United States of America v. John Edward Juneau

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2780
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
John Edward Juneau
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: March 16, 2023
Filed: July 13, 2023
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Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
John Edward Juneau was convicted by a jury on multiple counts of possessing
methamphetamine and firearms. Juneau appeals his conviction, arguing that the
district court1 erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during
1 The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

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searches of two residences in Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids, Minnesota.
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
In June 2018, Juneau and his then-girlfriend, Crystal Bolan, began renting a
house in Columbia Heights on a month-to-month tenancy. In November 2018, the
city of Columbia Heights revoked their landlord’s rental license because the property
was not up to code. Soon thereafter, the city posted a notice on the door of the
property notifying Juneau and Bolan that they had 45 days to vacate the premises.
Before moving out in January 2019, Juneau asked the landlord if he could store some
personal items in the garage. The landlord responded, “It’s not really my house
anymore. If you store stuff, you store stuff.”
At the time, Juneau was under investigation by a local narcotics task force for
suspected methamphetamine offenses. In January 2019, having learned of Juneau’s
connection to the Columbia Heights property through public records, task-force
detective Paul Bonesteel applied for a warrant to search the property for drugs and
other evidence of criminal activity. The search warrant affidavit stated that
Detective Bonesteel confirmed Juneau’s lease at the Columbia Heights property and
was familiar with his “extensive criminal history.” The affidavit explained that
Detective Bonesteel also received a tip from a confidential informant that Juneau
was dealing drugs from the Columbia Heights residence. The informant described
the rough location of the residence and described Juneau’s appearance. Detective
Bonesteel followed up by conducting a trash pull from the garbage cans outside the
Columbia Heights residence. He searched four garbage bags and found “multiple
clear plastic bags which contained crystal[-]like residue which field[-]tested positive
for methamphetamine.” Detective Bonesteel also identified at least three exterior
surveillance cameras outside the Columbia Heights residence. The day before he
Katherine M. Menendez, then United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Minnesota, now United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

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submitted the affidavit, Detective Bonesteel spotted Juneau’s car parked near the
house. Finally, the affidavit also described details of Juneau’s and Bolan’s criminal
histories, which included some inaccuracies. For example, the affidavit incorrectly
stated that Juneau had been convicted of unlawful possession of ammunition in 2018
when, in fact, those charges had been dismissed.
A state-court judge issued the search warrant on January 25, 2019, and
Detective Bonesteel and other task-force officers executed the warrant on
February 1, 2019. Officers seized methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and a cell
phone. Juneau was present during the search, standing near a pair of bib overalls in
the garage. Inside the overalls, officers located three plastic baggies containing
methamphetamine. DNA evidence taken from two of the baggies connected them
to Juneau.
After moving out of the Columbia Heights home, Juneau claims to have
moved in with his brother in Andover, Minnesota, but he stayed there only
occasionally. Nonetheless, Juneau informed authorities that his brother’s house was
his new residence, as required by his predatory-offender registration. Juneau also
spent time at a duplex in Coon Rapids, Minnesota. The duplex was owned by an
acquaintance of Juneau and Bolan. Bolan lived at the property, and Juneau often
assisted one of the other tenants in working on motorcycles and cars in the garage
and performing other household projects. The duplex owner recalled Juneau
receiving a package at the residence, and he saw Juneau and Bolan coming and going
from the garage.
The Coon Rapids residence eventually came to the attention of the same
narcotics task force that executed the Columbia Heights warrant. After officers
recovered methamphetamine during an April 2019 search of the Coon Rapids
residence, task-force Detective Daniel Neitzel began investigating an individual
named Jamie Shore, whom Detective Neitzel believed to be at the center of a local
drug-trafficking ring. Detective Neitzel installed GPS units on Shore’s vehicle and
tracked numerous stops at the Coon Rapids residence in May and June of 2019.

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While surveilling the house in May 2019, Detective Neitzel also noticed a red pickup
truck registered to Juneau in the driveway, and he was familiar with Juneau’s
criminal history and his connection to the Columbia Heights search executed just a
few months prior. On July 1, 2019, Detective Neitzel observed Shore leave the Coon
Rapids residence and drive to a nearby bar to conduct what Detective Neitzel thought
was a drug transaction. This activity led Detective Neitzel to believe that Shore was
using the Coon Rapids residence as a hub of drug-trafficking activity.
In July 2019, Detective Neitzel applied for a warrant to search the Coon
Rapids house for drugs and other evidence of criminal activity. The search warrant
affidavit pointed to Shore’s suspected drug-trafficking activity and his connection to
the house. Specifically, the affidavit listed Shore’s eighteen separate stops at the
Coon Rapids residence between May 10, 2019, and June 26, 2019, many of which
were at unusual times of the day and for short durations. The affidavit concluded
that this activity was “consistent with Jamie Shore using the location as a hub to
conduct illegal narcotics sales.” The affidavit also noted Juneau’s presence at the
house and recounted his criminal history. The affidavit finally recounted the
suspected drug sale conducted by Shore directly after leaving the Coon Rapids
house.
A state-court judge signed the Coon Rapids warrant on July 3, 2019. The
warrant authorized a search for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and other indicia of the
drug trade, but it did not include language about weapons. Local law enforcement
executed the warrant on July 9, 2019. As they did so, officers saw Juneau attempting
to leave the house through a downstairs bedroom door. Officers seized $6,000 in
cash as well as 37 grams of methamphetamine from the same bedroom. They also
searched a detached garage on the property, where they found a motorcycle
registered to Juneau as well as several baggies containing roughly 47 grams of
methamphetamine in a cabinet. In a safe above the cabinet, officers seized two
pistols, loaded magazines, and a gun holster. A DNA sample from the firearms
matched to Juneau.

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Juneau was indicted by a federal grand jury on two counts of possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B); one count of possessing and carrying firearms in
furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and
one count of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Juneau filed several pretrial motions, including motions
to suppress evidence seized from the Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids homes, a
separate motion to exclude the firearms seized during the Coon Rapids search, and
a motion for a Franks2 hearing.3
After conducting an evidentiary hearing on Juneau’s motions, the magistrate
judge recommended that the district court deny the suppression motions and motion
to exclude on the merits and deny the Franks motion as moot. The magistrate judge
assumed that Juneau had Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the Columbia
Heights and Coon Rapids searches, though she noted that the state of the evidentiary
record complicated the standing inquiry. On the Franks motion, the magistrate judge
noted the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the search warrant affidavits but
concluded that they did not undermine the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause.
Finally, the magistrate judge found that the Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids
warrants were both supported by probable cause, and that the guns were properly
seized under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. Juneau filed
multiple objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Without
addressing the question of Fourth Amendment standing, the district court considered
and rejected each of Juneau’s objections and adopted the report and
recommendation.
2 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
3 Juneau also filed a motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained from the
firearms seized at the Coon Rapids residence. The magistrate judge recommended
denying this motion, and the district court adopted this recommendation without
comment. Juneau does not appeal this ruling.

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The case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Juneau on all counts, and the
district court sentenced him to 216 months’ imprisonment followed by 5 years of
supervised release. Juneau appeals, arguing that the district court erroneously denied
his motions to suppress.
II.
The government first argues that we should affirm the district court on the
basis that Juneau lacks standing to contest the Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids
search warrants. “In an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”
United States v. Allen, 43 F.4th 901, 907 (8th Cir. 2022).
The concept of Fourth Amendment standing is a “useful shorthand for
capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest
in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search.” Byrd v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018). But Fourth Amendment standing
“should not be confused with Article III standing.” Id. Unlike Article III standing,
Fourth Amendment standing is “not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be
addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment
claim.” Id. Consistent with the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection, a
defendant may challenge an unconstitutional search only if the defendant had a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in the places searched or things seized. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); accord United
States v. Bettis, 946 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2020). “There is no ‘single metric or
exhaustive list of considerations,’ but a defendant’s expectation of privacy must be
grounded in property law or understandings that are recognized by society.” Bettis,
946 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1527).
Here, Juneau argues he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in both the
Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids residences. Though he had moved out of the
Columbia Heights residence, Juneau contends that he had been given “permission

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or acquiescence” by his former landlord to keep personal belongings in the garage.
Thus, Juneau argues, he “stood in the shoes of the owner” with respect to his access
and use of the garage. Appellant Br. 14. As to the Coon Rapids residence, Juneau
argues that he was a routine overnight guest and, therefore, had a reasonable
expectation of privacy consistent with his usage, citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.
91 (1990). The government contends that Juneau had vacated the Columbia Heights
residence and had no legally effective permission to store his items in the garage.
As to the Coon Rapids residence, the government points to Juneau’s own testimony
denying that he was a routine overnight guest or that he kept belongings there.
However, because Fourth Amendment standing “need not be addressed before
addressing other aspects of the merits,” Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1530, we need not address
these arguments before deciding whether the Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids
search warrants were supported by probable cause. See United States v. James, 3
F.4th 1102, 1106 n.3 (8th Cir. 2021) (assuming, without deciding, that defendant
had standing to challenge search warrants before deciding whether those search
warrants were supported by probable cause); accord United States v. Ross, 964 F.3d
1034, 1040 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Unlike Article III standing . . . Fourth Amendment
‘standing’ is an ordinary, and waivable, aspect of the merits of a defendant’s
constitutional challenge.”). The magistrate judge assumed Fourth Amendment
standing in her report and recommendation, noting that the standing inquiry was
“complicated by the state of the evidentiary record.” The district court did not
address Fourth Amendment standing. Because full consideration of this issue would
likely require a more developed factual record, we assume, without deciding, that
Juneau has standing to challenge the search warrants before us.
III.
Having assumed Fourth Amendment standing, we now address Juneau’s
contention that the Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids search warrants were
unsupported by probable cause, contrary to the district court’s ruling. We review

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the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
Allen, 43 F.4th at 907.
In reviewing whether a warrant was supported by probable cause, our role is
to ensure that the issuing judge “had a ‘substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed.’” United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted). “Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States
v. Gater, 868 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983)). Mindful that “[p]robable cause . . . is not a high bar,” Kaley v. United
States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014), we pay “great deference” to the issuing judge’s
determination, Johnson, 848 F.3d at 876 (citation omitted). “When, as here, the
issuing court relies solely on an affidavit to determine whether probable cause
[exists], only the information ‘found within the four corners of the affidavit may be
considered.’” United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 286 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
A.
We first consider the Columbia Heights search warrant. Juneau argues that
the affidavit exaggerated Juneau’s and Bolan’s criminal records and relied on stale
or imprecise information. Namely, the affidavit stated that Bolan had been convicted
of first-degree possession of a controlled substance when, in fact, Bolan had two
convictions for fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. And the affidavit
stated that Juneau had been convicted on possession-of-ammunition charges when,
in fact, those charges were dismissed. Further, the affidavit did not include the fact
that Juneau had moved out of the Columbia Heights residence even though officers
were allegedly aware of Juneau’s move.
Discounting those parts of the affidavit, what remains is sufficient to establish
probable cause. The trash pull, in particular, strongly supports a finding of probable
cause. As we have recognized time and again, “the recovery of drugs or drug

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paraphernalia from the garbage contributes significantly to establishing probable
cause.” United States v. Briscoe, 317 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2003); see also United
States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that “two plastic bags
with cocaine residue, two corners torn from plastic bags, Brillo pads, [and] a film
canister with white residue . . . were sufficient to establish probable cause that
cocaine was being possessed and consumed in [defendant’s] residence” (footnotes
omitted)); United States v. Shockley, 816 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding
that trash pull identifying “eight small, clear plastic sandwich bags with stretched
and torn corners; a small amount of a green leafy substance that tested positive for
THC; and eleven plastic gloves . . . was sufficient to support probable cause to
search [defendant’s] residence for controlled substances”). Indeed, in Briscoe, we
held that recovery of drug-related evidence in a trash pull can, in the right
circumstances, be “sufficient stand-alone evidence to establish probable cause.” 317
F.3d at 908.4
Here, a trash pull yielded multiple baggies containing methamphetamine
residue. On top of that, the affidavit pointed to Juneau’s prior controlled substance
conviction, a tip from an informant that Juneau was dealing methamphetamine, and
surveillance linking Juneau’s vehicle to the Columbia Heights residence.
Altogether, this evidence provided the issuing judge a substantial basis to find that
probable cause existed to search the Columbia Heights residence for evidence of
drug trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Thurmond, 782 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th
Cir. 2015) (holding that recovery of two marijuana roaches and other marijuana
blunt materials in trash pull, along with defendant’s “earlier arrest for possession of
4 At oral argument, defense counsel argued that the affidavit did not provide
enough facts linking Juneau to the trash pull. However, officers sought a warrant to
search the Columbia Heights residence—not Juneau himself—for evidence of drug-
trafficking crimes. While Juneau’s connection to the Columbia Heights residence is
relevant to establishing probable cause, it is not necessary. Cf. United States v.
Tellez, 217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here must be evidence of a nexus
between the contraband and the place to be searched before a warrant may properly
issue.” (emphasis added)).

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controlled substance[s] and his juvenile history with controlled substances,” was
sufficient for finding of probable cause). Thus, the district court did not err by
denying Juneau’s motion to suppress the evidence found pursuant to the Columbia
Heights warrant.5
B.
We next consider the Coon Rapids warrant. Juneau takes issue with several
inaccurate or imprecise details in the affidavit. He contends that probable cause was
undermined by the statement that, during the Columbia Heights search, “an ounce
of methamphetamine was recovered from a pair of bibs belonging to Juneau,”
though investigators never confirmed that the bibs were actually owned by Juneau.
Further, Juneau contends that the affidavit misleadingly represented that Juneau was
living at the Coon Rapids residence, despite contradictory information from
Juneau’s brother that he was living in Andover.
Notwithstanding these asserted inaccuracies, we conclude that the affidavit
provided the issuing judge a “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed” to search the Coon Rapids residence for evidence of drug trafficking.
Johnson, 848 F.3d at 876 (citation omitted). The affidavit relied heavily on the
investigation of Jamie Shore, a known drug dealer. Detective Neitzel linked Shore
5 At oral argument, defense counsel insisted that Juneau was also appealing the
district court’s denial of his motion for a Franks hearing. However, Juneau’s brief
only discusses the denial of his motions to suppress. See Appellant Br. 11, 16-17.
Thus, we deem the Franks argument waived. See United States v. Williams, 39 F.4th
1034, 1045 n.3 (8th Cir. 2022) (noting that issues not meaningfully argued by
Appellant in opening brief are waived). Even if we were to consider the Franks
argument, Juneau could not show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying Juneau’s motion for a Franks hearing because, as demonstrated above,
Juneau has not shown that “if the false information is excised (or the omitted
information is included), the [Columbia Heights] affidavit no longer establishes
probable cause.” United States v. Arnold, 725 F.3d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). The same goes for the Coon
Rapids warrant, as discussed below.

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to the Coon Rapids residence and tracked eighteen visits to the residence, several of
which were at night and lasted only a few minutes. Detective Neitzel believed, based
on his training and experience, that these visits were consistent with drug-trafficking
activity. See United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding
probable cause based, in part, on investigation linking a known drug dealer to an
apartment and “a great deal of short-term traffic to the apartment, consistent with
narcotics trafficking”). The affidavit also noted the presence of Juneau’s red truck
at the Coon Rapids residence and Juneau’s criminal history. See United States v.
Turner, 953 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding that defendant’s prior drug
convictions and the presence of his car at the place to be searched contributed to
finding of probable cause). Further, the affidavit cited what investigators believed
to be a drug transaction conducted by Shore immediately after he left the Coon
Rapids residence one evening, though this was later proven inaccurate. See United
States v. Flores, 888 F.3d 537, 544 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding probable cause based, in
part, on undercover officer “witness[ing] what he reasonably believed to be a hand-
to-hand drug buy”). Based on the “totality of the circumstances,” the details cited
in the affidavit are “sufficient to create a fair probability that evidence of a crime
[would] be found” at the Coon Rapids residence. Johnson, 848 F.3d at 876.
Even if the Coon Rapids affidavit was imperfect, perfection is not required for
a search warrant to survive appellate review. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
(“[A]ffidavits ‘are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a
criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted
under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.’” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Juneau’s motion to suppress
the evidence found pursuant to the Coon Rapids warrant.
IV.
Finally, Juneau contends that the district court should have suppressed the
firearms found at the Coon Rapids residence because the search warrant did not

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include firearms in its list of things to be seized at the Coon Rapids residence, as the
Fourth Amendment requires. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
However, the warrant requirement has exceptions, and one such exception
applies here. Under the plain-view doctrine, law enforcement may “seize an object
without a warrant if ‘(1) the officer lawfully arrived at the location from which he or
she views the object, (2) the object’s incriminating character is immediately
apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.’” United
States v. Saddler, 19 F.4th 1035, 1041-42 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Juneau
only challenges the second factor—whether the “incriminating character” of the
firearms was “immediately apparent” to the officers executing the search at the Coon
Rapids residence. We have held that “[a]n item’s incriminatory nature is
immediately apparent if the officer at that moment had probable cause to associate
the property with criminal activity.” United States v. Figueroa-Serrano, 971 F.3d
806, 811 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Here, the incriminating character of the firearms was immediately apparent to
the officers executing the Coon Rapids search warrant. Officers had just located
roughly 25 grams of methamphetamine in a cabinet inside a garage at the Coon
Rapids residence. They then found the firearms in a safe on top of the cabinet. We
have held that when firearms are found directly adjacent to controlled substances,
their incriminating nature is immediately apparent. See United States v. Hughes,
940 F.2d 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Cocaine is contraband, and the officers had
probable cause to associate the gun with criminal activity.”); United States v.
Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 928, 936 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he incriminating nature of the
guns was immediately apparent, as they were in close proximity to a plethora of
drugs and drug-related equipment.” (citation omitted)).
Further, the officers searching the home knew of Juneau’s criminal
background and his status as a felon, see R. Doc. 77, at 166 (“[W]e knew of
Mr. Juneau’s history.”), which would make his possession of the firearms a crime.
See Rodriguez, 711 F.3d at 936-37 (“[T]he incriminating nature of the guns was

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immediately apparent . . . also because the officers were aware of [defendant’s] prior
criminal record, likely making him ineligible to possess the firearms.” (citation
omitted)); United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A gun,
possessed by a felon, is always evidence of a crime.”). The firearms were found in
the garage near Juneau’s motorcycle, and, as the warrant explained, Juneau’s truck
had been observed at the Coon Rapids residence. Thus, the officers had probable
cause to believe the firearms belonged to Juneau. Because the firearms fit
comfortably within the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, the district
court did not err in denying Juneau’s motion to suppress.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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