United States of America v. Brandon A. House

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-3129
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Brandon A. House
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
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Submitted: June 16, 2023
Filed: June 29, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
In December 2016, Brandon House pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy
to distribute methamphetamine and one count of possession of methamphetamine
with the intent to distribute. He received a mandatory minimum sentence of 240
months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count and a concurrent 180-month term of

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imprisonment on the possession-with-intent count. His sentence was affirmed on
appeal. See United States v. House, 923 F.3d 512, 518 (8th Cir. 2019).
In April 2022, House filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), also known as a motion for compassionate release. Pursuant to this
statute, a district court may modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment if it finds,
among other things, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction.” Id. House posited that if he had been sentenced after the First Step Act
had been passed, he would no longer face a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence.
See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401, 132 Stat. 5194. This
statutory change, he argued, amounted to an “extraordinary and compelling” reason
for a reduction in his sentence. The district court1 denied the motion, relying in
significant part on United States v. Crandall, which held that “a non-retroactive
change in law, whether offered alone or in combination with other factors, cannot
contribute to a finding of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for a reduction in
sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” 25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir. 2023).
House concedes that Section 401 of the First Step Act is not retroactive, and
he acknowledges our ruling in Crandall. See House, 923 F.3d at 514 n.2 (noting that
House “do[es] not contest that [he was] ineligible for relief under Section 401 of the
First Step Act of 2018 at [the time of appeal]”). But House argues that Crandall is
no longer good law after Concepcion v. United States, which held that “the First
Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in
exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” 142
S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). While House’s appeal was pending, however, a panel of
our court decided this very question. In United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, we
concluded that “Concepcion did not overrule our prior decision in Crandall.” 65
F.4th 1000, 1001 (8th Cir. 2023). As such, “Concepcion is irrelevant to the threshold
question of whether [House] has shown an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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for § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief.” Id. at 1004 (quoting United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594,
596 (7th Cir. 2022)).
The district court did not err in denying House’s motion, and the judgment of
the district court is affirmed.
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