United States of America v. Christopher Allen Edwards

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2841
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Christopher Allen Edwards
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: May 10, 2024
Filed: August 6, 2024
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Edwards was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846, and
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

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§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The district court1 sentenced him to 220 months’
imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release. He appeals, asserting both trial and
sentencing errors. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
After receiving multiple tips that Edwards was selling drugs, law enforcement
began investigating him for drug trafficking. The tips allowed investigators to
identify Edwards’s vehicle and home and an apartment belonging to his
coconspirator, Chloe Johnson. Investigators began tracking his vehicle and observed
a pattern of quick roundtrips between Johnson’s apartment and several neighboring
towns. This led investigators to believe Edwards was selling drugs and using
Johnson’s apartment to store drugs and possibly cash proceeds.
Law enforcement conducted a controlled buy of fentanyl and
methamphetamine from Johnson at her apartment and executed multiple search
warrants as part of the investigation: two individuals’ homes where officers believed
Edwards had sold drugs the previous night; Johnson’s apartment; Edwards’s house;
and a rental car obtained by Edwards. These searches yielded varying amounts of
packaged cocaine, a heroin and fentanyl mixture, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and
several thousand dollars in cash. The search of Edwards’s rental car revealed four
kilograms of cocaine, documented by body camera footage and photographs. The
cocaine was left in the rental car, and the car was towed to the local sheriff’s office.
An officer followed the rental car as it was towed to ensure the car and any evidence
were not tampered with, and the officer remained with the car until other
investigators arrived to finish the search. At the sheriff’s office, the lead investigator
removed the cocaine from the rental car, weighed, photographed, and field-tested it,
and created an inventory of evidence seized. However, he failed to list the four
kilograms of cocaine on the search warrant inventory.
1 The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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Edwards and Johnson were subsequently indicted for conspiracy to distribute
several controlled substances and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
The conspiracy count specifically alleged that Edwards was responsible for “500
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing . . . cocaine; 100 grams or more
of a mixture or substance containing . . . heroin; [and] 40 grams or more of a mixture
or substance containing . . . fentanyl . . . .” Conviction under each of these weights
would trigger a five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B). The possession count alleged that Edwards possessed 500 grams or
more of cocaine.
Edwards filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his home and the
rental car, arguing that the search warrants were not supported by probable cause.
The district court denied the motion upon the recommendation of the magistrate
judge.2 After the deadline for pretrial motions had passed, Edwards moved for leave
to file an amended motion to suppress the cocaine seized during the rental car search,
arguing that the failure to record the cocaine on the search warrant inventory broke
the chain of custody and thus warranted its suppression. The district court denied
the motion as untimely, finding Edwards had not shown good cause for his failure
to timely raise the argument.
At trial, the Government sought to admit into evidence the cocaine it asserted
was seized from Edwards’s rental car. Edwards lodged a chain-of-custody
objection, to which the Government responded that Edwards’s concern about any
defect in the chain of custody went to the cocaine’s evidentiary weight, as opposed
to its admissibility. The district court overruled Edwards’s objection. Later, the
Government sought to introduce a photograph of the same cocaine taken in the
sheriff’s office’s evidence room. Edwards objected, arguing that the substance in
the photo appeared to be altered because it was pink in color. The district court also
overruled this objection. The Government also elicited extensive testimony about
2 The Honorable Elizabeth Cowan Wright, United States Magistrate Judge for
the District of Minnesota.

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the efforts made to guarantee the substance was not altered, including from the
officer that discovered the cocaine, the officer that followed the rental car with the
cocaine to the sheriff’s office, the employee who processed the cocaine into evidence
and into a secure evidence locker, the officer who checked that cocaine out from the
locker and transported it to the laboratory for testing, and the forensic scientist who
detailed the process for handling and testing the cocaine.
At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict
on the conspiracy count must be accompanied by findings on the quantities of
cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine that were attributable to Edwards
in the conspiracy, including the quantities that Johnson distributed or agreed to
distribute, provided that her actions were part of the conspiracy and were reasonably
foreseeable by Edwards. The district court also instructed the jury that the
Government need only prove that Edwards knew generally that he had agreed or
intended to distribute a controlled substance and was not required to establish
Edwards’s knowledge of the specific drug types at issue. The jury returned a guilty
verdict on both counts and found that the Government sufficiently established the
drug quantities alleged in the indictment.
The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation
Report (PSR), which calculated an advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines
range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment and recommended application of a
career-offender enhancement because Edwards had at least two prior felony
convictions for crimes of violence: first-degree robbery and first-degree assault.
While Edwards did not object to the specific portions of the PSR detailing these prior
felonies and the dates on which he committed them, at the sentencing hearing, he
argued that there was no intervening arrest such that these two felonies should be
counted as separate crimes of violence. The Government had also submitted to the
district court the criminal complaints for these prior felonies as proof of the dates
Edwards committed these crimes and the dates of arrest. The district court overruled
Edwards’s objection and found there was an intervening arrest such that Edwards’s
prior felonies should be counted separately; thus, it found that the career-offender

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enhancement applied. In imposing Edwards’s sentence, the district court detailed its
application of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to Edwards’s case,
explaining various mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Based on these
considerations, the district court varied downward by 140 months and imposed 220
months’ imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release. Edwards appeals.
II.
Edwards asserts two trial errors: (A) the admission of cocaine into evidence
despite an insufficient showing by the Government of an adequate chain of custody;
and (B) improper instruction of the jury concerning how it was to determine drug
quantities for which Edwards was responsible.
A.
We review the admission of evidence for a clear abuse of discretion, United
States v. Moore, 71 F.4th 678, 686 (8th Cir. 2023), and we may affirm “on any basis
supported by the record,” United States v. Needham, 852 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir.
2017). “[W]e afford deference to the district judge who saw and heard the evidence”
and will only reverse “when an improper evidentiary ruling affected the defendant’s
substantial rights or had more than a slight influence on the verdict.” United States
v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1139 (8th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
Edwards asserts that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
cocaine into evidence because there was reason to believe the substance had been
altered, and the Government had not established an adequate foundation for the
chain of custody because the cocaine was omitted from the search warrant inventory.
Specifically, Edwards emphasizes that photographs of the cocaine allegedly
recovered from the rental car showed that the substance appeared pink in color, and
the lead investigator, Joel Johnson, testified that he could not explain the cocaine’s
color and noted that it was “in different packaging and a little bit broken up.”

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Edwards further asserts that the failure to properly record the cocaine on the search
warrant inventory “was part of an overall breakdown in the chain of custody.”
The Government argues that Edwards did not properly preserve his
chain-of-custody arguments about the cocaine’s appearance and the failure to
include it on the search warrant inventory because he did not articulate these
concerns when he objected. See United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 823 n.3
(8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that foundation objections, including those to the chain
of custody, “must be specific, and a defendant may not raise on appeal a ground not
mentioned at the time of his objection”); see also United States v. Kimble, 54 F.4th
538, 549 (8th Cir. 2022) (“[Defendant] needed to object with specificity as to the
foundational defects . . . .”). Edwards disagrees, arguing that his objection to the
cocaine’s admission based on chain of custody, his later objection to the admission
of a photograph of the cocaine based on its allegedly altered appearance, and his
pretrial motion to suppress, in which he alerted the district court to the search warrant
inventory defect, were sufficient to preserve these arguments. Edwards
acknowledges, though, that the district court denied the pretrial motion to suppress
as untimely without reaching the merits. If Edwards did not properly preserve his
arguments, we would review for plain error, rather than an abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Broussard, 87 F.4th 376, 379 (8th Cir. 2023). Regardless, we need
not decide whether Edwards lodged a sufficiently specific objection to preserve the
arguments for appeal because, even assuming that he did, the district court did not
err in overruling the objection and admitting the evidence.
To admit an exhibit into evidence:
‘[T]here must be a showing that the physical exhibit being offered is in
substantially the same condition as when the crime was committed.’
‘The district court may admit a piece of physical evidence if it is
satisfied that there is a reasonable probability [that] such evidence has
not been changed or altered.’ ‘Factors to be considered in making the
determination of admissibility include the nature of the article, the
circumstances surrounding its preservation and custody, and the

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likelihood of others tampering with it.’ Generally, ‘any defect in the
chain of custody goes more to [the] weight [of the evidence rather] than
its admissibility.’
Moore, 71 F.4th at 687 (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Ortega, 750 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that
defendant’s argument “attack[ing] the foundation for admission of the cocaine by
pointing to a gap in the chain of custody to question the authenticity of the sample”
normally goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility). Importantly,
“[t]he chain of custody does not have to be perfect. All that is required is testimony
that the evidence in question was the same as that involved in the offense and that it
is substantially unchanged.” United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 494, 505 (8th Cir.
2012).
First, we are unconvinced by Edwards’s argument that the pink hue of the
cocaine shown in the photograph taken in the evidence room indicated that it had
been altered. For this proposition, Edwards asserts that Johnson testified that he
could not explain the change in color of the substance shown in that photograph.
But Edwards mischaracterizes Johnson’s testimony. Johnson testified that he could
not explain why this particular cocaine was pink instead of white; he made no
suggestion that the cocaine’s color had changed between when it was discovered
and when it was examined in the evidence room. In fact, Johnson testified that, in
his experience “it is common for narcotics to show up in other colors,” and various
factors such as the manufacturer and the manufacturing location and process can
play a role in its color. Moreover, both the photograph taken at the time the cocaine
was seized from the rental car and the photograph taken when it was assessed in the
evidence room show that the substance had a pink hue. And while Johnson testified
that the cocaine shown in the photograph taken in the evidence room was “in
different packaging and a little bit broken up,” he explained that he believed this
occurred because of testing done by the laboratory and that, in his experience, bricks
of cocaine tend to break up over time.

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Edwards similarly fails to persuade us that law enforcement’s failure to record
the cocaine on the search warrant inventory was a sufficient defect in the chain of
custody such that the cocaine’s admission into evidence was an abuse of discretion.
Indeed, testimony presented at trial shows that the chain of custody was adequately
established. This includes testimony explaining that: the cocaine was in a similar
condition at trial as when an officer found it in the rental car; the cocaine remained
in the car while an officer waited at the scene for a tow truck; an officer followed
the car as it was towed to the sheriff’s office; upon the car’s arrival at the sheriff’s
office, the cocaine was processed as evidence, labeled, and stored in a secure
evidence locker accessible only by evidence technicians; an officer checked the
cocaine out of the secure evidence locker and transported it to a separate laboratory
for further testing; and that laboratory’s forensic scientist followed a meticulous
process for the handling, tracking, and processing of the cocaine before it was
returned to law enforcement. Further, none of this testimony suggested that the
cocaine had been altered. While law enforcement’s failure to record the cocaine on
the search warrant inventory may have been a defect in the chain of custody, any
concern that Edwards has with that purported defect goes more to its weight, rather
than its admissibility. Moore, 71 F.4th at 687. We therefore find no error in the
district court’s admission of the cocaine into evidence.
B.
Edwards next challenges the district court’s jury-instruction charge on two
fronts. He first asserts that the district court erroneously permitted the jury to
attribute to him drug quantities beyond those for which he was “personally
responsible” in the conspiracy. We find that Edwards has waived this argument, as
he, along with the Government, jointly proffered the very instruction that he now
challenges on appeal. See United States v. Mariano, 729 F.3d 874, 881 (8th Cir.
2013). The relevant part of that proposed instruction, which borrows heavily from
the Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instructions, reads:

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You are instructed that the quantity of controlled substances
involved in the agreement or understanding includes controlled
substances the defendant possessed for personal use, distributed, or
agreed to distribute. The quantity also includes controlled substances
fellow conspirators distributed or agreed to distribute, if you find that
those distributions or agreements to distribute were a necessary or
natural consequence of the agreement or understanding and were
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.
See Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions (Criminal) 6.21.846A.1
(2023). The district court instructed the jury with nearly identical language:
If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 1, you
must then determine unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt the
quantity of any mixture or substance containing cocaine, heroin,
fentanyl, and methamphetamine that the defendant possessed for
personal use, distributed, or agreed to distribute. The quantity also
includes controlled substances fellow conspirators distributed or agreed
to distribute, if you find that those distributions or agreements to
distribute were a necessary or natural consequence of the agreement or
understanding and were reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.
Thus, while Edwards argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury
that he must have reasonably foreseen that the conspiracy involved the distribution
of fentanyl-laced heroin—a contention we find puzzling given the plain text of the
charge—it is well-established “that a defendant who requests and receives a jury
instruction may not challenge the giving of that instruction on appeal.” Mariano,
729 F.3d at 881. Stated otherwise, by requesting an instruction that the district court
adopted largely verbatim, Edwards “‘invited’ the alleged mistake” and therefore has
“give[n] up the right to appeal any error in that instruction.” Id. at 880-81 (citation
omitted).
Relatedly, Edwards argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury
that he need not have knowledge of the precise nature of the controlled substances
that were agreed to be distributed in the conspiracy, instead requiring knowledge
only that “some type” of controlled substance was agreed to be distributed. “We

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typically review a challenge to jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Boen, 59 F.4th 983, 993 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Here, Edwards
objected to this instruction as it was originally proposed by the Government, but he
did not provide the grounds for doing so. Further, our review of the record reveals
that Edwards failed to elaborate on his objection at any point before or during trial.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) (“A party who objects to any portion of the instructions
or to a failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific
objection and the grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”).
By failing to comply with the dictates of Rule 30(d), Edwards concedes that he
benefits only from plain-error review. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To satisfy this
demanding standard, he “must show that there was an error that is clear or obvious
under current law, that affected [his] substantial rights, and that seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Spencer, 998 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
As Edwards acknowledges, this Court has previously rejected his argument,
finding that “a defendant may be convicted of a drug conspiracy violation [under 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846] without proof that he knew the precise drug he conspired to
possess and distribute.” United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir.
2000); see also United States v. Ramos, 814 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
‘knowingly’ element of th[e] offense refers to a general criminal intent, i.e.,
awareness that the substance possessed was a controlled substance of some kind.
Since the factfinder can seldom know with certainty what someone actually knows,
knowledge must necessarily be shown circumstantially.” (alterations in original)
(citation omitted)). The Supreme Court concluded similarly in McFadden v. United
States that “[t]he ordinary meaning of § 841(a)(1) . . . requires a defendant to know
only that the substance he is dealing with is some unspecified substance listed on the
federal drug schedules.” 576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015).
Nonetheless, Edwards relies on Apprendi and its progeny to argue that
because certain types of controlled substances trigger mandatory-minimum penalties
under § 841(b)’s sentencing provisions, knowledge of drug identity and quantity is

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an element of the offense that must be submitted to a jury. See Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (concluding that a jury must find “facts that
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed”
(citation omitted)); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 112 (2013) (applying the
holding of Apprendi to facts that increase the mandatory-minimum sentence for an
offense). Importantly, however, § 841(b) does not impose the same mens rea
requirement that § 841(a) does; the only “fact” that the Government must prove for
a § 841(b) enhancement to apply is “that the offense ‘involved’ a particular type and
quantity of controlled substance, not that the defendant knew he was distributing that
particular type and quantity.” Sheppard, 219 F.3d at 768 n.2. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, even under Apprendi, “the jury need only be instructed to find, as it
did in this case, that a particular type and quantity of controlled substance was
involved in the offense.” Id.
Edwards also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United
States constitutes intervening precedent that vitiates this Court’s § 841
jurisprudence. 588 U.S. 225 (2019). There, the Supreme Court held that in a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits the possession of firearms by
certain persons, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (amended 2022), which prescribes
penalties to “anyone who ‘knowingly violates’” § 922(g), the Government must
prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew that he
belonged to a category of persons prohibited from doing so. Id. at 227 (emphasis
omitted). The Court discussed the “longstanding presumption, traceable to the
common law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable
mental state regarding ‘each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise
innocent conduct.’” Id. at 229 (citation omitted). According to Edwards, this
presumption of scienter applies with equal force here to require extending § 841(a)’s
mens rea requirement to § 841(b)’s mandatory-minimum penalty provisions.
Otherwise, Edwards asserts, a defendant could be punished for conduct exceeding
his level of culpability. See id. at 233 (“[W]e normally presume that Congress did
not intend to impose criminal liability on persons who, due to lack of knowledge,
did not have a wrongful mental state.”).

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We have not had occasion to squarely address the effect of Rehaif in this
context, but we now join our sister circuits to have considered the issue and conclude
that Rehaif does not affect the statutory requirements under § 841 or otherwise call
into question our case law holding that the Government need not prove a mens rea
regarding drug type or quantity under § 841(b). See United States v. Cruz-Rivera,
14 F.4th 32, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Mahaffey, 983 F.3d 238, 242-45
(6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Collazo, 984 F.3d 1308, 1322-29 (9th Cir. 2021)
(en banc); see also United States v. Vela Diaz, 793 F. App’x 351, 351-52 (5th Cir.
2020) (per curiam). Apart from the plain text of § 841, discussed supra, §§ 922(g)
and 924(a)(2) differ markedly in structure from § 841(a) and (b). The Supreme
Court determined that “[t]he term ‘knowingly’ in § 924(a)(2) modifies the verb
‘violates’ and its direct object, which in this case is § 922(g). . . . As ‘a matter of
ordinary English grammar,’” then, the term “knowingly” applies “to all the
subsequently listed elements of the crime.” Rehaif, 588 U.S. at 229-30 (citation
omitted). In § 841(a), by contrast, the “knowingly” mens rea requirement “applies
just within that subsection to cover the statute’s verbs (i.e., ‘manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense’) and ‘the
object of those verbs—“a controlled substance.”’” Mahaffey, 983 F.3d at 244
(citations omitted). In other words, § 841(b)’s mandatory-minimum sentencing
provisions are “not the object of the verbs in § 841(a)(1),” as “the only triggering
word” in that subsection is “involving.” Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Court in Rehaif noted that the common-law scienter
presumption “helps to separate wrongful from innocent acts,” e.g., innocuous gun
possession from knowingly unlawful gun possession. 588 U.S. at 232. Critically,
that dichotomy is absent in § 841: There is no scenario where an individual can
knowingly—but innocently—“manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Thus, “[r]egardless of the type and quantity of the controlled substance,
there is no risk that a defendant would fail to understand the unlawful nature of the
act.” Collazo, 984 F.3d at 1327. At bottom, then, § 841(b)’s penalty provisions

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“serve[] not to convict an innocent actor, but rather to increase a defendant’s
sentence once convicted.” Mahaffey, 983 F.3d at 245.
In sum, the district court correctly applied the law in instructing the jury that
Edwards need not know the type and quantity of controlled substances that were
agreed to be distributed in the conspiracy. See United States v. Maxwell, 61 F.4th
549, 558 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 217 (2023). Accordingly, Edwards has
failed to establish error, plain or otherwise.
III.
Edwards next asserts two sentencing errors: (A) the district court’s finding
that Edwards qualified as a career offender; and (B) the district court’s improper
reliance on its characterization of Edwards’s codefendant as a victim, which led it to
impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.
A.
We first address Edwards’s challenge to his career-offender status. Edwards
qualifies as a career offender if, as relevant here, he has at least two prior felony
convictions for crimes of violence. USSG § 4B1.1(a). To determine the number of
qualifying offenses, “prior sentences are counted separately when there is an
intervening arrest,” United States v. Waits, 919 F.3d 1090, 1096 (8th Cir. 2019),
which occurs when “the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing
the second offense,” USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2). “We review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its construction and application of the sentencing
guidelines de novo.” United States v. Coleman, 60 F.4th 1184, 1186 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 143 S. Ct. 2630 (2023) (citation omitted).
Edwards asserts that his first-degree robbery and first-degree assault
convictions should not count as separate offenses for the purpose of determining
career-offender status because the Government did not meet its burden of proving

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an intervening arrest. The Government disagrees, claiming that because the portions
of the PSR to which Edwards did not object establish that Edwards was arrested for
the robbery offense and then later committed the assault offense, there was an
intervening arrest that permitted counting the two offenses separately. Because
Edwards’s challenge to his career-offender status is cabined only to the district
court’s finding that there was an intervening arrest, i.e., a factual finding, we review
for clear error. See United States v. Walterman, 343 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2003).
Edwards’s PSR details that he was arrested for first-degree aggravated
robbery on December 13, 2004, and, while awaiting trial for that offense, he was
arrested for first-degree assault on January 31, 2006, among other things. The
criminal complaint that the Government submitted to the district court for the assault
offense clarifies that Edwards committed the assault on January 28, 2006. Edwards
does not dispute the date he committed the assault—he disputes only whether the
Government sufficiently proved the date of the robbery arrest. But the date of the
robbery arrest was included in the portions of the PSR to which Edwards did not
object, so the district court was entitled to accept the date for purposes of determining
whether there was an intervening arrest. See United States v. Dokes, 872 F.3d 886,
889 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Unless a party objects . . . to fact statements in the PSR, the
district court may accept those facts as true at sentencing.”). Because Edwards was
arrested for robbery before he committed assault, there was an intervening arrest.
Accordingly, we reject Edwards’s contention that the district court clearly erred in
finding that there was an intervening arrest and thus counting the two offenses
separately.
B.
Edwards finally challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable. “We
review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Merrett, 8 F.4th 743, 751 (8th Cir. 2021). Edwards asserts that the
district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence, primarily claiming that
the district court improperly relied on its characterization of Johnson as Edwards’s

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victim, a finding not supported by the evidence or even Johnson’s own
characterization. See id. (explaining that a district court abuses its discretion by
“giv[ing] significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor” (citation omitted)).
The district court imposed a below-Guidelines range sentence, varying
downward by 140 months. “[A] sentence below or within the Guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable on appeal.” United States v. Barraza, 982 F.3d 1106, 1116
(8th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). And when the district court
varies downward, “it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in
not varying downward still further.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court explained its justification for the sentence, considering the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court weighed various
mitigating factors, including Edwards’s alleged community support, his
codefendant’s request for leniency on his behalf, the circumstances of his
upbringing, his remorse, and his trustee status in jail. However, the district court
balanced these mitigating factors against the serious nature of the crimes and
Edwards’s criminal record, the impact of drug dealing on others, and the fact that
Edwards committed the offense while on supervised release and used an addict to
perpetuate the crimes. The district court’s reference to Edwards’s codefendant as a
victim was a figure of speech referring to her condition as a drug addict. Given the
district court’s wide discretion to balance the statutory sentencing factors, United
States v. Donahue, 959 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2020), we hold that Edwards’s
below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable.
IV.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
______________________________

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