James Hunter v. Page County, Iowa

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-1405
___________________________
James Hunter; Sheri Hunter; Bradley Hutchison; Katherine Hutchison; Susan
Kelley; William McConnell; Cindy O’Hearn; Michael O’Hearn; Barbara Oliver;
James Rine; Mary Rine; Stephanie Sholes
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Page County, Iowa; Board of Supervisors of Page County, Iowa; Alan Armstrong;
Jacob Holmes; James King; Chuck Morris; Carl Sonksen
Defendants - Appellees
Shenandoah Hills Wind Project, LLC
Intervenor - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Western
____________
Submitted: October 19, 2023
Filed: May 17, 2024
____________

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge,1 LOKEN and COLLOTON,2 Circuit Judges.
____________
SMITH, Chief Judge.
The Board of Supervisors of Page County, Iowa (Board) issued a commercial
wind energy permit to Shenandoah Hills Wind Project, LLC (SHW) to erect wind
turbines in Page County, Iowa (County). Plaintiffs, who own properties or reside
near proposed turbine sites, sued the County, the Board, and County officials
(collectively, “defendants”) in Iowa state court. Plaintiffs claimed that (1) the
permit’s issuance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution; (2) it violated the Iowa Constitution, Iowa Code, and
County ordinances; and (3) County officials, in violation of the Iowa Open Meetings
Act, held nonpublic meetings on SHW’s application. Defendants removed the case
to federal court based on the federal due process claim.
The district court exercised federal question jurisdiction over the federal due
process claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. It dismissed the
federal due process claim for lack of prudential standing and as implausibly pleaded
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It further dismissed the state claims
as time-barred under Iowa law and implausibly pleaded under Rule 12(b)(6). A few
days later, the County revoked the permit. Even though the permit has been revoked,
plaintiffs have appealed the district court’s order.
Although the parties have not raised jurisdiction as an issue in this appeal, we
have an independent obligation to determine whether a dispute is a constitutional
case or controversy that we may decide. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For the reasons
1 Judge Smith completed his term as chief judge of the circuit on March 10,
2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A).
2 Judge Colloton became chief judge of the circuit on March 11, 2024. See 28
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).

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stated herein, we hold that the County’s revocation of SHW’s permit mooted
plaintiffs’ claims, except their claims under the Iowa Open Meetings Act. The
district court permissibly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining
claims and properly dismissed them. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
Since 1983, the State of Iowa has promoted the development of alternative
energy resources, including wind, solar, and hydroelectric energy. Iowa Code
§§ 476.41–.42. As of 2022, Iowa exceeded every other state in the percentage of
wind energy—62 percent—used to meet residents’ electricity demands. U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Iowa: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. Energy Atlas, https://
www.eia.gov/state/?sid=IA (accessed Mar. 28, 2024). In Iowa, county governments
play an integral role in assisting the state government’s efforts to develop wind
energy. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 476.48 (“Small wind innovation zone program”).
In accordance with these statewide efforts, the Board enacted the Wind
Energy Conversion Systems on Property Located in the Unincorporated Areas of
Page County Ordinance (Wind Ordinance) in 2019. The Wind Ordinance establishes
a framework for siting, building, and operating commercial wind turbines in the
County. According to plaintiffs, the Board enacted the Wind Ordinance at the behest
of representatives of Invenergy Renewables Holdings LLC (Invenergy)—a privately
owned, international developer of alternative energy resources. SHW, the intervenor
in this case, is Invenergy’s subsidiary. SHW was created to develop the Shenandoah
Hills Wind Project in Page and Fremont Counties, Iowa.3
3 Fremont County’s portion of the project is being litigated entirely in Iowa
state court. The trial court dismissed the case. That dismissal is on appeal. See
Jennings v. Fremont Cnty., No. EQCV025651 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Fremont Cnty. 2023),
No. 23-1101 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). SHW originally aimed to begin operations by
December 1, 2023. That date was moved to December 1, 2024. Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm’n Rep. ¶ 61,029, 2023 WL 398007 (Jan. 25, 2023).

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Pursuant to the Wind Ordinance, Invenergy and SHW applied for a
Commercial Wind Energy Conversion Systems (C-WECS) permit in March 2022.
Obtaining a C-WECS permit was merely the first of several steps that Invenergy and
SHW would need to complete before proceeding with their proposed project. They
would also need further regulatory approvals, including building or construction
permits, a road-use agreement, and a decommissioning plan. The County’s zoning
administrator thoroughly reviewed Invenergy and SHW’s application, determined
that it complied with the Wind Ordinance, and forwarded it to the Board. The Board
conducted its own review, consulted outside counsel, received public comments, and
ultimately issued a C-WECS permit in August 2022.
Plaintiffs are County residents who oppose the project. They own properties
near proposed turbine sites. They are concerned that turbines would interfere with
the use, enjoyment, and values of their properties and could injure bald eagles,
migratory birds, bats, butterflies, and other winged species. In Iowa state court,
plaintiffs filed a 219-page complaint against the County and its Board, supervisors,
zoning administrator, and attorney. Plaintiffs made numerous claims. These
included claims that the Wind Ordinance is void for vagueness under the due process
clauses of the federal and state constitutions; the Board did not follow proper
procedures when it enacted the Wind Ordinance, and an older zoning ordinance still
controls;4 issuance of a permit to SHW was arbitrary and capricious under Iowa law;
the Board unlawfully favored SHW by considering its application despite a local
moratorium on new wind projects; the Board exceeded its authority under home-rule
provisions in Iowa law; one Board member was conflicted when he voted because
4 A 1997 ordinance imposes a height limit of 2½ stories on new structures in
the agricultural zone. Of course, commercial wind turbines are normally much taller.
See Patricia E. Salkin, 4 Am. L. Zoning § 37:9 (5th ed.) (“Because commercial wind
turbines are tall and are most effectively placed above tree-lines on hilltops,
ridgelines, and elevated plateaus, they can often be seen from a great distance and
may alter landscapes.” (footnote omitted)); id. at n.66 (“Wind turbine sizes vary
depending on the type of turbine. A large utility-size turbine would have a total
height . . . of about 440 feet.”).

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he had an interest in a Nebraska company that explores for minerals, some of which
can be used in wind turbines; and County officials violated the Iowa Open Meetings
Act by holding nonpublic meetings with Invenergy and SHW lobbyists. Plaintiffs’
entire complaint sounded in Iowa law, except for their federal due process claim.
Based on the federal due process claim, defendants removed this case from
state court to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446. The district court
exercised federal question jurisdiction over the federal due process claim and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. See id. §§ 1331, 1367(a). SHW
intervened to defend its interests in the project. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
During the district court proceedings, County voters elected County officials
who opposed the project. Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to Iowa state court,
defendants (the new officials) consented to remand, and intervenor SHW opposed
remand. Against the express desires of plaintiffs and defendants, the district court
declined to remand the case. It cited a “public interest” in developing alternative
energy resources, federal and state interests in developing these resources, SHW’s
interest in moving forward with the project, and judicial interests in “efficiency” and
“economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Hunter v. Page Cnty., 653 F. Supp.
3d 600, 606, 613, 615 (S.D. Iowa 2023).
On January 31, 2023, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims. It first
concluded that plaintiffs had constitutional but not prudential standing to bring their
federal due process claim. Thus, it dismissed this claim and cited implausibility as
an alternative rationale. Next, the district court exercised its discretion and retained
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state claims, notwithstanding its dismissal
of the only federal claim. Then, the district court addressed defendants’ and
intervenor’s Rule 12(b)(6) motions. The district court concluded that plaintiffs’ state
claims were time-barred under Iowa law and implausible on their face. See id. at 616
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
On February 3, 2023, the County’s zoning administrator sent a letter to SHW,
purporting to revoke the C-WECS permit. SHW appealed to the County Board of
Adjustment. On March 3, 2023, the Board of Adjustment upheld the decision to

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revoke the permit.5 On March 9, 2023, SHW filed a complaint in the federal district
court against the County, Board of Supervisors, Board of Adjustment, zoning
administrator, and other County officials. Am. Compl., SHW v. Page Cnty., No.
1:23-CV-00005-SMR-SBJ (S.D. Iowa Mar. 9, 2023), ECF No. 4. Among other
things, SHW claimed violations of its property interests under the Takings and Due
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
On February 27, 2023, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal in this case. No party
suggested that this case became moot after the zoning administrator’s decision of
February 3, 2023, or the Board of Adjustment’s decision of March 3, 2023.
II. Discussion
In this appeal, the parties have meaningfully addressed a number of issues.
However, we begin this discussion with an issue that no party raised: whether this
case became moot after the County revoked SHW’s C-WECS permit.
A. Mootness
Article III of the United States Constitution requires this court, in every case,
to make an independent determination about its own jurisdiction. Thomas v. Basham,
931 F.2d 521, 522–23 (8th Cir. 1991). Even if the parties do not raise a jurisdictional
issue, it is the court’s duty to raise the issue of its own accord, or sua sponte. Id. at
523. At all stages of litigation, including throughout any appeals, “a live case or
5 Under the res judicata doctrine, an administrative agency’s decision can have
preclusive effect. Johnson v. Vilsack, 833 F.3d 948, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2016); accord
Ghost Player, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 906 N.W.2d 454, 465 (Iowa 2018)
(same under Iowa law). However, res judicata is not an issue here. Even if the Board
of Adjustment qualifies as an administrative agency, acted in the requisite capacity,
and issued a final and binding decision, its decision would not bind us because this
case involves different parties. See Satanic Temple v. City of Belle Plaine, 80 F.4th
864, 870 (8th Cir. 2023) (stating that, under federal law, both actions must “involve
the same parties”); accord Pavone v. Kirke, 807 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 2011) (same
under Iowa law). In the zoning appeal, the parties were SHW and County defendants.
Here, the parties are County residents and County defendants.

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controversy” must exist between the parties. Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 67 (1997); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (defining the judicial power).
At every stage, the plaintiff must be injured in fact, a causal connection must exist
between the injury and an action of the defendant, and there must be a likelihood
that a favorable decision from the court will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Absent a case or controversy of this kind, the
court has “no business deciding legal disputes or expounding on law.” Already, LLC
v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A pending case becomes moot when circumstances change and the parties’
dispute ceases to exist. Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973, 976 (8th Cir. 2013). A moot
case is a “dispute [that] is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the
plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.” Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 (2009). After a
case becomes moot, plaintiffs may continue to have general interests in some matter
of public policy. But the proper forum for advocating these interests is not a federal
courthouse. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016) (discussing the
federal judiciary’s circumscribed role). A federal court loses its jurisdiction when
plaintiffs no longer have a “personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,” or a stake
unique to them. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)
(quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990)).
Here, plaintiffs alleged various harms arising from the County’s decision to
issue a C-WECS permit to SHW. Essentially, they contended that the County
violated their rights by approving a commercial wind project near their properties.
When the County issued the permit and plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in 2022, a live
case or controversy existed between them. The claims remained viable when the
district court issued its order on January 31, 2023. Days later, the County’s zoning
administrator revoked the permit. SHW appealed to the Board of Adjustment, which
upheld the revocation. At that point, almost all of plaintiffs’ claims died. The object
of their lawsuit was no longer viable. Plaintiffs might have lost their battle in the
district court, but they won their war in the County government. Cf. Phelps-Roper v.
City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 687 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (observing that the
repeal of a law ordinarily moots a case, unless the “capable of repetition yet evading

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review” rule applies); Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 856 n.7 (8th Cir. 1999)
(“The capable of repetition yet evading review rule is an extraordinary and narrow
exception to the mootness doctrine.”).
The absence of a live case or controversy notwithstanding, plaintiffs have
continued to press their expired claims in this appeal. Even though they are not
presently injured, plaintiffs argue that the federal judiciary must still construe the
Wind Ordinance and issue a declaratory judgment. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that
the County could repeat its action under the Wind Ordinance and issue a new C-
WECS permit near their properties, which could violate their rights. Oral Argument
at 1:14–2:47, 11:01–11:48. Alternatively, intervenor SHW argues that this case
remains live because our decision here could have some collateral effect on SHW’s
takings and due process claims in its separate action against County defendants,
which it filed in the federal district court. Id. at 15:17–16:07, 19:26–23:22; see SHW
v. Page Cnty., No. 1:23-CV-00005-SMR-SBJ, ECF Nos. 4, 15.6
We decline plaintiffs’ invitation to construe the Wind Ordinance, or instruct
the district court to do so, in the absence of an ongoing dispute that directly concerns
them. At this stage, this is no longer a dispute “about the plaintiffs’ particular legal
rights.” Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 93. It is about some unknown and unknowable future
set of plaintiffs, near whose properties a future permit might issue. This appeal has
become “an abstract dispute about the law, unlikely to affect these plaintiffs any
more than it affects other [County] citizens. And a dispute solely about the meaning
of a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or threatened harm, falls outside the
scope of the constitutional words ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Id.
6 The County suggests a “ripeness issue.” Oral Argument at 28:18–29:33.
Mootness and ripeness are both aspects of the Constitution’s case-or-controversy
requirement. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). The
difference is that a case is moot when it has died and unripe when it has never lived.
Already, 568 U.S. at 91; Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998).

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Given that County voters recently replaced County officials and that County
officials recently revoked SHW’s C-WECS permit, there is no reason to think that
these plaintiffs face any actual or threatened harm greater than that of other County
residents. Id. Their arguments on appeal are either generalized grievances against a
past set of County officials, who no longer hold office, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568,
575–76, or hypothetical, conjectural, or speculative grievances against some future
set of County officials, who might (or might not) act under the Wind Ordinance and
might (or might not) approve future applications for permits, see id. at 560–61. Even
when parties seek a declaratory judgment, as here, the federal courts do not decide
disputes about generalized past grievances or hypothetical future harms. Plaintiffs
present “no controversy of sufficient immediacy and reliability to warrant
declaratory relief.” Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2012); cf. City
Union Mission, Inc. v. Sharp, 36 F.4th 810, 815–16 (8th Cir. 2022) (concluding that
a county official’s resignation mooted a declaratory judgment action when
remaining officials took the position that the previous official was mistaken);
Prowse v. Payne, 984 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the court usually
dismisses a case as moot when a governmental defendant has voluntarily ceased its
challenged behavior).
Similarly, we decline intervenor SHW’s invitation. When we address a case’s
potential mootness, we concern ourselves with “the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights”
and not the interests of outside parties. Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 93. Here, plaintiffs’ case
against the County became moot when the County changed its position and revoked
the permit of which plaintiffs complained. Then, SHW brought its own appeal to the
Board of Adjustment and its own lawsuit to the federal district court. In its federal
lawsuit, SHW claimed, among other things, that the County violated its property and
due process rights. See Am. Compl. at 29–31, SHW v. Page Cnty., No. 1:23-CV-
00005-SMR-SBJ, ECF No. 4. The local appeal or the federal lawsuit was the proper
vehicle for SHW to litigate its interests. The instant case is not a substitute vehicle.
See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 67; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; cf. Local No. 93, Int’l

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Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528–30 (1986). Under these
circumstances, a party must bring its own challenge. SHW has done so twice.7
All that remains, then, are plaintiffs’ claims against County officials under the
Iowa Open Meetings Act. Iowa Code §§ 21.1–.11. The County’s revocation of
SHW’s permit mooted all other claims. Under Iowa law, an Open Meetings violation
is an independent harm on which an Iowan may recover statutory damages, attorney
fees, and costs, regardless of the final action public officials took. Id. § 21.6.
Here, the issuance of the C-WECS permit and its later revocation make no
difference to plaintiffs’ Open Meetings claims for statutory damages, attorney fees,
and costs. If County officials held nonpublic meetings in violation of Iowa law and
if plaintiffs timely filed their complaint, then plaintiffs have a right to recover under
Iowa law. Furthermore, because plaintiffs were interested in the siting of new wind
turbines as affected property owners and observers of certain animal species, these
state claims are justiciable in federal court. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937) (defining justiciability); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711
F.3d 844, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he violation of a procedural right can
constitute an injury in fact so long as the procedures in question are designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest of the petitioner that is the ultimate basis
of his standing.” (cleaned up)); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (stating that aesthetic injuries are
7 Above, we have already described SHW’s appeal to the Board of Adjustment
and the Board of Adjustment’s rejection of the appeal on March 3, 2023. SHW chose
not to appeal further. See Iowa Code § 414.15 (affording persons aggrieved by board
of adjustment decisions 30 days to petition for judicial review in state court). Instead,
SHW filed a federal lawsuit against the Board of Adjustment, its members, and other
defendants. The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, dismissed the lawsuit on March 18, 2024.
She gave SHW 14 days to amend its complaint. See SHW v. Page Cnty., No. 1:23-
CV-00005-SMR-SBJ, ECF No. 15. We express no opinion on that case.

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injuries in fact).8 The County’s revocation of SHW’s permit provided plaintiffs the
equivalent of the vacatur they sought under Iowa Code § 21.6(3)(c), but not the
monetary sums they seek under Iowa Code §§ 21.6(3)(a) and 21.6(3)(b).
Plaintiffs’ Open Meetings claims for damages, fees, and costs continue to
present a live case or controversy. We now address these claims.
B. Iowa Open Meetings Act
When we interpret a state statute, we review de novo the determinations of
the district court. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991). We take
our guidance from decisions of the state’s highest court, which we treat as binding.
N. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. EOG Res., Inc., 970 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2020). When there
are no such decisions on point, we predict how a state’s highest court would decide
an issue by looking to other reliable indicators of state law, including the decisions
of other state courts, decisions in analogous cases, and considered dicta. Id.; Olmsted
Med. Ctr. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 65 F.4th 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2023).
The Iowa Open Meetings Act aims to promote openness and transparency in
state and local government. Iowa Code § 21.1. The Act imposes on state and local
government bodies, including county boards, a duty to conduct their official business
in open session, or “meeting[s] to which all members of the public have access.” Id.
§ 21.2. The Act “is to be liberally construed. Its purpose is to prohibit secret or star
chamber sessions of public bodies, to require such meetings to be open and to permit
the public to be present.” Donahue v. State, 474 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Iowa 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Any aggrieved person, taxpayer to, or citizen
of, the state of Iowa, or the attorney general or county attorney” may bring an action
to enforce the Act. Iowa Code § 21.6(1). If the court finds a violation, it must assess
statutory damages of $100 to $2,500, which the defendant pays to the government.
Id. § 21.6(3). In addition, a violating defendant must pay the plaintiff’s “costs and
8 The existence, scope, and remedies for violations of plaintiffs’ procedural
rights are questions of state law, but their justiciability in federal court is a question
of federal law. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013).

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reasonable attorney fees.” Id. It is “mandatory” for the court to award these sums.
See Olinger v. Smith, 889 N.W.2d 476, 479–80 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).
Here, plaintiffs claim that County officials denied them the right to be present
at meetings pertinent to SHW’s application. They allege that County officials held
nonpublic meetings with representatives of Invenergy and SHW and that no
exceptions recognized by the Act applied. See Iowa Code § 21.5 (enumerating when
public bodies may hold closed sessions). If plaintiffs were to prove these allegations,
then County officials would be required to pay statutory damages to the government,
as well as costs and reasonable attorney fees to plaintiffs. Id. § 21.6(3). Plaintiffs’
concrete interest in recovering damages, costs, and fees, joined with their underlying
property interests and aesthetic interests in the siting of new wind turbines, suffices
for federal jurisdiction. See Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 870–71.
As to plaintiffs’ Open Meetings claims, the district court (1) concluded that
this case was properly removed from state court to federal court, (2) exercised
supplemental jurisdiction, (3) denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand, (4) declined to
abstain under the Pullman doctrine,9 and (5) dismissed plaintiffs’ Open Meetings
claims as time-barred under Iowa law and implausible on their face under federal
law. Plaintiffs meaningfully address these issues in their opening brief. Therefore,
we will consider each one in turn.
C. Removal Jurisdiction
The federal removal statute provides, in relevant part:
§ 1441(a). [A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending.
9See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

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§ 1446(b)(2)(A). When a civil action is removed solely under section
1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must
join in or consent to the removal of the action.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(b)(2)(A) (adding subsection numbers).
Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in Iowa state court, and defendants removed to
the federal district court. Defendants cited plaintiffs’ federal due process claim as
the basis for federal jurisdiction. See id. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.”). On appeal, plaintiffs dispute the propriety of removal.
They argue that defendant Jacob Holmes—one of the County supervisors—was a
necessary party and did not “join in or consent to . . . removal.” Id. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
Defendants argue that Holmes’s consent to removal was unnecessary because he had
not been “properly joined and served” or else was a nominal party. Id.10
When parties raise issues related to service of process, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its interpretation of the applicable service
rules de novo. See United States v. Rainey, 605 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (serving notice in a criminal proceeding); Norris v. Causey, 869 F.3d 360,
368 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying clear error review when a question arose about whether
the process server went to the correct residence). A party’s nominal or necessary
status is a jurisdictional issue, which we review de novo. Cascades Dev. of Minn.,
LLC v. Nat’l Specialty Ins., 675 F.3d 1095, 1098 (8th Cir. 2012).
Here, the district court found that plaintiffs served process on the County and
the Board, but not on individual County officials. Hunter, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
10 The Board has three supervisors. Alan Armstrong and Chuck Morris voted
for SHW’s application, and Jacob Holmes voted against it. Appellants’ Br. at 11 n.4.
A candidate running on an anti-turbine pledge defeated Armstrong in a 2022 election
and took office on January 3, 2023. Id. Morris resigned the same day. Id. Thus, the
Board changed from being pro-turbine in 2022 to being anti-turbine in 2023.

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Plaintiffs’ opening appellate brief states: “[S]even copies of the Original Notice and
Petition, each in separate folders bearing one defendant’s name, were personally
served on the individual who acts as both the Page County Auditor and Secretary of
the Board.” Appellants’ Br. at 11. We accept these facts as accurate and not clearly
erroneous. The question for us is: Was this attempted service proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(2)(A)? More specifically, did plaintiffs properly serve Holmes by leaving
a folder addressed to him with the County auditor and Board secretary?
Because plaintiffs’ attempt to serve process on Holmes occurred while an
Iowa state court held jurisdiction over this case, Iowa’s rules govern. In Iowa, service
of process may be accomplished through personal service or an alternate method.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.305–.306. Iowa’s methods of personal service are familiar. They
include service on a defendant’s person, home, or spouse. Id. at 1.305(1). Relevant
here, they also include “[u]pon any county by serving its auditor or the chair of its
board of supervisors” or “[u]pon a governmental board, commission or agency, by
serving its presiding officer, clerk or secretary.” Id. at 1.305(9), (13) (emphasis
added). Iowa’s alternate method is not relevant here. Id. at 1.306.
Assuming Holmes is a necessary party in this case, we agree with the district
court that the County and the Board did not need to obtain Holmes’s consent when
they removed this case to federal court. At the moment of removal, Holmes had not
been “properly joined and served.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A); see Schubert v. Auto
Owners Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic the court’s
jurisdiction is measured . . . at the time of removal.”). Plaintiffs did not serve process
on Holmes’s person, home, or spouse, nor by any other authorized method. Instead,
they served process on the County auditor and Board secretary. Under Iowa law, this
action was sufficient for serving the County and the Board, but it was not sufficient
for serving Holmes separately. When this case was removed, all properly joined and
served defendants consented. Therefore, removal jurisdiction existed.
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction
After removal, the district court exercised federal question jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’ federal due process claim and supplemental jurisdiction over their state

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claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. We now address whether this exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction was proper. Under the federal statute:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
Id. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) concerns diversity cases and does
not apply here. Subsection (c) does apply. It provides:
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if—(1) the claim raises a novel or
complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are
other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
Id. § 1367(c) (emphasis added and spacing altered).
The purpose of supplemental jurisdiction is to avoid duplicate, parallel, or
divided litigation between federal and state courts. Richard D. Freer, Supplemental
Jurisdiction—Background and Overview, in 13D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3567 (3d ed. 2008). When federal and
state claims are both present and “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,”
the district court may “try them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see Benchmark Ins. Co. v. SUNZ Ins.
Co., 36 F.4th 766, 771 (8th Cir. 2022) (same).
Our review of supplemental jurisdiction has two steps. First, we review de
novo whether the district court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28

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U.S.C. § 1367(a). See Myers v. Richland Cnty., 429 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“We review the question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”); see also ABF
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“Once original jurisdiction exists, supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims
is mandatory . . . .”); McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The
statute’s use of the word ‘shall’ . . . is a mandatory command.”). Second, if the first
step yields an affirmative answer, we review for abuse of discretion whether the
district court should have exercised or declined supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c). Crest Constr. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir. 2011). We
address the first step in this section and the second step in the next section.
Applying § 1367(a), the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs’
federal due process claim and their state claims formed part of the same case or
controversy. Hunter, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 610–12. At various times, plaintiffs have
urged that supplemental jurisdiction never existed in this case because there was no
federal claim to which the state claims could append. Plaintiffs’ own complaint
belies this assertion. On its face, it asserted a federal due process claim.11
The appearance of a federal due process claim on the face of plaintiffs’
complaint created a federal question, provided a basis for removal, and consequently
provided a basis for supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ related state claims.
Plaintiffs were the masters of their complaint. If they did not want to risk removal
of their case to federal court, they should not have pleaded a federal claim. See
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (explaining the well-pleaded
11See, e.g., R. Doc. 1-2, at 108–12, ¶ 605 (“[T]he Ordinance is illegal and fails
to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause because it is so vague and
standardless that it leaves the public uncertain is to [sic] what conduct it permits and
what conduct it prohibits.”); ¶ 618 (“The vagueness and contradiction within the
Ordinance renders it unconstitutional under the Due Process clauses of the United
States and State of Iowa Constitutions.”); ¶ 625 (“This structure violates the Due
Process Clause.”); ¶ 628 (“[T]he Ordinance as adopted by the Board of Supervisors
is unconstitutionally vague and void, and violates the Due Process Clause.”).

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complaint rule in removal cases). “If even one claim in the complaint involves a
substantial federal question, the entire matter may be removed.” Pet Quarters, Inc.
v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 779 (8th Cir. 2009).
E. Motions to Remand
Even if a district court has supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a), that
does not answer whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c). On this second step, Supreme Court and circuit precedent afford great
latitude and substantial deference to the district court. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v.
HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“purely discretionary”); Elmore v. Harbor
Freight Tools USA, Inc., 844 F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (“broad discretion”);
Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 738 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2013) (“very
broad” discretion). As discussed above, we review a district court’s decision to retain
or remand a case under § 1367(c) for abuse of discretion. Crest, 660 F.3d at 359.
A district court “grappl[ing] with whether it should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction” must “consider[] the four factors enumerated in the federal
supplemental-jurisdiction statute.” Wong v. Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 820 F.3d
922, 933 (8th Cir. 2016). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the district court fails
to consider an important factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper
factor, or commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 2009). The statute’s four
factors are: (1) whether “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,” (2)
whether state claims “substantially predominate[]” over federal claims, (3) whether
“the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,”
and (4) whether “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
The Supreme Court has identified four interests—“comity, fairness, judicial
economy, and convenience”—that underlie the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
Marianist Province of U.S. v. City of Kirkwood, 944 F.3d 996, 1003 (8th Cir. 2019)
(citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Exercising
its discretion under § 1367(c), a court must focus on the four factors enacted by

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Congress and construe these factors in light of the four interests articulated by the
Supreme Court. See McLaurin, 30 F.3d at 985 (“The statute plainly allows the
district court to reject jurisdiction over supplemental claims only in the four
instances described therein.”); see generally Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the statute’s
history and its relationship with the case law), overruled on other grounds by Cal.
Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). We now
address each of the § 1367(c) factors.
1. Novel or Complex Issues of State Law
A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over a
state claim if “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c). The district court concluded that this case raises no novel or complex state
issues. See Hunter, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 615. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that “[t]here
are no reported Iowa state court decisions interpreting [the County’s wind or zoning
ordinances].” Appellants’ Br. at 37. We agree with the district court.
A case raises a novel or complex issue of state law when the case presents a
state law issue of first impression, state law is unsettled, the case touches upon a
fundamental interest of the state government (especially a state constitutional issue),
or federal resolution of the case would deprive the state courts of a fair opportunity
to develop state law on a significant issue. See Carver v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin.
Auth., 730 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2013); Brookshire Bros. Holding v. Dayco Prods.,
Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009); Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d
231, 254 n.33 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d
299, 308 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1997);
Johnson v. Cala Stevens Creek/Monroe, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 904, 911 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
Here, plaintiffs’ state claims are neither novel nor complex. Although Iowa’s
courts have not specifically interpreted the County’s wind or zoning ordinances, they
have interpreted the wind and zoning ordinances of other counties. See, e.g., Mathis
v. Palo Alto Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 927 N.W.2d 191, 200 (Iowa 2019) (upholding

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a wind ordinance and project against challenges by county residents). Iowa’s highest
court has announced a “general rule that zoning determinations are a legislative
function of a city council or board of supervisors.” Residential & Agric. Advisory
Comm., LLC v. Dyersville City Council, 888 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Iowa 2016). Likewise,
Iowa’s courts have an established body of case law on the Open Meetings Act. See,
e.g., Hutchison v. Shull, 878 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 2016); City of Postville v. Upper
Explorerland Reg’l Plan. Comm’n, 834 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2013). Iowa’s case law
provided sufficiently clear guidance for the district court to address plaintiffs’ state
claims. The first factor weighs in favor of the district court’s decision.
2. Predominance of State Claims
A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state
claims if the state claims “substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, the
district court had original jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ federal due process claim and
supplemental jurisdiction over their state claims. The state claims greatly
outnumbered and substantially predominated over the federal due process claim. See
Hunter, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 609–10, 614. On appeal, plaintiffs contest the weight that
the district court assigned this factor. See Appellants’ Br. at 40.
Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we ask whether the district court
committed “a clear error of judgment” when it assigned a factor a certain weight.
Harry Brown’s, 563 F.3d at 316. This “standard of review is a narrow one.” Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated on
other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). A district court commits
a clear error of judgment when it has no “rational basis” for the weight it assigns to
a factor, Madison Cnty. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 622 F.2d
393, 397 (8th Cir. 1980); it reaches “a patently erroneous result,” In re Apple, Inc.,
602 F.3d 909, 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); or our court is “left with the definite
and firm conviction that an error has been made,” United States v. Peeples, 879 F.3d
282, 287 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Here, plaintiffs’ federal due process claim was not the gravamen of their
complaint. The district court took this into account. Having carefully reviewed the
district court’s order, we are not definitely and firmly convinced the district court
gave irrational or patently erroneous weight to this factor. It had broad discretion to
determine the weight it accorded the predominance of state claims. The statute
allows a district court to remand a case when the state claims predominate over a
federal claim, but it does not require this result, especially where, as here, other
§ 1367(c) factors point in a different direction. The predominance of state claims
favors plaintiffs, but it is only one factor in a multi-factor analysis.
3. Dismissal of the Federal Claim
A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state
claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, the district court dismissed the federal due
process claim for lack of prudential standing and as implausibly pleaded. Hunter,
653 F. Supp. 3d at 612. Then, it disposed of plaintiffs’ state claims. In two sentences,
plaintiffs assert that the district court, by proceeding in this way, abused its
discretion. They do not elaborate any further. See Appellants’ Br. at 41.
“Appellants bear a heavy burden in showing an abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Adkins, 842 F.2d 210, 212 (8th Cir. 1988). On this third factor, plaintiffs
make no real showing. Again, the statutory language is permissive. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) (“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction”). On appeal, there is
a strong presumption that a district court properly exercised its discretion and gave
every factor appropriate weight. See Adkins, 842 F.2d at 212. Certainly, the district
court could have remanded plaintiffs’ state claims after it dismissed their federal
claim. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. But the district court opted against remand, and
plaintiffs offer no reason why we should conclude that the district court abused its
discretion. See Carlsbad, 556 U.S. at 639 (“A district court’s decision whether to
exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had
original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”); Thomas v. United Steelworkers Loc.
1938, 743 F.3d 1134, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014) (“If the district court dismisses every

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claim over which it had original jurisdiction, the court maintains its broad discretion
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims.”).
4. Other Compelling Reasons
Finally, the statute allows the district court, “in exceptional circumstances,”
to consider “other compelling reasons” bearing on jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(4). This fourth factor allows the district court to consider the underlying
interests the Supreme Court has articulated: comity, fairness, judicial economy, and
convenience. Marianist Province, 944 F.3d at 1003; Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at
1558–59. This factor “permit[s] courts to extend the doctrine’s underlying values
beyond previously recognized applications whenever doing so [is] consistent with
those values.” Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1559 (emphasis omitted).
The district court expressly referred to interests justifying retention of this
case. Hunter, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 613, 615. Specifically, it noted the large number of
filings, the late date at which defendants consented to remand, the “significant
investment of time and energy by the parties and the Court,” the unnecessary delay
in final resolution that a remand order would produce, and the “significant time and
money” that SHW had already invested in its project. Id. at 615. We have previously
allowed district courts to consider similar interests. See, e.g., United Steelworkers,
743 F.3d at 1141 (“Given the substantial amount of time and judicial resources
expended in this case and the well-settled principles of state law . . . we find no error
in the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction . . . .”). We give the same
allowance here. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it considered
other compelling reasons, rooted in the case law interests, for denying remand.
***
In sum, a district court presented with a motion to remand must consider the
four statutory factors in its supplemental jurisdiction analysis. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Here, the district court considered all four factors and denied the motions to remand.
On the record before us, we affirm the district court. Its decision to address plaintiffs’
state claims was a permissible exercise of its “broad discretion.” Elmore, 844 F.3d
at 767; United Steelworkers, 743 F.3d at 1141.

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F. Pullman Abstention
Next, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by not abstaining under the
Pullman doctrine. The Pullman doctrine, or Pullman abstention, derives from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission issued an order to ban
railroads from putting black employees in charge of sleeper cars. Id. at 497–98. The
Pullman Company and other plaintiffs sued the Commission and challenged the
order. They argued that the order violated the United States Constitution’s Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Dormant Commerce Clauses. Id. at 498. A three-judge
federal district court agreed and issued an injunction. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed. It said that the district court had “touche[d] a
sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless
no alternative to its adjudication is open.” Id. Observing that Texas law empowered
the Commission to counteract “unjust discrimination . . . [and] any and all other
abuses in the conduct of railroads,” the Court questioned whether the Commission’s
order was not designed to prevent some abuse in the railroad industry. Id. at 499
(quoting Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 6445). The Court continued: “Reading the Texas statutes
and the Texas decisions as outsiders without special competence in Texas law, we
would have little confidence in our independent judgment regarding the application
of that law to the present situation.” Id. Even though the district court had comprised
“an able and experienced circuit judge” and “two capable district judges trained in
Texas law,” the Supreme Court reversed the injunction. Id. It cautioned federal
courts to abstain from making “unnecessary ruling[s]” that create “needless friction
with state policies,” particularly when a state’s own courts have not had the
opportunity to rule on an important issue for themselves. Id. at 499–501.
The Pullman doctrine now exists in an “extraordinary and narrow” form.
Allegheny Cnty. v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959). “Pullman
abstention is a limited exception to the virtually unflagging obligation that federal
courts have to exercise their jurisdiction in proper cases.” Sisney v. Kaemingk, 15
F.4th 1181, 1189 n.2 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
Pullman, a federal court may abstain from deciding a case only if the case raises a

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federal constitutional question, and the answer to that question necessarily depends
on state courts’ construction of ambiguous state law. Id.; see Burris v. Cobb, 808
F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 2015) (asking whether state law is “susceptible to an
interpretation that would avoid any federal constitutional question”).
We have employed a five-factor test to determine when Pullman abstention is
appropriate. Beavers v. Ark. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.3d 838, 841 (8th
Cir. 1998). We review the district court’s decision to abstain or not abstain under
Pullman for abuse of discretion. Id. at 840. Here, it is unnecessary to apply our five-
factor test. After the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ federal due process claim, no
federal constitutional question remained. The absence of a federal constitutional
question excepts this case from Pullman’s “narrowly limited” and “judge-made
doctrine of abstention.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that the district court should have
abstained under Pullman. Plaintiffs invoke no other abstention doctrine. See, e.g.,
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).12
G. Plausibility Standard
Finally, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ Open Meetings claims,
concluding that these claims were untimely under Iowa law and implausibly pleaded
under federal law. Hunter, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 617–18. These two grounds are
independent, and either of them is sufficient for dismissal. On appeal, plaintiffs
argue that the district court erred on both grounds. As a federal court of appeals,
12 The federal abstention doctrines are not jurisdictional. If parties do not raise
these doctrines, federal courts have no duty to raise them on their own motion, or
sua sponte. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013); Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 n.8 (1987); Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th
1083, 1086 n.3 (8th Cir. 2023); Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089,
1093 (8th Cir. 2021); Graphic Commc’ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 636 F.3d 971, 973–74 (8th Cir. 2011).

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which authoritatively construes federal law, we choose to begin our analysis with
the federal plausibility issue. See Ag Spectrum Co. v. Elder, 865 F.3d 1088, 1091
(8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that our court’s views of Iowa law are merely predictive
of how an Iowa state court would decide an issue).
“We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.” Iverson
v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2020). “[M]atters removed to federal
court are governed by the current federal pleading standard.” Novak v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 518 F. App’x 498, 501 (8th Cir. 2013) (unpublished per curiam);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1). Thus, we apply Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–56 (2007).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a federal court will grant a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, unless the complaint alleges facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must state a
claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. This “standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ complaint might have survived Iowa’s more permissive pleading
standard when plaintiffs brought this case in Iowa court. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f);
see Nahas v. Polk Cnty., 991 N.W.2d 770, 776–77 (Iowa 2023) (“[W]e have
explicitly declined to replace our notice pleading system with the heightened
pleading standards that federal courts use.”). However, we agree with the district
court that, once this case was removed, the complaint was insufficient to satisfy the
more demanding standard of Rule 12(b)(6).13 In 219 pages, the complaint spends
13 Generally, a federal district court should allow a party to replead, if the party
so requests, when a case is removed from a state court with a pleading standard less
demanding than Rule 12(b)(6). See Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613,
617 (5th Cir. 2018); Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir.
2013); see also Joan Steinman, Mary Kay Kane & A. Benjamin Spencer, Procedure

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only a few pages on the Open Meetings claims. All of its allegations relevant to these
claims are “speculative” or “conclusory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. On its face, the complaint does not provide sufficient factual content to
support a reasonable inference that County officials violated plaintiffs’ Open
Meetings rights. The complaint does not raise plaintiffs’ right to relief above a
speculative level. Regardless of how an Iowa court might have ruled, “barebones
allegation[s],” like the allegations that plaintiffs made here, are “insufficient to state
a claim” in federal court. Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1103 (8th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (en banc). Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was proper.14
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ Open Meetings
claims as facially implausible under Rule 12(b)(6), we do not address the timeliness
of these claims under Iowa law.
III. Conclusion
The County’s revocation of SHW’s C-WECS permit, shortly after the district
court issued its order, mooted most of plaintiffs’ claims. The only claims not mooted
are their claims against County officials under the Iowa Open Meetings Act. The
After Removal, in 14C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3738
(rev. 4th ed. 2023); Glenda K. Harnad & Karl Oakes, Repleading or Amendment of
Pleading in Removed Case, 77 C.J.S. Removal of Cases § 163. No request to amend
the complaint appears to have been made in this case.
14See, e.g., R. Doc. 1-2, at 102–06, ¶ 572 (alleging that it was “not possible
for the Board to have not met in closed meetings”); ¶ 573 (“It is not possible for the
Board to have evaluated the WECS Application without hiring independent experts,
implies the Board or its representatives met with Invenergy and its experts.”); ¶ 580
(“closed sessions were held”); ¶ 583 (same); ¶ 585 (“The process adopted for
negotiating the road use agreement and decommissioning plan is a ruse . . . .”); ¶ 589
(“The process adopted by the Board for conducting negotiations with Invenergy
regarding the road use agreement and the decommissioning plan violates the Open
Meetings Act . . . .”).

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district court permissibly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over these claims and
properly dismissed them under Rule 12(b)(6).
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ Open Meetings claims,
vacate the remainder of the district court’s order, and remand to the district court
with instructions to dismiss without prejudice plaintiffs’ non-Open Meetings claims
as moot. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994)
(“[V]acatur must be granted where mootness results from the unilateral action of the
party who prevailed in the lower court.”); Epp v. Kerrey, 964 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir.
1992) (“When a civil case becomes moot pending appeal, the appellate court
normally vacates the order being appealed and remands to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the case as moot.”); see also Bloodman v. Kimbrell, 604 F.
App’x 529, 529–30 (8th Cir. 2015) (unpublished per curiam) (modifying a district
court’s dismissal for mootness to be “without prejudice”).
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the court’s disposition of this appeal, and with Part II.B of the
opinion, but would dismiss the claims addressed in Part II.A because they are not
ripe for adjudication. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). As the
court explains, “[o]btaining a C-WECS permit was merely the first of several steps
that Invenergy and SHW would need to complete before proceeding with their
proposed project. They would also need further regulatory approvals, including
building or construction permits, a road-use agreement, and a decommissioning
plan.” Ante, at 4. The project may never come to fruition, and any assessment of
the plaintiffs’ challenges relating to the Wind Ordinance and issuance of a permit
should wait until a more concrete controversy arises. Any hardship to the plaintiffs
of postponing consideration is insufficient to justify review at this stage. I therefore
deem it unnecessary to address whether the claims are also moot. Cf. Driftless Area
Land Conservancy v. Rural Utils. Serv., 74 F.4th 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2023).
______________________________

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