United States of America v. Spencer Mason

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2705
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Spencer Mason
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
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Submitted: March 13, 2023
Filed: April 28, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Spencer Mason appeals the above-Guidelines sentence imposed by the district
court1 after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). We affirm.
1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Arkansas.

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On November 8, 2021, law enforcement received a tip from a confidential
source that Mason was driving a stolen car while possessing a 9mm pistol and large
amounts of methamphetamine. Mason was eventually arrested near Springdale,
Arkansas. When a Washington County Sheriff’s Office deputy attempted the traffic
stop, Mason fled at a high rate of speed, reaching 90 miles per hour. During the
chase, Mason ran traffic lights, drove the wrong way and through a fence, and tossed
the pistol from the vehicle before crashing into a semi-truck and rolling into a ditch.
Law enforcement searched Mason’s vehicle, finding a syringe, a spoon with
methamphetamine residue, and stolen tools. The officers also retrieved the
discarded loaded pistol. Mason told the arresting officers that he had found the pistol
in an unlocked car, and acknowledged he was prohibited from possessing a firearm
due to his status as a felon.
Mason pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing,
the district court calculated an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 37 to 46
months. In considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court
identified and weighed both aggravating and mitigating factors. As aggravating
factors, the district court considered the severity of the offense, including Mason’s
possession of a stolen loaded handgun, operation of a stolen vehicle, and attempted
escape from law enforcement in a dangerous high-speed chase while under the
influence of methamphetamine. The district court also noted Mason’s prior federal
convictions for bank fraud and possession of stolen mail, and subsequent
revocations. In mitigation, the district court acknowledged Mason’s addiction and
mental health and the role they played in his criminal conduct. Ultimately, the court
determined the advisory Guidelines range was insufficient and imposed a 63-month
term of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.
On appeal, Mason asserts the above-Guidelines sentence was substantively
unreasonable. “We review all sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines
range, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Pepper,
518 F.3d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A district court abuses its
discretion when it “(1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received

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significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor;
or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits
a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Palkowitsch, 36 F.4th 796, 802 (8th Cir.
2022) (quotation omitted). Where, as here, the district court varies from the
Guidelines range, we are “not permitted to apply a presumption of
unreasonableness” and “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify
the extent of the variance.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461–62 (8th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
While Mason contends the district court abused its discretion by giving
insufficient weight to certain factors, such as his history of substance abuse and
mental illness, the sentencing court “has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors
in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an
appropriate sentence.” United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009).
To be entitled to a new sentencing hearing, Mason must demonstrate more than the
district court disagreed with his view of the weight to be given certain sentencing
factors. United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
The record demonstrates the district court was thoroughly aware of Mason’s
history of methamphetamine addiction and mental health history and took these
factors into consideration when imposing the sentence. The district court found the
continued threat Mason posed to public safety and his lengthy criminal history
outweighed his addiction and mental health issues. The court acted within its broad
discretion in determining the appropriate sentence. See United States v. Drew, 9
F.4th 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2021) (determining the district court did not abuse its
discretion in varying upward by 67 months after considering the defendant’s
criminal history, the need for respect for the law, and public safety).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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