
exemption at issue here does exactly the opposite: It relieves
Wisconsin from federal regulatory burdens because its voter-
registration laws already align with federal policy. And the
“congruence and proportionality” principle announced in
City of Boerne applies to laws enacted pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress adopted the Voter Regis-
tration Act under its Elections Clause power. U.S. C ONST.
art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
I. Background
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȬ
ization that seeks to promote the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess. As part of this mission, the Foundation regularly in-
spects state voter rolls looking for the unlawful inclusion of
ineligible voters or the unlawful removal of eligible voters. To
that end, in January 2024 the Foundation asked the Wisconsin
Elections Commission for a copy of the state’s voter registra-
tion list pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act,
52 U.S.C. §§ 20501 et seq.

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4 No. 24-3258
The Act was adopted in 1993 to simplify the process for
citizens to register to vote in federal elections. Young v. Fordice,
520 U.S. 273, 275 (1997). It requires each state to provide at
least three methods for voter registration: by mail, in person
at designated locations, and as part of an application for a
driver’s license. § 20503(a); see §§ 20504–06. The Act further
directs states to ensure that anyone who submits a “valid
voter registration form” at least 30 days before an election is
in fact “registered to vote” in that election. § 20507(a)(1). And
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱ
list of voters except “at the request of the registrant” (or in
cases of criminal conviction, mental incapacity, or death).
§ 20507(a)(3).
Key here is the Act’s public-disclosure provision, which
directs each state to maintain, for at least two years, all records
pertaining to “the implementation of programs and activities
conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and cur-
¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ,” and to make these rec-
ords “available for public inspection” and “photocopying at a
reasonable cost.” § 20507(i)(1).
As we’ve noted, the Act exempts some states: It “does not
apply” to states that have Ĵed same-day polling-place
registration or have not required registration at all “under law
that is ȱ ěȱ continuously on and after August 1, 1994.”
§ 20503(b). Wisconsin ęȱȱȱ¡ǲȱȱhas per-
Ĵȱ-day polling-place voter registration since at least
that date. See W IS. STAT. § 6.55(2)(a) (providing for same-day
voter registration). Only a handful of other states are also ex-
empt: North Dakota, which has no registration requirement;

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No. 24-3258 5
and Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming,
which permit same-day polling-place registration. 1
Because Wisconsin is exempt, the Commission advised the
Foundation that it would process the request under the state
public-records law. See §§ 6.36(1)(b)(1), 19.35(1). Wisconsin
law ȱȱę¢ȱ voters’ birth dates, so the
Commission could not disclose that information.
§ 6.36(1)(b)(1)(a). Wisconsin also charges a fee to obtain a copy
of voting records. Starting at $25 per electronic report, the fee
increases by $5 for each set of 1,000 records requested until it
reaches a statutory maximum of $12,500. § 6.36(6); 2 W IS.
A DMIN . C ODE EL § 3.50(4). Given the size of the state’s voter
roll, the maximum fee of $12,500 applied to the Foundation’s
request.
The Foundation balked at the fee and nondisclosure of
Ȃȱȱǰȱȱȱęȱthe Commission of its
1 See The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) Q&A 2, U.S. D EP ’T
OF J UST., CIV. RTS. DIV., https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-regis-
tration-act-1993-nvra.
2 The statute directs the Commission to set the fee based on both the cost
to maintain the list and the cost to produce a copy. In relevant part, the
statute provides:
The commission shall establish by rule the fee for obtain-
ing a copy of the official registration list, or a portion of
the list, including access to the subscription service estab-
lished under s. 5.05(14)(b). The amount of the fee shall be
set, after consultation with county and municipal election
officials, at an amount estimated to cover both the cost of
reproduction and the cost of maintaining the list at the
state and local level.
W IS. S TAT. § 6.36(6).

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6 No. 24-3258
intent to sue for violation of the Voter Registration Act. See
§ ŘŖśŗŖǻǼȱ ǻȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ). The
Foundation asserted that Wisconsin’s exemption from the Act
iȱȃȱȱěȄȱafter the Supreme Court’s decision in
Shelby County. Commission ěȱreplied by email reiterating
that Wisconsin is exempt from the Act and again explaining
that the Commission would process the request under Wis-
consin’s public-records law.
As it had warned, the Foundation responded with this suit
challenging the Commission’s refusal to produce a complete
copy of the state’s voter roll—including voters’ birth-date in-
formation—at a “reasonable cost” as required by the Voter
Registration Act. § 20507(i)(1). The complaint alleges that the
Act’s exemption violates the “equal state sovereignty” princi-
ple articulated in Shelby County and the “congruence and pro-
portionality” requirement announced in City of Boerne.
Among other remedies, the suit seeks a declaration invalidat-
ing the exemption provision and an order compelling
Wisconsin to comply with the terms of the Act.
The Commission moved to dismiss the case, invoking
Wisconsin’s exemption and arguing that neither Shelby
County nor City of Boerne calls its validity into question. As
Ĵȱ¢ȱŘŞ U.S.C. § 2403(a), the United States intervened
to defend the constitutionality of the exemption, agreeing
with the Commission that Shelby County and City of Boerne do
not apply. The government also challenged the Foundation’s
standing to sue under the prudential doctrine of third-party
standing. Because the Foundation’s legal theories rest not on
its own rights but on those of the states, the government ar-
gued that the Foundation was improperly asserting “the
rights of others.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004).

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No. 24-3258 7
The district judge granted the motion. He began his anal-
ysis with the question of standing, holding that the Founda-
tion’s allegation of an informational injury was Ĝȱȱ
support Article III standing. He expressed some concern
about prudential standing, but he set that issue aside and
opted to address the case on the merits. The judge concluded
that neither Shelby County nor City of Boerne casts doubt on the
validity of the Voter Registration Act’s exemption provision.
Both cases, the judge explained, concerned federal statutes
that imposed burdens on the states; using them to invalidate
Wisconsin’s exemption from federal burdens woulȱĚȱthem
on their heads. The judge accordingly dismissed the case. This
appeal followed.
II. Discussion
We review the judge’s dismissal order de novo. Milchtein
v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814, 821 (7th Cir. 2022). To sur-
vive a motion to dismiss, a federal complaint must “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see F ED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6).
ȱěȂȱfactual allegations are taken as true at the plead-
ings stage, but the same presumption does not apply to legal
conclusions. Nobles v. Mullin, 177 F.4th 886, 896 (7th Cir. 2026).
A claim that lacks the support of a cognizable legal theory
cannot proceed, so we evaluate the viability of the Founda-
tion’s claim under “the governing sources of law” on which it
is based. Id.
We start with a few words on the Foundation’s standing
to sue. Like the district judgeǰȱ Ȃȱ ęȱ that the com-
plaint adequately alleges Article III standing, though our rea-
ȱȱ ȱě. Ĵȱȱ ȱȱȬ
ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ

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8 No. 24-3258
injury, the Foundation has alleged a traditional pocketbook
injury—ę¢ǰȱ the $12,500 fee that Wisconsin charges
for a copy of the state’s voter roll. Tyler v. Hennepin County,
598 ǯǯȱŜřŗǰȱŜřŜȱǻŘŖŘřǼȱǻȱȃȱȱ¢ȄȱĜȱ
to establish Article III standing.). That alleged ęȱȱ
ěȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱother circuits have
concluded that the Foundation lacked Article III standing to
sue for access to state voting records. E.g., Pub. Int. Legal
Found. v. Benson, 136 F.4th 613, 631–32 (6th Cir. 2025); Pub. Int.
Legal Found. v. Sec’y of Pennsylvania, 136 F.4th 456, 469 (3d Cir.
2025).
We’re not so sure about prudential standing, however. As
ȱȱĴǰȱȱ¢ȱȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
interests” and “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975). That rule poses a problem for the Founda-
tion’s claim, which is largely premised on the rights and pre-
rogatives of the states in our system of federalism. The Foun-
dation obviously has no claim to sovereignty—let alone the
right of equal state sovereignty as described in Shelby County,
570 U.S. at 544. A similar problem ěȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
theory based on City of Boerne. Simply put, the Foundation
cannot accuse Congress of intruding into its regulatory au-
thority or usurping its police powers; it has none. See City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
But a general rule requiring a party to assert his own in-
terests is just that—a general rule. And a claim rooted in prin-
ciples of federalism may implicate individual rights that
aren’t immediately apparent. As the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Bond v. United States, our federal balance is in one
sense “an end in itself”: It ensures that the “States function as

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No. 24-3258 9
political entities in their own right.” 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011).
But in another sense, it “secures to citizens the liberties that
ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȄȱ Id. (quoting
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)). “When
government acts in excess of its lawful powers,” those liber-
ties are “at stake.” Id. at 222. Accordingly, citizens have a “di-
rect interest in objecting to laws” that upset this federal bal-
ance—at least in some cases. Id. Put another way, “[f]idelity
to principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindi-
cate.” Id.; see Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703–
04 (7th Cir. 1999).
The Foundation leans heavily on Bond, but there are rea-
sons to doubt its application here. To start, Bond involved a
defensive challenge to a statute on federalism grounds. Carol
Anne Bond was criminally charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 229, which prohibits the possession of chemical weapons;
she moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute as
applied to her exceeded Congress’s powers in violation of the
federalism principles secured by the Tenth Amendment.
Bond, 564 U.S. at 214. The Supreme Court concluded that the
ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȬ
lenge as a defense to the criminal charges. Id. at 220–26. The
Court relied in part on I.N.S. v. Chadha, which likewise in-
volved a defensive constitutional challenge to a statute
authorizing a so-called legislative veto in the context of de-
portation proceedings. 462 U.S. 919, 925–28 (1983).
In both Bond and Chadha, the challengers’ constitutional
interests were clear: The statutes in question were being used
to prosecute or deport them. Thȱȱȱěǯȱhe Foun-
dation has raised federalism principles oěensively; it seeks to
invalidate the Voter Registration Act’s exemption provision

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10 No. 24-3258
and force Wisconsin’s compliance with the Act’s public-
disclosure requirements. Unlike in Bond and Chadha, the
Foundation is not invoking federalism principles as a shield
against congressional encroachment on states’ rights and in-
dividual liberty. It is instead deploying Shelby County and City
of Boerne to impose federal regulatory burdens on Wisconsin.
That strikes us as a misapplication of the principle recognized
in Bond.
But we do not need to decide. The general rule against as-
serting the interests of third parties is prudential: “It does not
involve the Constitution’s ‘case-or-controversy requirement’”
and thus does not inform our jurisdiction. June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. 299, 317 (2020) (quoting Kowalski,
543 U.S. at 128–29). So like the district judge, we set it aside
and focus on the merits of the Foundation’s constitutional
claim.
We can be brief. The Foundation’s main contention is that
the Voter Registration Act’s exemption provision is invalid
under the principle of equal state sovereignty articulated in
Shelby County. That case involved a constitutional challenge
to the “preclearance” requirement in § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. Applicable to only nine states in full and several others
in part, § 5 required that covered jurisdictions “obtain federal
permission before enacting any law related to voting.” Shelby
County, 570 U.S. at 535; see 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a). The Supreme
Court observed that requiring a state to obtain federal ap-
proval before pursuing its own legislative objectives was “a
drastic departure from basic principles of federalism.” Shelby
County, 570 U.S. at 535. And singling out certain states for the
preclearance requirement marked “an equally dramatic de-
parture from the principle that all States enjoy equal

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No. 24-3258 11
sovereignty.” Id. Both features of the preclearance regime
were “extraordinary and unprecedented.” Id. at 549.
As the Court explained, our constitutional structure pre-
serves the “broad autonomy” of each state to structure its own
government, to legislate for the health and welfare of its citi-
zens, and “to regulate elections”—all without “beseech[ing]
the Federal Government for permission.” Id. at 543–44 (quo-
ȱĴǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȃ¢ȱȬ
der the Constitution” and is entitled to equality “in power,
dignity[,] and authority.” Id. ȱśŚŚȱǻȱĴǼǯ
Because § 5’s preclearance requirement “sharply de-
part[ed]” from these ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱĜȱ
ęǰȱȱȱinvalidated the statutory formula spec-
ifying which jurisdictions were subject to preclearance. Id.; see
52 U.S.C. § 10303(b). The coverage formula swept in states “by
reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turn-
out in the 1960s and early 1970s”—in other words, “decades-
old data relevant to decades-old problems.” Shelby County,
570 U.S. at 551, 553. And because Congress had failed to up-
ȱȱȱȱĚȱ-day conditions, the Court
declared the formula unconstitutional; without an operative
coverage formula, there was no “basis for subjecting jurisdic-
tions to preclearance.” Id. at 557.
With this background in mind, the problems with the
Foundation’s reliance on Shelby County are hard to miss. To
start, the preclearance requirement imposed onerous burdens
on certain states for their past behavior. The statutory exemp-
tion at issue here does precisely the opposite: It relieves certain
states from generally applicable regulatory burdens.

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12 No. 24-3258
Recall, too, that the exemption applies to states that since
August 1, 1994, have had no registration requirement at all or
have ěȱ-day registration at the polls. In substance,
then, the Act’s exemption functions more like an equalizer.
The Act requires all states to provide ample opportunity for
their citizens to register to vote in federal elections and ex-
empts the states whose registration laws have consistently
aligned with this federal policy since the Act’s adoption. The
Act thus does not “sharply depart[]” from basic federalism
and equal-sovereignty principles; it conforms to them. Id. at
544.
Moreover, the Voting Rights Act—the law at issue in
Shelby County—was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power. Louisiana v. Callais,
146 S. Ct. 1131, 1144 (2026). That authority is not all-
encompassing: It extends only to legislation that ȃěǽǾ
by ‘appropriate’ measures” the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohi-
bition on discriminatory voting practices. South Carolina v.
Kaĵenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (emphasis added) (quoting
U.S. C ONST. amend. XV, § 2). To be considered “appropriate,”
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȃǽǾȱ ȱȱĴȱ
and spirit of the [C]onstitution.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 555
ǻęȱȱȱǼ ǻȱĴǼ. That includes
basic federalism and equal-sovereignty principles, which are
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱĴȱȱǯ
In contrast, Congress enacted the Voter Registration Act
pursuant to its power under the Elections Clause. League of
Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Sullivan, 5 F.4th 714, 723 (7th Cir.
2021). That clause authorizes Congress to alter or supplant
state regulations prescribing the “Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”

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No. 24-3258 13
U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Unlike Congress’s Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power, its Elections Clause power
“is paramount”; Congress may exercise it “at any time[] and
to any extent which [Congress] deems expedient.” Arizona v.
Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (quoting
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880)). And because the role
of the states in regulating federal elections has always been
subject to Congress’s preemptive Elections Clause authority,
the federalism concerns that animated Shelby County “are
somewhat weaker here.” Id. at 14.
That brings us back to the fundamental mismatch between
this case and Shelby County. The Foundation’s requested rem-
edy would entail the imposition of federal regulatory burdens
on Wisconsin and the other states exempt from the Act—not,
as in Shelby County, the elimination of such burdens. As the dis-
trict court correctly observed, that result would turn Shelby
County on its head. Indeed, for all the reasons we’ve dis-
cussed, the Foundation’s reliance on Shelby County is clearly
misplaced; the case has no application here.
We turn, then, to the Foundation’s argument under City of
Boerne, which it essentially treats as an afterthought. Under-
standably so. City of Boerne is similarly irrelevant. That case
concerned the scope of Congress’s authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to “enforce” the Amendment “by ap-
propriate legislation.” U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Because
that authority is limited to enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that
Congress may not enact legislation that “alters the meaning”
of the constitutional right. 521 U.S. at 519. In other words,
Congress’s § 5 authority is remedial; it may impose “measures

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14 No. 24-3258
that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions,” but it may
not “make a substantive change in the governing law.” Id.
To mark the boundaries of this distinction, the Court an-
nounced what has come to be known as the “congruence and
proportionality” test for § 5 legislation: “There must be a con-
gruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id.
at 520. Without this connection, “legislation may become sub-
ȱȱȱȱěǯȄȱId. The Court held that alt-
hough Congress has “wide latitude” to draw the substan-
tive/remedial line, the “distinction exists and must be ob-
served.” Id.
The statute at issue in City of Boerne, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), Ĵed to change the substance
of the free-exercise right. Id. at 532. And that, the Court said,
was “broader than is appropriate if the goal is to prevent and
remedy constitutional violations.” Id. at 535. Accordingly, the
Court held that RFRA ȃĚǽǾȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
congruence” and was “a considerable congressional intrusion
into the States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority
to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.” Id. at
533–34.
There are several reasons why City of Boerne doesn’t help
the Foundation here. We’ve already noted the most obvious
one: Congress adopted the Voter Registration Act pursuant to
its Elections Clause power—not its authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment—so the “congruence and propor-
tionality” test does not apply. And as the district judge aptly
observed, a case about Congress’s authority to curtail the
states’ traditional ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ǻȱ ¢Ǽȱ
about Congress’s authority to exempt certain states from an

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No. 24-3258 15
otherwise valid federal regulatory regime. In short, City of
Boerne is simply inapposite.
The Foundation tries to shore up its case with what is es-
sentially a political argument, warning that Congress might
wield its Elections Clause power ȱęȱpartisan allies and
punish foes. Whatever can be said about that prospect—and
we note that other constitutional provisions would likely
stand in the way—the Voter Registration Act’s exemption
provision ȱȱęȱȱ. The exemption did not open the
door to partisan mischief or tit-for-tat retaliation. Quite the
opposite. The exemption, along with the rest of the Act,
simply made it “easier to register to vote in federal elections.”
Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d
791, 792 (7th Cir. 1995).
A FFIRMED

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16 No. 24-3258
BRENNAN , Chief Judge, concurring. The majority opinion
persuasively explains why this suit fails on the merits, and I
agree with that analysis in full. I write separately to highlight
another fundamental problem with this case: the Public Inter-
est Legal Foundation may lack Article III standing to bring
this suit.
Though “we cannot reach the merits of a case” without
satisfying this “bedrock constitutional requirement,” Wis.
Voter All. v. Millis, 166 F.4th 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2026) (per cu-
riam), the Foundation’s theory of standing is challenging to
evaluate because it implicates multiple unresolved circuit
splits. In fact, there is now a split about whether the Founda-
tion itself has standing to bring suits like this one. Compare
Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Sec’y Commw. of Pa., 136 F.4th 456, 461–
70 (3d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1785 (2026) (dismissed
for lack of standing), and Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Benson, 136
F.4th 613, 629–32 (6th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1772
(2026) (dismissed for lack of standing), with Pub. Int. Legal
Found., Inc. v. Wooten, 164 F.4th 362, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2026) (re-
manding to evaluate standing), and Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc.
v. Nago, 174 F.4th 664, 670–77 (9th Cir. 2026) (standing).
Unique features of this case make it a poor vehicle for ad-
dressing these questions. But this action highlights the need
to clarify the test for identifying informational injuries and or-
ganizational standing after TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594
U.S. 413 (2021), and FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine,
602 U.S. 367 (2024).
I
In its quest to apply the National Voter Registration Act to
the state of Wisconsin, the Foundation’s principal argument

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No. 24-3258 17
for standing is that it ě an “informational injury.” The
ȱȱȱ£ȱȱȃȱěȱěȱȱȁȬ
¢ȱ ȱ ȂȄȱ Ĝȱ for Article III standing “when the
ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
disclosed pursuant to a statute.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (citing Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Just., 491
U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). It appears this rule has survived recent
developments in standing jurisprudence. See Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016) (citing Akins and Pub. Citizen).
The Foundation ę lawsuits around the country based on a
¢ȱȱȱěs an informational injury every time a state
declines to produce voter records in the exact format it de-
sires.
Wisely, my colleagues have declined to decide whether
ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ¢. Accord
Sec’y Commw. of Pa., 136 F.4th at 459; Benson, 136 F.4th at 629.
And though a close call, I am less persuaded that the Founda-
tion has done enough to allege a “classic pocketbook injury.”
Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 636 (2023). I have found
no evidence in the record that the Foundation spent any
money. And there may be another way for the Foundation to
obtain the information it seeks without imposing federal law
on Wisconsin or paying the $12,500 fee for electronic access.
At least in this case, the Foundation may lack standing
three times over. It supplied no evidence that it was denied
any of the requested informationǲȱȱęȱȱ ȱ
consequences from the alleged denial; and it did not discuss
whether it could assert standing for its own injuries. Several
circuits have held that an advocacy organization cannot sue
to redress informational injuries in federal court without mak-
ing these three showings. The allegations in the Foundation’s

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18 No. 24-3258
ȱȱȃȱȱȄȱȱǰȱȱĴȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱęǯȱCommon Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944,
964 (7th Cir. 2019) (Brennan, J., concurring). Because this case
comes to us at the motion to dismiss phase, though, the unu-
sual allegations here might cross the threshold. Wis. Voter All.,
ŗŜŜȱ ǯŚȱ ȱ ŜřŘȱ ǻěȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
stage).
A
To start, the record suggests that the Foundation has not
actually been “deni[ed] … information subject to public dis-
closure.” Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329,
337–řŞȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗşǼȱǻĴǰȱ ǯǼ; accord TransUnion, 594 U.S.
at 441 (citing Casillas with approval for this proposition). This
is the central ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ
But after comparing the materials covered by the National
Voter Registration Act’s disclosure provision, the documents
requested by the Foundation, and the information made
available under Wisconsin law, the Foundation may not have
been denied the information it requested.
ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ. It requires states
to “make available for public inspection … all records con-
cerning the implementation of programs and activities con-
ducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency
ȱĜȱȱȱȱǯȄȱśŘȱǯǯǯȱȗ 20507(i)(1). Many
kinds of records come into this statute’s ambit. Project Vote /
Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2012)
ǻȃȱ ȱȁȂȱ… suggests an expansive meaning”).
But there are also limits to that disclosure. For one, the
statute “does not require electronic production” of docu-
ments “at all.” Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State,

-- 18 of 27 --

No. 24-3258 19
105 F.4th 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2024). The phrase “make avail-
able for public inspection” is a term of art drawn from the
Freedom of Information Act context, and it does not encom-
pass digital disclosure of documents. Id. at 1332–35. Congress
amended FOIA to provide for electronic disclosure; it has not
done the same for this Act, which has not been amended since
it was enacted in 1993. Id. at 1333.
For another, no appellate court has held that the Act re-
quires states to disclose certain kinds of sensitive information
about voters along with the requested documents. Project
Vote, 682 F.3d at 339–40 (appropriate to redact Social Security
Numbers from voter rolls released under the Act); Pub. Int.
Legal Found. v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 996 F.3d 257, 267 (4th
Cir. 2021) (A ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ¢ȱ
sensitive information’ in otherwise disclosable documents.”).
Therefore, the Act subjects information to public disclosure in
ȱę, constrained way.
The Foundation requested two kinds of records—ȱĜȬ
cial list of voters registered in Wisconsin and several years’
worth of “Deceased Reports” produced by the Electronic Reg-
istration Information Center, a national voting database. Both
records fall into the Act’s broad disclosure provision.
The critical question is whether Wisconsin denied the
Foundation access to these documents. On my reading of the
record, it did not. Following a statutory requirement, the state
makes its voter rolls “open to public inspection” and “elec-
tronically accessible.” WIS. STAT. ȗ 6.36(1)(b); WIS. A DMIN .
C ODE EL 3.50(2). This law both encompasses and exceeds the
disclosure required under the federal Act. There is also no rea-
son to think “Deceased Reports” are not “records” open to
public inspection under Wisconsin’s Freedom of Information

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20 No. 24-3258
Act, at least according to the record in this case. W IS. S TAT.
ȗ 19.35(1)(a), (2). In other words, Wisconsin’s current public
disclosure laws may permit access to all desired documents.
Even more, when the Foundation requested these docu-
ments, Wisconsin did not turn it away. ȱȱȱęȱǰȱ
ȱĜȱȱthe Foundation to the online voter regis-
tration list, which is the state’s preferred means for dissemi-
nating this information. As to its second request, the record
does not speak either way about whether it was denied. The
ȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȃǽǾȱȱȱȱȱ
to the second part of your request soon.” ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ
¡ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ
continue to “process requests” like this one under state law.
The Foundation supplied neither allegation nor evidence of
whether the state complied with or formally rejected this re-
quest.
Whether these allegations show a “deni[al]” of requested
documents is questionable. Casillas, 926 F.3d at 338. That is
especially so if all the information the Foundation requested
could be obtained under state law. At the least, the Founda-
tion has not ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ show an informational
injury. Wis. Voter All., 166 F.4th at 632.
The Foundation also complains that ȱĜȱȱȱ
provide the requested documents for free, in the desired
format, and without releasing certain pieces of redacted infor-
mation. But this does not change whether there is an informa-
ȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱę as a pocketbook
injury without further allegations of compelled spending.
Assume that the Foundation succeeded on the merits and
the National Voter Registration Act was applied to the State

-- 20 of 27 --

No. 24-3258 21
of Wisconsin. It would still not be entitled to obtain the de-
sired documents for free. Rather, the Foundation must pay for
ȃ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȄȱśŘȱǯǯǯȱȗ 20507(i)(1).
That language is identical to the state-law analog. See W IS.
STAT. ȗȗ 6.45(2) & 19.35(3)(a) (“An authority may impose a fee
upon the requester of a copy of a record which may not ex-
ceed the actual, necessary and direct cost of reproduction and
transcription of the record.”) And in its initial records request,
the Foundation made clear that it was willing and able to pay
such costs to obtain the documents it desired.
Even though accessing voter rolls online incurs a cost of $5
per thousand voters, then, the Foundation might have ac-
quired these documents for its desired price. It is not apparent
to me that the reproduction costs qualify as a pocketbook in-
jury. After all, the Foundation did not actually pay a dime to
the state. It instead proceeded straight to federal court. To al-
lege a denial of information or a pocketbook injury under
these circumstances, the Foundation must supply at least
some evidence that other “pathways are [not] viable” if it
wants to show a cognizable injury. Wis. Voter All., 166 F.4th at
637 n.5; see also id. at 636 n.4. The record does not answer these
questions, which means the Foundation may not have dis-
charged its burden to identify facts supporting Article III
standing. Id. at 632.
In sum, the Foundation had an avenue to obtain the infor-
mation it sought without recourse to federal court. It has not
ěȱȱȱ¢ȱif it did not engage in a gen-
ȱěȱȱȱ desired documents through state-
law procedures. The Act it seeks to invoke is narrower than
the state laws—it does not provide for electronic disclosure of
documents at all, while Wisconsin law does. ȱěȱȱ

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22 No. 24-3258
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ
“certainly impending” when it disregards a cost-ěȱȬ
ternative. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402
(2013). At the least, it is questionable whether the Foundation
has adequately alleged Article III standing, even at the motion
to dismiss stage. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992) (Ĝ allegations needed for court to “presum[e]
ǳȱęȱȱǳȱȱȱȱȄǼǯ
B
The Foundation may lack Article III standing for two fur-
ther reasons: it ȱȃęȱȱȁ ȱȂȱ
from failing to receive” access to the voter rolls, TransUnion,
594 U.S. at 442 (ȱ Ĵ), and it has not explained
whether it can assert standing for its own injuries. Both
grounds are implicated in the circuit split over whether the
Foundation can assert an informational injury.
Downstream Consequences. In TransUnion, the Supreme
Court said, “An asserted informational injury that causes no
ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¢ȱ III.” Id. (citation modi-
ęǼǯȱ This formulation of the test could be in tension with
Spokeoǯȱ ȱȱĴȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ȱȃȱěȱǳȱȱȱȱ
any additional ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȄȱ
in a statute to have standing. 578 U.S. at 342. And Spokeo seems
more consistent with the cases supplying a foundation for the
informational injury doctrine. Both Akins and Public Citizen
seem to treat the denial of information sought through a sun-
shine statute as a cognizable harm in its own right. Akins, 524
U.S. at 20–21; Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 448–50.

-- 22 of 27 --

No. 24-3258 23
ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
whether TransUnion added a new requirement to the test for
informational injuries. Compare, e.g., Harty v. W. Point Realty,
Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 444 (2d Cir. 2022) (“Even assuming that
ǽěǾȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
which he [was] ȱǳȱȱȱȱȱȁ ȱ
consequences from failing to receive the required infor-
mation.’”), with Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC, 60 F.4th 156, 170
(4th Cir. 2023) (holding that TransUnion did not change the
requirements outlined in Akins). A few years ago, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Lau-
fer, 601 U.S. 1 (2023), a case involving a related circuit split.
But the Court opted to dismiss Acheson Hotels as moot without
addressing standing, leaving the question open. Id. at 3–5.
The Foundation’s litigation has deepened this split. When
the Third Circuit denied the Foundation standing in a similar
case, that court relied explicitly on the fact that the organiza-
tion had not alleged any downstream harm. Sec’y Commw. Pa.,
136 F.4th at 464–69. So too for the Sixth Circuit’s decision. Ben-
son, 136 F.4th at 630. But the Ninth Circuit recently broke from
this consensus, concluding that TransUnion did not change
Public Citizen and Akins by implication and requiring no
showing of downstream consequences. Nago, 174 F.4th at
670–74. Now, there are circuit splits about whether TransUn-
ion changed the informational injury test and about whether
the Foundation itself has standing.
To my knowledge, we have not considered an informa-
tional injury case since TransUnion was decided. See Bryant v.
Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 624–26 (7th Cir. 2020);
but see Wis. Voter All., 166 F.4th at 633 n.2 (observing that the
ěȱ ȱ ȱ -related case could have raised

-- 23 of 27 --

24 No. 24-3258
informational injury, but that argument would have failed).
In this case, the majority opinion declines to choose a side in
this ongoing split. That means future cases must still consider
whether “downstream consequences” are necessary to allege
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱȱęȱǯ
If it is true that ěȱȱȱ ȱdownstream conse-
quences from the denial of information, the Foundation has
not cleared that bar. Its complaint highlights three possible
harms: the cost of obtaining the information through the elec-
tronic disclosure portal; the Foundation’s inability to ensure
ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
law; and the lack of information to support its advocacy and
ȱěǯȱ“As actual harm for Article III purposes,”
these reasons are weak. Common Cause, 937 F.3d at 964 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Add to this that the Foundation might be
able to obtain the requested information in other ways at a
lower cost, and it becomes apparent that the Foundation’s al-
legations of downstream consequences may be neither con-
crete nor cognizable.
Organizational Standing. If the Foundation used any of
these harms to justify “downstream consequences,” it might
face another hurdle: these injuries cannot supply standing to
a public-interest advocacy group. In Hippocratic Medicine, the
Supreme Court made clear that an interest group cannot
“spend its way into standing simply by expending money to
gather information and advocate against the defendant’s ac-
tion.” 602 U.S. at 394. Based on its complaint, the Foundation
has indicated it may be spending its way into standing.
Hippocratic Medicine changed the law governing organiza-
tional standing and rendered some of this court’s caselaw ob-
solete. See Wis. Voter All., 166 F.4th at 638–44 (Brennan, C.J.,

-- 24 of 27 --

No. 24-3258 25
concurring). Some uncertainties remain about how far the
holding of that case extends. Id. at 641–42. But two things are
certain: public-education expenses and harms regarding in-
ternal operations are “now foreclose[d]” as a means for advo-
cacy groups to secure standing. Id. at 640. The Foundation
raises these exact harms in its complaint.
It is not immediately clear how Hippocratic Medicine ęȱ
with the informational injury test. The Third Circuit added
Hippocratic Medicine’s language on organizational injury to its
discussion of the “downstream consequences” prong of the
informational injury test. Sec’y Commw. Pa., 136 F.4th at 469.
But the Ninth Circuit kept the two separate, treating them as
alternate theories of standing. Nago, 174 F.4th at 676.
I observed in Wisconsin Voter Alliance that the Supreme
Court invoked an information-based framework when it
ęȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ǯȱ Hippocratic Medi-
cine explicitly cabined Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363 (1982), the seminal organizational standing case, to its
facts. Wis. Voter All., 166 F.4th at 639–40, 644 (Brennan, C.J.,
concurring). In the process, the Court ȃęȱȱ¢ȱȱ
[Havens] as an informationalǰȱȱȱȱęǰȱǯȄȱId.
at 639 (emphasis added). Though not the same as the classic
informational injury of Akins, the new “paradigmatic Havens
injury” is an intangible injury ȱ ȃȱ £Ȃȱ ȁȱ
business activities’ … not a self-Ěȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ
directing resources.” Id. at 640 (quoting Hippocratic Med., 602
U.S. at 395); see also Az. All. for Retired Ams. v. Mayes, No. 22-
16490, 2026 WL 2277101, at *14–22 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc)
(Bress, J., concurring). That view comports with Akins, which
cited Havens Realty for the proposition that a “deprivation of
ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȁęȱ

-- 25 of 27 --

26 No. 24-3258
¢Ȃȱ Ĵȱ ǯȄȱ Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (quoting
Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 374).
If an informational injury is just a type of intangible injury,
as our precedent suggests, these two lines of cases may be
ȱȱ¢ȱęȱǯȱSee Casillas, 926 F.3d at 337–38.
And the Foundation’s disregard of state-law means for ob-
ȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ
harms, might be the same kind of “self-ĚȄȱęȱȬ
juries now forbidden by Hippocratic Medicine. Wis. Voter. All.,
166 F.4th at 640 (Brennan, C.J., concurring).
ȱȱȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱ
ĜȂȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
group’s core business activities.” Id. ȱŜŘşȱǻȱęǼǯȱ
If an advocacy organization asserting an informational injury
must also satisfy this test, that would be another reason why
the Foundation lacks standing to sue.
II
To me, this case presents justiciability issues from the be-
ginning. An interest group sued to impose a burdensome fed-
eral law onto a state—against that state’s expressed wishes
and interests—by asserting the state’s “equal sovereignty”
rights on its behalf. The majority opinion correctly observes
the prudential standing issues raised here; it also cogently ex-
plains why the Foundation cannot succeed on the merits.
I respectfully concur because I believe an organizational
ěȱmay need to do more to allege an informational in-
jury. It cannot just say it was “denied” information that it
could access through other means. Still, I join the majority
opinion because ambiguities in the law obscure the proper
test for evaluating standing here. I hope the Supreme Court

-- 26 of 27 --

No. 24-3258 27
will step in and address both circuit splits implicated by the
Foundation’s main theory of Article III standing.

-- 27 of 27 --

Public Interest Legal Foundation , Inc . v. MEAGAN WOLFE, Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission

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