United States of America v. Baudeleo Mejia-Mejia, also known as Francisco Morales

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-1795
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Baudeleo Mejia-Mejia, also known as Francisco Morales
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Delta
____________
Submitted: November 13, 2023
Filed: February 28, 2024
[Unpublished]
____________
Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Baudeleo Mejia-Mejia pled guilty to being an “[a]lien in possession of a
firearm, a Class C felony,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(5). Mejia-Mejia
appeals, claiming two errors (1) the district court violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment in imposing a written sentence containing standard
and mandatory conditions that were not in its oral pronouncement, and (2) the district

-- 1 of 4 --

-2-
court’s above-Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court
abused its discretion when it placed too much weight on the seriousness of his
offense, the danger to the public, and deterrence. Because a sentencing court cannot
alter the sentence of a criminal defendant after he has begun serving his sentence,
we vacate imposition of the 12 standard conditions neither referenced nor
pronounced at sentencing. We otherwise affirm the sentence.
“The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a sentencing court from increasing a
defendant’s sentence after the defendant has developed a legitimate ‘expectation of
finality in the original sentence.’” United States v. Harrison, 113 F.3d 135, 138 (8th
Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980)). At
Mejia-Mejia’s sentencing, the district court imposed a term of 48 months’
imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. While on supervised
release, the court informed Mejia-Mejia that he would be required to contact the
probation office in the district to which he is released within 72 hours, and that if
Mejia-Mejia is deported, he is not to return to the United States illegally. The written
judgment included 12 additional standard conditions, and the mandatory condition
that Mejia-Mejia cooperate with DNA collection by the probation officer.
Because Mejia-Mejia’s double jeopardy claim presents a legal question, we
review it de novo. United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d 1082, 1096 (8th Cir. 2011).
When the written judgment conflicts with an oral sentence, the oral sentence
controls. United States v. Foster, 514 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2008). This rule
“affords the defendant an opportunity to object, raise concerns and challenges as to
the sentence, and seek tailored conditions of supervised release limited to what is
‘reasonably necessary’ to meet sentencing objectives.” United States v. Walker, 80
F.4th 880, 882 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)).
Other cases raising double jeopardy claims premised on a sentencing court’s
alleged failure to expressly announce it was imposing standard supervised release
conditions have failed because this Court found the defendants received sufficient
notice at the time of the oral pronouncement that their sentence would be subject to

-- 2 of 4 --

-3-
standard conditions. See, e.g., White Bull, 646 F.3d at 1096; United States v.
Drapeau, 644 F.3d 646, 656 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Little Bear, 413 Fed.
App’x 942, 945 (8th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); United States v. Demery, 674 F.3d
776, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2011). This case is distinguishable from those cases because
at no time during sentencing did the district court identify or even reference the
imposition of 12 standard supervised release conditions that were included in the
judgment.
In another case, not involving a double jeopardy argument, this Court
remanded for resentencing when the district court discussed at sentencing two
special conditions of supervised release tailored to the defendant’s personal and
offense characteristics but failed to address the standard supervised release
conditions and a third special condition that were included in the judgment. Walker,
80 F.4th at 882. The Court reasoned the error was a mere oversight, observing that
“[a]s a practical matter, it would be virtually impossible to supervise a defendant or
verify compliance with the two special conditions that were orally pronounced
without at least some of the standard conditions of supervised release being
imposed.” Id.
Unlike Walker, we are unable to connect the two supervised release conditions
expressly imposed by the district court with the 12 additional standard conditions
imposed in the judgment. Unlike in the other cases challenging the imposition of
standard conditions, we can find no statement at sentencing putting Mejia-Mejia on
notice that additional conditions of supervised release were being contemplated,
much less imposed, by the district court. We vacate the 12 standard conditions of
supervised release contained in the judgment that were not referenced or pronounced
at sentencing. While Mejia-Mejia also challenges the mandatory DNA collection
requirement, this is a statutorily mandated condition that Mejia-Mejia must comply
with while on supervision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (“[t]he court shall order, as an
explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant cooperate in the
collection of a DNA sample from the defendant, . . . .”).

-- 3 of 4 --

-4-
Regarding Mejia-Mejia’s challenge to the imprisonment term imposed by the
district court, the Sentencing Guidelines range calculated by the district court was
18 to 24 months. A district court may vary upward by relying on factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Drew, 9 F.4th 718, 725 (8th Cir. 2021). Here,
the record shows the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and found an
upward variance was warranted due to Mejia-Mejia’s conduct, which included
discharging a firearm into the front windshield of a tractor trailer. While the district
court placed more weight on certain factors than Mejia-Mejia wanted, such as the
seriousness of this offense, the danger Mejia-Mejia posed to the public, and
deterrence, it is not an abuse of discretion to vary upward for these reasons. See
Drew, 9 F.4th at 725-26 (rejecting argument that upward variance was substantively
unreasonable when the district court considered the defendant’s earlier in-custody
conduct, his criminal history, the timing of the offense, the need for respect for the
law, and public safety). The district court did not abuse its wide sentencing
discretion or impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate imposition of the 12 standard conditions
of supervised release that were not pronounced at sentencing and remand with
directions that the judgment be amended to remove these conditions. We affirm the
sentence in all other respects.
______________________________

-- 4 of 4 --