United States of America v. Tobias Ritesman

18-3137Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit31.08.2020

Gesamter Gesetzestext

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 19-2560
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Tobias Ritesman
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls
____________
Submitted: April 16, 2020
Filed: August 25, 2020
[Unpublished]
____________
Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
The district court1 sentenced Tobias Ritesman, who pleaded guilty to mail and
wire fraud, to 108 months in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343
(wire fraud). He challenges an enhancement he received for “abus[ing] a position
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.

-- 1 of 3 --

-2-
of public or private trust,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, and the overall reasonableness of the
sentence. We affirm.
A few years ago, Ritesman and his partner hatched a plan to build a
commercial fish farm and aquaponics facility in South Dakota. They raised money
from prospective investors by telling a series of lies on topics ranging from whether
one of them attended business school to their ability to complete the project. The
lies continued even after Ritesman was left “entirely in charge.” In the end, investors
were bilked out of over one million dollars, a portion of which he converted for his
own personal use.
Ritesman argues that he did not hold “a position of public or private trust.”
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. On these facts, this argument is a stretch. Officers and directors
hold a position of trust, both to the company and its investors. See United States v.
Reichel, 911 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that a CEO and president
held a position of trust); United States v. Walker, 818 F.3d 416, 423 (8th Cir. 2016)
(same). And here, as the project’s leader, he exercised significant “professional or
managerial discretion” with limited supervision. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1. The
district court did not err, much less clearly err, in finding that the enhancement
applied. See Walker, 818 F.3d at 423.
We also conclude that Ritesman’s sentence was substantively reasonable. See
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing
the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion). In imposing
a bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence, the district court considered a host of
factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States v. Washington, 893 F.3d 1076,
1080–81 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a sentence within the Guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable). The fact that he wished the court would have
emphasized the mitigating circumstances he presented over other considerations is
not a reason to reverse. See United States v. Nguyen, 829 F.3d 907, 925–26 (8th Cir.
2016) (acknowledging the “wide latitude” that district courts have to weigh the

-- 2 of 3 --

-3-
statutory sentencing factors). Nor is his sentence unreasonable simply because
another, allegedly more culpable defendant received the same sentence for fraud.
See United States v. Keys, 918 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2019).
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________________

-- 3 of 3 --

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.