United States of America v. Jerry Smith

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 21-3660
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jerry Smith
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
____________
Submitted: September 19, 2023
Filed: November 6, 2023
[Unpublished]
____________
Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Jerry Smith appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion to dismiss the
Government’s petition for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

-- 1 of 4 --

-2-
Smith was charged in the District of New Mexico with assault causing bodily
injury and assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113 and
1153. After the district court granted Smith’s unopposed motion for a
mental-competency examination under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), Smith’s examination
report concluded that he was not competent to stand trial and that it could not be
determined if he would later attain competency. Based on the report and the parties’
stipulations, the court found Smith incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to § 4241(d),
it ordered him to be committed to the Attorney General’s custody for a reasonable
period not exceeding four months to determine whether there was a substantial
probability that he would later attain capacity.
Smith was designated to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in
Springfield, Missouri, and after a second report concluded that Smith was unlikely
to be restored to competency, the district court ordered civil commitment
proceedings to begin under § 4246.
Pursuant to § 4246, a Risk Assessment Panel found that Smith would pose a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another or damage to property if released, and
recommended he be civilly committed. Accordingly, the Government filed a § 4246
civil commitment petition in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri—the district where Smith was confined.
Smith moved to dismiss the Government’s § 4246 petition. He argued that
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico had committed him
for longer than the four months allowed by § 4241(d)(1), and therefore he was no
longer legally in the custody of the Attorney General when the § 4246 petition was
filed. This, he argued, meant that the civilly committing court—the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri—lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and statutory authority to commit him under § 4246.
At the time of Smith’s motion and the district court’s ruling, this Court had
not decided whether the time limits imposed on custody with the Attorney General

-- 2 of 4 --

-3-
by § 4241 were jurisdictional elements of § 4246 civil commitment proceedings.
Still, the district court reasoned that the proper place to challenge a violation of
§ 4241’s time limits was before the court that ordered the evaluation under § 4246,
not the civilly committing court. Having jurisdiction over the § 4246 proceedings,
but not the underlying § 4241 proceedings, the district court declined to disturb the
original order placing Smith in the custody of the Attorney General.
Since the district court’s ruling, and while the instant appeal was pending, this
Court had occasion to consider the jurisdictional question posed by Smith. See
United States v. Ryan, 52 F.4th 719 (8th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1791
(2023). In Ryan, this Court held that a defendant’s commitment to the custody of
the Attorney General pursuant to § 4241(d) is not a jurisdictional element of
§ 4246(a). Id. at 722. Accordingly, we held that § 4246(a)’s requirement2 that a
defendant be committed to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4241(d) is
waivable. Id. A defendant waives a challenge to § 4246 commitment proceedings
based on his custody under § 4241(d) if he fails to challenge the duration of that
custody in the court that ordered it. Id.
We review de novo Smith’s motion to dismiss the § 4246 petition. Id. at 721.
On appeal, Smith raises the same arguments as he did before the district court: first,
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and statutory authority to
commit him under § 4246 because he had been held for longer than the four months
permitted by § 4241; and second, that his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were
violated by the delays. But, like the defendant in Ryan, Smith failed to raise these
challenges before the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
See id. at 722, 723 n.3. These claims are therefore waived.
2 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) also permits commitment proceedings against persons
in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whose sentences are about to expire, and
persons against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons
related to their mental conditions. In this case, however, neither party argues that
Smith falls into either alternative category.

-- 3 of 4 --

-4-
Finally, Smith urges us to reverse our holding in Ryan. But “[i]t is a cardinal
rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.” Mader
v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citations and
quotations omitted). Whatever the merits of Smith’s arguments as to Ryan, we are
bound to follow it.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the district court.
______________________________

-- 4 of 4 --