The Satanic Temple v. City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 21-3079
___________________________
The Satanic Temple
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota; Councilman Cary Coop, as City Council Member
of the City of Belle Plaine, MN; Councilwoman Theresa McDaniel, as City
Council Member of the City of Belle Plaine, MN; Councilman Ben Stier, as City
Council Member of the City of Belle Plaine, MN; Councilman Paul Chard, as City
Council Member of the City of Belle Plaine, MN; Mayor Christopher Meyer, as
Mayor of the City of Belle Plaine, MN
Defendants - Appellees
___________________________
No. 21-3081
___________________________
The Satanic Temple
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota
Defendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
____________

-- 1 of 10 --

-2-
Submitted: December 15, 2022
Filed: August 30, 2023
____________
Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
____________
KOBES, Circuit Judge.
The City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota, designated Veterans Memorial Park as a
limited public forum and granted permits to two groups to place monuments there.
Before the Satanic Temple could place its monument, the City closed the Park as a
limited public forum and terminated both permits.
The Satanic Temple sued the City. The district court1 dismissed its claims,
except for promissory estoppel, without prejudice. When the Satanic Temple moved
to amend its complaint, a Magistrate Judge2 denied its motion. So the Satanic
Temple filed a second suit, reasserting the dismissed claims and adding new ones.
The district court held that res judicata bars the second suit and granted summary
judgment to the City on the promissory estoppel claim from the first suit. We affirm.
I.
After a resident placed a statue of a soldier kneeling before a cross in the Park
without the City’s permission, someone threatened to sue and the City removed the
statue. The Belle Plaine City Council then passed an “Enacting Resolution,” which
designated the Park as a limited public forum and allowed people with a permit to
place monuments.
1 The Honorable Wilhelmina Wright, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.
2 The Honorable Leo I. Brisbois, United States Magistrate Judge for the
District of Minnesota.

-- 2 of 10 --

-3-
In March 2017, the City gave two groups permits: the Belle Plaine Veterans
Club and the Satanic Temple. The Veterans Club returned the kneeling soldier statue
to the Park in April, but the Satanic Temple’s display wasn’t ready yet. While the
Satanic Temple’s display was being built, people objected to it being placed in the
Park. In June, the Satanic Temple told the City that its display was ready. The City
Council then passed a “Recission Resolution,” closing the Park as a limited public
forum, terminating both permits, and instructing the Veterans Club to remove its
statue.
The Satanic Temple sued the City (Satanic Temple I). It alleged that the City
had violated the U.S. Constitution, Minnesota Constitution, and Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and that the City was liable under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. After both parties moved for judgment on the
pleadings, the district court dismissed the constitutional and RLUIPA claims without
prejudice but allowed the promissory estoppel claim to move forward. A Magistrate
Judge denied the Satanic Temple’s attempt to amend its complaint. So it sued again
(Satanic Temple II), reasserting the constitutional claims dismissed from Satanic
Temple I and bringing new claims under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. The
district court granted summary judgment to the City on the promissory estoppel
claim from Satanic Temple I and dismissed the Satanic Temple II claims on res
judicata grounds. The Satanic Temple appeals.
II.
We start with Satanic Temple I. The Satanic Temple appeals the dismissal of
its free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and RLUIPA claims, and it appeals
the grant of summary judgment to the City on its promissory estoppel claim. We
review de novo orders granting judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment.
Levitt v. Merck & Co., 914 F.3d 1169, 1171 (8th Cir. 2019) (judgment on the
pleadings); Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075, 1082 (8th Cir. 2021)
(summary judgment).

-- 3 of 10 --

-4-
A.
The Satanic Temple first asserts that the City violated its free speech rights
under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. The parties agree that the Park was a
limited public forum. In a limited public forum, the government limits “expressive
activity to certain kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain subjects.”
Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Restrictions
on speech in a limited public forum must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id.
The Satanic Temple argues that it was viewpoint discrimination to close the
Park after its display was ready. But “[n]othing in the Constitution requires the
Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free
speech on every type of Government property.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985). And the Government is not required to
keep limited public forums open. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). The City closed the limited public forum to everyone,
not just speakers with certain views. The Satanic Temple has not plausibly alleged
that closing the Park as a limited public forum was unreasonable or viewpoint
discriminatory.3
B.
The Satanic Temple also asserts that the City violated its free exercise rights.
Although the Enacting and Recession Resolutions were facially neutral, facial
neutrality is not a safe harbor if the City’s actions targeted the Satanic Temple’s
religious conduct. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“The Free Exercise Clause . . . extends beyond facial
3 The free speech protection in the Minnesota Constitution “is coextensive with
the First Amendment,” so Minnesota “look[s] primarily to federal law for guidance.”
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Minn. 2012). Because the Satanic
Temple’s claim fails under the First Amendment, it fails under the Minnesota
Constitution.

-- 4 of 10 --

-5-
discrimination. . . . Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality.”).
The Satanic Temple fails to plausibly claim that its display was targeted. It
argues that the Veterans Club had ten months of display time, while it had none. But
the City did not approve the initial display of the kneeling soldier statue. After the
City passed the Enacting Resolution, it granted permits at the same time to the
Veterans Club and the Satanic Temple. And the Recission Resolution applied
equally to the Satanic Temple’s and the Veterans Club’s displays. The Satanic
Temple has not alleged any facts showing that its religious conduct was targeted for
“distinctive treatment.”4 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534.
The Satanic Temple also fails to state a claim under Article I, § 16, of the
Minnesota Constitution. To state a claim under § 16, the Satanic Temple must
plausibly allege that “the state action burdens the exercise of religious beliefs.” See
Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 442 (Minn.
2002). And to establish a burden, the Satanic Temple must show that “the risk of
interference with religious beliefs or practice is real and not ‘remote.’” Edina Cmty.
Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (citation
omitted). For a generally applicable law like the City’s resolutions, “the focus is on
whether compliance requires a change in ‘religious conduct or philosophy.’” Id.
(citation omitted). The Satanic Temple has not plausibly alleged that the City’s
resolutions burden its religious conduct or philosophy.
4 The Satanic Temple argues that it does not need to show that its display was
targeted because it is bringing a hybrid claim. In a hybrid claim, “‘the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech,’ can ‘bar[] application of a neutral, generally applicable law.’” Telescope
Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 759 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t
of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990)). But for its hybrid claim to
succeed, the Satanic Temple must establish an independently viable free speech
claim. Redlich v. City of St. Louis, 550 F. Supp. 3d 734, 763 (E.D. Mo. 2021), aff’d,
51 F.4th 283 (8th Cir. 2022). Because it has not done so, its hybrid claim fails.

-- 5 of 10 --

-6-
C.
The Satanic Temple argues next that the City violated the Equal Protection
Clause. To state an equal protection claim, the Satanic Temple must plausibly allege
that it was singled out and treated differently than similarly situated entities for a
prohibited purpose or motive, such as religious discrimination. See Ellebracht v.
Police Bd. of Metro. Police Dep’t, 137 F.3d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1998). It can clear
the pleading threshold for religious discrimination if the Rescission Resolution was
discriminatory on its face or had a discriminatory purpose or impact. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976).
The Satanic Temple has not plausibly alleged that it and the Veterans Club
were similarly situated or that it was treated differently. Nor has it plausibly alleged
that the Rescission Resolution was discriminatory on its face or had a discriminatory
purpose or impact. The City gave a permit to both groups, had no control over the
fact that the Veterans Club placed its statue first, and closed the Park as a limited
public forum to everyone. So the Satanic Temple has not plausibly alleged an equal
protection claim.
D.
The RLUIPA prohibits the Government from imposing a land use regulation
that substantially burdens the exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). The
Satanic Temple argues that the City’s permitting regime was an express easement
and that because the Recission Resolution terminated its permit, it infringed on its
reasonable expectation to use the land. See Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News,
813 F.3d 510, 515 (4th Cir. 2016). But the Satanic Temple cites no precedent saying
that a city-issued revocable park permit is an easement. And it didn’t allege that the
City acted pursuant to a land use regulation, like a zoning or landmarking law. Nor
did it allege any facts supporting its assertion that the City substantially burdened its
religious exercise. So the Satanic Temple has not stated a plausible RLUIPA claim.

-- 6 of 10 --

-7-
E.
We turn to the order granting summary judgment to the City on the Satanic
Temple’s promissory estoppel claim. In Minnesota, promissory estoppel has three
elements: (1) the promisor made a clear and definite promise, (2) the promisor
intended to induce reliance and such reliance occurred, and (3) the promise must be
enforced to prevent an injustice. Martens v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d
732, 746 (Minn. 2000).
The Satanic Temple argues that the permit to place its display in the Park is
the clear and definite promise it relied on. The permit, it says, consists of only the
“cover letter,” which does not mention the City’s ability to close the Park as a limited
public forum. But the district court found that the permit includes both the cover
letter and a copy of the permit application. And to complete the permit application,
the Satanic Temple had to agree to comply with the “Limited Public Forum
Policy”—a reference to the Enacting Resolution. The Enacting Resolution stated
that the City could terminate the permits by giving ten days’ notice and that within
that time the permit holders had to remove their displays from the Park.
We agree that the permit includes both the cover letter and the permit
application. The Satanic Temple’s contrary interpretation would mean that none of
the stipulations in the Enacting Resolution (about design, insurance, removal
requirements, etc.) apply to the monuments. But the cover letter included
“reminder[s]” about the permit requirements and enclosed the permit application.
Because the permit contemplated the City’s ability to close the Park as a
limited public forum at any time, the Satanic Temple could not detrimentally rely on
any guarantee from the City that it could display its monument for the original
duration of the permit. The City promised the Satanic Temple only an opportunity
to display its monument. And the City delivered: It gave the Satanic Temple a
permit, which gave the Satanic Temple an opportunity to put its display in the Park.
The Satanic Temple knew that the City could rescind the permit, and the City did so.

-- 7 of 10 --

-8-
III.
We turn to Satanic Temple II and review the district court’s res judicata
decision de novo. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Compaq Comput. Corp., 457
F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir. 2006).
The district court held that res judicata bars the Satanic Temple’s
constitutional claims from Satanic Temple I. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “bars
relitigation of the same claim between parties . . . where a final judgment has been
rendered upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.” In re Anderberg-
Lund Printing Co., 109 F.3d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Res
judicata applies if “(1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the
first suit was based on proper jurisdiction; (3) both suits involve the same
parties . . . ; and (4) both suits are based upon the same claims or causes of action.”
Elbert v. Carter, 903 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
In Satanic Temple I, the district court dismissed the Satanic Temple’s claims
without prejudice, and a Magistrate Judge later denied the Satanic Temple’s motion
to amend its complaint. The Satanic Temple concedes that both suits involve the
same parties and are based on the same claims or causes of action. But it argues that
its first suit did not result in a final judgment on the merits and that, even if it did,
the Magistrate Judge did not have proper authority over it.
A.
Dismissing a claim without prejudice is not a judgment on the merits. See Al-
Saadoon v. Barr, 973 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2020). But denying a motion to amend
is a final judgment on the merits for the purposes of claim preclusion:
The denial of a motion to amend a complaint in one action is a final
judgment on the merits barring the [claims in the proposed amended]
complaint in a later action. . . . This is so even when denial of leave to
amend is based on reasons other than the merits, such as timeliness.

-- 8 of 10 --

-9-
Pro. Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. KPMG LLP, 345 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (citations omitted); see also King v. Hoover Grp., Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 222–
23 (8th Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled that the denial of leave to amend constitutes res
judicata on the merits of the claims which were the subject of the proposed amended
pleadings.”).
The Satanic Temple tries to distinguish Professional Management Associates
and King on the ground that the barred claims in those cases were ruled on at
summary judgment or dismissed with prejudice. But that doesn’t matter. The
preclusive effect comes from a litigant’s obligation to “bring all claims at once
against the same defendant relating to the same transaction or event.” N. Assurance
Co. of Am. v. Square D Co., 201 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he actual decision
denying leave to amend is no more than a proxy to signify at what point claims have
been forfeited due to a plaintiff’s failure to pursue all claims against a particular
defendant in one suit.”). So the denial of leave to amend “constitutes res judicata on
the merits of the claims” the Satanic Temple wanted to assert. See King, 958 F.2d
at 222–23.
B.
The Satanic Temple argues that if the denial of its motion to amend was a final
judgment on the merits, then the Magistrate Judge lacked the power to enter that
order. Magistrate Judges cannot issue a binding decision on a dispositive motion
without the parties’ consent. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); N. Bottling Co. v. Pepsico,
Inc., 5 F.4th 917, 924 (8th Cir. 2021). The Satanic Temple argues that because it
did not consent, the Magistrate Judge lacked the power to enter the order denying it
leave to amend its complaint—the “final judgment on the merits” for res judicata.
The Satanic Temple conflates a “binding decision on a dispositive motion”
with a “final judgment on the merits.” The Magistrate Judge’s denial of the motion
to amend did not dispose of any claims in Satanic Temple I. Rather, it prevented the

-- 9 of 10 --

-10-
Satanic Temple from later reasserting the claims that the district court had already
dismissed. See Daley v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 415 F.3d 889, 893 n.9 (8th Cir. 2005)
(referring to a Magistrate Judge’s denial of a motion to amend as an “order denying
[a] nondispositive pretrial motion”); cf. Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 595
(7th Cir. 2006) (treating as nondispositive a motion to amend that “did not terminate
[the] existing lawsuit” but “merely prevented” the plaintiff from adding a party). So
it was not a binding decision on a dispositive motion. Because the Magistrate Judge
had the authority to decide the Satanic Temple’s motion to amend its complaint, see
§ 636(b)(1)(A); Daley, 415 F.3d at 893 n.9, the Magistrate Judge properly entered
the order here that constitutes the “final judgment on the merits” for res judicata.
IV.
For the reasons above, we affirm the district court.
______________________________

-- 10 of 10 --