Ronnie L. Famous v. Joseph Jezwinski

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 18, 2026 *
Decided August 21, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2681
RONNIE L. FAMOUS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH JEZWINSKI, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 20-CV-510-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ronnie Famous, a Wisconsin prisoner, challenges the summary judgment
rejecting his claims that prison employees failed to prevent him from self-harm and
treated his resulting injury with constitutionally inadequate care. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2681 Page 2
In December 2019, Famous, then incarcerated at the Wisconsin Resource Center
in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, threatened to harm himself after becoming upset with the
quality of recent meals. Famous asserts that he told a psychiatric-care technician, Joseph
Jezwinski, that he needed to speak with a psychologist because “he was going to harm
himself.” According to Famous, Jezwinski responded “go ahead” and walked away.
Jezwinski denies that this exchange took place, but we resolve this conflict in Famous’s
favor as the non-moving party at summary judgment. See, e.g., Stewart v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021). No one contests that Famous proceeded to
slam his hand repeatedly against a metal desk in his cell and injure his left pinky finger.
Famous was treated for his injuries that same morning by Dr. Carlo Gaanan, a
doctor in the Center’s Health Services Unit. While awaiting an x-ray result, Dr. Gaanan
ordered that Famous’s pinky be “buddy taped” to the ring finger to act as a splint for
one week. Dr. Gaanan also issued a thrice-daily dose of ibuprofen. When the x-ray
result came back two days later, Dr. Gaanan reviewed an x-ray and radiology report
stating that there was mild soft tissue swelling but no acute fracture or dislocation.
From this, Dr. Gaanan concluded that buddy taping and ibuprofen remained an
appropriate treatment. The parties dispute whether Gaanan told Famous that someone
would follow up with him, and we again at this stage resolve this dispute in Famous’s
favor. See id. In March and April 2020, Famous sent two requests to the Health Services
Unit for stronger pain medication but nothing in the record suggests that Dr. Gaanan
personally received these requests.
In the meantime, in January 2020, Famous saw Dr. Loyda Loria, also a doctor in
the Center’s Health Services Unit, after requesting a follow-up visit for his pinky pain.
Dr. Loria reviewed the x-ray and saw that it showed mild swelling but no “osseous
abnormality or fracture.” But on her examination, she noticed that his pinky was stuck
in a bent position (a “mild flexion deformity”), which she concluded was caused by a
tendon injury. She advised Famous to continue with buddy taping and gentle exercise
of his pinky finger, and to take ibuprofen up to four times a day as needed for pain.
Dr. Loria says that Famous told her the ibuprofen was “helping” the pain, but he recalls
saying that it did not “completely” stop the pain and that he asked for something
stronger. Famous also asserts that he asked if surgery was an option, but she retorted
that “they” did not operate on pinky fingers and that he had four other “good fingers.”
Dr. Loria denies saying this.
In July 2020, Dr. Loria saw Famous for a follow-up appointment. He complained
of pain despite switching from ibuprofen to Tylenol (which he says he took at least
twice a day) and said that he still could not fully extend or flex his finger. Dr. Loria

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reviewed the x-ray once more and stood by her original diagnosis. She opined that
stronger pain medication was not necessary. But she did refer him to a hand surgeon
for further evaluation, forewarning him that an appointment might take several months
because of the COVID pandemic and the nonemergency nature of his injury. Dr. Loria
was not responsible for the scheduling herself; that was handled by other staff in the
Health Services Unit. Dr. Loria was scheduled to see Famous twice more, but each time
he refused to see her.
In August 2020, Famous was transferred from the Wisconsin Resource Center to
the Columbia Correctional Institution in Portage, Wisconsin. At this point, Dr. Loria’s
involvement ended, and other practitioners became responsible for managing his
transition between facilities and future care.
More than a year later, Famous saw an outside orthopedic specialist, Dr. Bradely
Foulke. Dr. Foulke noted that Famous had developed a painful “lump” on his finger
and was still unable to fully straighten it. Dr. Foulke also noted, without further
comment, that Famous’s prior treatment did not include “extension splinting.”
Dr. Foulke ultimately referred Famous to an orthopedic surgeon, and Famous had
surgery on his pinky finger.
Famous sued prison officials for not preventing his self-harm and for mistreating
his resulting pinky injury, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. 1915A, and
construed it as raising three theories of relief: that (1) Jezwinski, the psychiatric-care
technician, violated his rights by not intervening when Famous said he would harm
himself; (2) Dr. Gaanan’s and Dr. Loria’s treatment for the resulting injury was
constitutionally inadequate because they did not provide him with strong enough pain
medication, diagnose him with needing surgery, or swiftly schedule him with a
specialist; and (3) each of the defendants was negligent under Wisconsin law. (Famous
also alleged that his rights were violated by Melissa Mitchell, the nursing supervisor at
Wisconsin Resource Center, but he does not discuss his claim against her on appeal and
so we discuss it no further.)
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on each of
Famous’s federal claims. Regarding Jezwinski, the court concluded that the record did
not support a conclusion, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, that he subjectively
knew of any imminent risk of serious harm that Famous faced. As for Dr. Gaanan and
Dr. Loria, the court found no evidence that either doctor’s actions were blatantly
inappropriate or significantly departed from accepted professional standards; at worst,

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they were merely negligent in diagnosing whether his finger required surgery. The
court acknowledged the long delay in Famous’s seeing a specialist after his transfer
from Wisconsin Resource Center but pointed out that Dr. Loria was not responsible for,
or even aware of, the delay. With no federal claims remaining, the court relinquished
jurisdiction over the state-law claims
On appeal, Famous first argues that the district court gave too little weight to
Jezwinski’s statement that Famous should “go ahead” and harm himself. This
statement, Famous maintains, shows that Jezwinski took the threat seriously yet failed
to intervene, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
We agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could find for Famous on
this issue. To establish a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm, a prisoner must provide evidence that the official “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994). Officials cannot “intentionally disregard” a threat of self-harm, see Lord v.
Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). But a jury must be able to
infer that the threat was genuine and not an “insincere” attempt to gain attention or
benefits. Id. at 904–05. And Famous’s statement was vague. Nothing about it suggested
seriousness or imminence: he did not hint at how he would harm himself, and he does
not suggest that Jezwinski was aware of a history of self-harm or the presence in his cell
of any dangerous items that he could use to harm himself. Cf. Belbachir v. Cnty. of
McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 982 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing grant of summary judgment where
plaintiff committed suicide and defendants knew of his hallucinations, acute anxiety,
feelings of hopelessness, and suicidal diagnosis).
Famous next argues that the district court overlooked evidence suggesting that
Dr. Gaanan and Dr. Loria acted with deliberate indifference when treating his pinky.
He first refers to an x-ray from January 2021 taken while housed at Columbia showing a
deformity on his finger with “degen[erative] changes”—a diagnosis, he contends, that
the court should have read to mean that he was originally more injured than
Dr. Gaanan and Dr. Loria believed him to be. But this 2021 x-ray—taken 13 months after
the injury—shows the injured finger at a different time than the x-ray viewed by
Dr. Gaanan and Dr. Loria immediately after the injury. The x-ray alone is not evidence
that the doctors abandoned all medical judgment as required to prevail under the
Eighth Amendment. See Christensen v. Weiss, 145 F.4th 743, 752 (7th Cir. 2025).
Famous also argues that Dr. Gaanan and Dr. Loria were deliberately indifferent
in prescribing merely ibuprofen and Tylenol, which he says did not help his pain “at

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all.” But that is inconsistent with the record: he repeatedly stated in his grievances and
statement of disputed facts that the medication did not “make the pain go away
completely.” (emphasis added). Indeed, prisoners are not constitutionally entitled to an
entirely painless recovery or even to a specific pain medication. Arce v. Wexford Health
Sources Inc., 75 F.4th 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). As the district court
noted, the existence of some pain despite medication is insufficient to show that
Dr. Gaanan’s and Dr. Loria’s treatment violated Famous’s constitutional rights.
Furthermore, he refused to see Dr. Loria on at least two occasions. We also agree with
the district court that no evidence suggests that Dr. Gaanan knew of Famous’s
grievances about ibuprofen’s lack of efficacy.
Famous further asserts that the district court discounted the significance of
Dr. Fouke’s treatment plan and should have called out as lacking in medical judgment
Dr. Gannan’s and Dr. Loria’s decision to treat him with only buddy taping. But
Dr. Foulke simply noted that Famous’s previous treatment did not include extension
splinting—the doctor did not state it was required. Dr. Fouke did not opine on the
therapeutic value of buddy taping, so we do not see how his note shows that
Dr. Gannan’s and Dr. Loria’s treatment reflects an absence of medical judgment. See id.
For that matter, Dr. Foulke’s decision to schedule surgery is merely evidence that
doctors could disagree on the proper treatment, not that conservative treatment was
wholly inappropriate. See Christensen, 145 F.4th at 752. And to the extent Famous
invokes Dr. Loria’s comment about his four other “good” fingers, her referral of
Famous to a hand surgeon defeats any notion that she was unwilling to recommend
surgery.
Finally, Famous broadly asserts that Dr. Loria was personally responsible for his
delay in seeing a specialist. But he does not engage with the district court’s observation
that the record includes a note from Dr. Loria referring him to a specialist, nor the
court’s conclusion that Dr. Loria was not responsible for coordinating his transfer or
ensuring that her referral was honored after the transfer. “Bureaucracies divide tasks;
no prisoner is entitled to insist that one employee do another’s job,” Burks v. Raemisch,
555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009), and Dr. Loria “cannot be held responsible for delays
caused by others,” Gills v. Hamilton, 164 F.4th 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2026).
AFFIRMED

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