United States of America v. Anton Joseph Lazzaro, also known as Tony Lazzaro, also known as Tony

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-3098
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Anton Joseph Lazzaro, also known as Tony Lazzaro, also known as Tony
Defendant - Appellant
___________________________
No. 23-3411
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Anton Joseph Lazzaro, also known as Tony
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
____________
Submitted: October 24, 2024
Filed: February 25, 2025
____________

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Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Anton “Tony” Lazzaro of sex trafficking of minors and
conspiring to do the same. Lazzaro appeals after the district court1 denied his various
motions. He argues that the federal sex trafficking statute is unconstitutionally
vague; that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions; that he
should have been permitted to introduce evidence of the age of consent under state
law; and that his trial was infected with prosecutorial and juror misconduct. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
“We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” United
States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 631, 632 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). In May
2020, Lazzaro was 29 years old and living in a condominium in downtown
Minneapolis. Through “SeekingArrangement.com,”2 he met 18-year-old Gisela
Castro Medina. He messaged Castro Medina and offered to pay her and her friend,
G.L., for a photograph of their faces. Medina and G.L. agreed. The next day,
Lazzaro asked Castro Medina to meet him. When asked if G.L. could join, Lazzaro
said it was perfectly fine, even though G.L. was only 16 years old. So, Lazzaro
ordered a car to bring both G.L. and Castro Medina to his condo.
1 The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota.
2 Following a rebrand, the website is now known as “Seeking.com,” though
the services remain the same: connecting individuals looking to engage in “sugar
dating.” As explained at trial, “sugar dating” refers to an older man—a “sugar
daddy”—gifting a younger woman money or expensive items in exchange for dates
or sex.

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Once they arrived, Lazzaro gave them alcohol, though he did not drink any
himself. He spoke with them about their struggles with abuse and drug addiction
while Castro Medina and G.L. continued drinking. As they got drunk, Lazzaro
displayed a wad of cash. He offered to pay them if they would kiss each other or
undress. Though Castro Medina and G.L. declined to kiss, they took off their
clothes. Then, Lazzaro took G.L. to his bedroom and had sex with her. A short time
later, G.L. came out and told Castro Medina that it was her turn, so Castro Medina
had sex with Lazzaro as well. Lazzaro then paid them both, ordered them food, and
called a car to take them away.
A couple of days later, Lazzaro again ordered a car to bring Castro Medina
and G.L. to his apartment. This encounter proceeded in much the same way as the
first. Lazzaro gave Castro Medina and G.L. alcohol until they were drunk. He
offered them money to kiss each other, though this time they agreed to do so. After
again having sex with both G.L. and Castro Medina, Lazzaro once again paid them
and ordered them food, and they left his apartment. At this meeting, however,
Lazzaro also approached Castro Medina with a different request. He wanted her to
be, in his words, his “recruiter.” As Lazzaro’s recruiter, Castro Medina would
message girls on his behalf, and she would get paid to do so. Lazzaro told Castro
Medina what he wanted: “younger girls” between 16 and 18—with a preference for
the former—who were “broken girls, sluts, [and] whores.” Though Castro Medina
initially refused, at another meeting later that month, she eventually agreed.
Throughout this time, G.L. continued to visit Lazzaro’s condo alone. Though
she could not remember the exact number, G.L. visited multiple times, each time
having sex with Lazzaro and getting paid afterwards. G.L. had no doubt that Lazzaro
was paying her for sex, and she would not have continued if Lazzaro stopped paying
her. Each time he paid G.L., however, Lazzaro would give her two envelopes of
cash: one for her and one for Castro Medina. Over time, Lazzaro began putting less
money in G.L.’s envelope and more in Castro Medina’s. G.L. soon voiced her
displeasure and refused to continue visiting Lazzaro.

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Despite G.L.’s decision, Lazzaro’s relationship with Castro Medina
continued. In the months that followed, Castro Medina helped find more girls for
Lazzaro. The interactions followed a similar pattern. Lazzaro or Castro Medina
would identify young girls through social media. Then Castro Medina or someone
acting on her behalf would reach out, asking if the girls wanted a “sugar daddy” and
offering to put them in touch with Lazzaro. Often, the girls would be told how
Lazzaro could get them alcohol or whatever else they wanted, and how he would
pay for their time. They would receive photos of money and alcohol, or photos of
Lazzaro with celebrities. The girls would then be put in touch with Lazzaro, who
would talk with them through social media. Eventually, the girls would arrive at
Lazzaro’s condo, where he would ply them with drugs or alcohol, while remaining
sober himself. He would offer them money to remove their clothes, pose for photos,
or kiss each other. Lazzaro would then have sex with the girls in his bedroom. After
he was finished, Lazzaro would give the girls money or other expensive items, and
each time, Castro Medina would get a cut for her help arranging the meeting.
To be sure, not every encounter was identical. In one instance, Lazzaro met
the victim, 16-year-old E.L., when she came to his apartment with her 18-year-old
sister and a 17-year-old friend. Though E.L. did not have sex with Lazzaro that
night, she returned a few weeks later with her sister and another friend, then 18 years
old. In his apartment, Lazzaro brought all three of them to his bedroom, where he
lined them up naked and face down on his bed. He took a photo of them, which he
shared with Castro Medina. Then, Lazzaro offered E.L., her sister, and their friend
$400 each to have sex with him. They agreed, and Lazzaro had sex with all three,
“one by one.” When the friend became uncomfortable and started to leave, Lazzaro
said, “[I]f you’re not going to stay, you’re not going to get paid.” She left, and true
to his word, Lazzaro did not pay her.
Lazzaro did not always meet the girls for the first time at his condo, either.
Lazzaro first met 16-year-old E.P. in person at the Mall of America, where he
purchased her a Prada bag. Though E.P. declined to return to his condo that day, her
friend S.G.—also 16 years old—became envious of the bag and reached out to

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Lazzaro herself. When Lazzaro invited S.G. to his condo, she shared the invitation
with E.P., who agreed to come along. Lazzaro offered E.P. and S.G. alcohol, and
though they declined to drink, they both had sex with Lazzaro. Later that month,
E.P. returned to Lazzaro’s condo alone. This time, however, E.P. and Lazzaro knew
“what [she] was there for,” so they skipped the usual introductory practices and
moved quickly to the bedroom to have sex. Separately, S.G. also returned to
Lazzaro’s condo alone, where she had sex with Lazzaro and was paid afterwards.
Nor did Lazzaro always order a car. 15-year-old E.R.3 twice traveled to his
apartment in a car that Lazzaro ordered for her. For a later encounter, however,
Lazzaro himself drove to pick up E.R. in his Ferrari. During this encounter, E.R.
became so drunk that Lazzaro let her stay the night, driving her home the next
morning in his Cadillac.
There were other differences. The acts leading up to sex varied. Sometimes
he had the girls play-fight in a sexual manner. Other times he had them dance in
lingerie or play sexual truth-or-dare. The alcohol differed, too. He gave them
champagne, or vodka, or shots of grain alcohol, or schnapps. After he was done
having sex with them, Lazzaro gave some girls emergency contraceptives. In
addition to cash, some girls received vape pens, or a new iPhone, or cosmetics.
Whatever these differences, many things remained the same. Lazzaro used
Castro Medina to identify potential matches—most often underage girls—and to
make the initial introduction. He used his condo to meet the girls and have sex with
them. He always paid the girls afterwards, and he always paid Castro Medina for
her assistance.
In August 2021, a grand jury indicted Lazzaro and Castro Medina on six
counts: one count of conspiring to commit sex trafficking of minors, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c) and 1594(c), and five counts of sex
3 E.R. told Lazzaro that she was 16, not 15.

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trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c),
1594(a), and 2.4 Castro Medina pled guilty to the conspiracy count and one count
of obstruction, and she agreed to cooperate with the Government’s investigation and
testify against Lazzaro. The grand jury then returned a superseding indictment
charging Lazzaro with those same six counts.5 Though initially limited to three
counts, Lazzaro eventually moved to dismiss all counts of the indictment, arguing
that § 1591 was unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied to him. The
district court denied the motion as premature, noting that Lazzaro’s vagueness claim
rested on the facts specific to his charges, which needed to be further developed at
trial.
The Government moved in limine to exclude evidence of the minors’
purported consent and Minnesota’s age of consent law as irrelevant under Federal
Rule of Evidence 401 and confusing or misleading under Rule 403. According to
the Government, state law was not relevant to whether Lazzaro violated 18
U.S.C. § 1591, and consent was neither an element of sex trafficking nor a valid
defense. The district court granted the motion in part. The district court prohibited
Lazzaro from arguing that he had not violated § 1591 if the victims consented, and
it barred any evidence of the age of consent under Minnesota law because the state
age of consent had no bearing on whether Lazzaro violated § 1591. But the court
prohibited the Government from implying Lazzaro’s guilt based only on the fact that
he had sex with 16-year-olds, and it further permitted Lazzaro to introduce “evidence
of what happened” during the interactions, including “evidence of consent.”
4 The original indictment also charged Lazzaro with one count of attempted
sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c)
and 1594(a), and two counts of sex trafficking obstruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(d), and included an additional count of sex trafficking obstruction against
both Lazzaro and Castro Medina.
5 The superseding indictment dropped the attempted sex trafficking and two of
the obstruction counts, leaving one sex trafficking obstruction charge. The district
court dismissed that remaining count on the Government’s motion before trial.

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The case proceeded to trial. In its opening statement, the Government
articulated its theory of the case and previewed the evidence it intended to introduce.
Five times, the Government referred to Lazzaro’s victims as “underage.” After the
Government concluded, Lazzaro objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the
references improperly suggested that sex with underage girls is itself a federal crime.
Though the district court agreed that the term might confuse the jury about the
relevance of consent, it denied Lazzaro’s motion for a mistrial. Instead, the district
court issued a curative instruction, informing the jury that, without more, “it is not a
violation of federal law for an adult to have consensual sex with a 16-year-old.”
Further, it advised the Government to instead refer to the girls as “minors” or “under
18,” and the Government agreed to do so.
The Government called Castro Medina as a witness. She testified to her
relationship with Lazzaro and her role in recruiting minor girls for him. In one
exchange, she discussed a photo Lazzaro had sent to her and G.L. after their first
meeting. The photograph—a selfie of Lazzaro with no shirt, wearing Minnesota
Vikings-branded underwear, and holding wads of cash—was accompanied by a
message: “I don’t fuck around.” According to Castro Medina, this meant Lazzaro
was willing to “pay up” for sex. Lazzaro did not object to the Government’s
questions or Castro Medina’s answers.6
The Government called several other witnesses, including the minor victims,
members of law enforcement, and a developmental and forensic pediatrician. After
the Government rested, Lazzaro moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to prove all of the elements of the charges beyond a
6 Lazzaro did object to the introduction of the photograph for lack of
foundation on the basis that the photograph was reproduced by an intelligence
software and, at that point, the Government had not called a witness to testify to the
software’s reproduction process. The district court overruled that objection, noting
that the Government intended to call such a witness and, in any event, Castro Medina
already testified that she received the text messages and photograph. Lazzaro did
not object to the photograph on any other basis.

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reasonable doubt. The district court denied the motion, and Lazzaro proceeded to
present his defense. In addition to calling five witnesses of his own, Lazzaro elected
to testify in his own defense. He admitted to having sex with each of the minor
victims and to giving them money or other expensive items. According to Lazzaro,
however, the money and items he gave to the girls were not payment for sex, just
“gifts that they asked for.” Though he admitted asking Castro Medina to “hook
[him] up” with girls, he stressed that he never asked her to be his “recruiter.” At the
close of his evidence, Lazzaro once again moved for judgment of acquittal. The
district court denied the motion and the parties made their closing arguments.
During its closing, the Government twice referred to Lazzaro as a “predator”
and his minor victims as his “prey.” The Government also commented on Castro
Medina, stating that while she admitted her conduct was “disgusting” and “horrible,”
she was “unshakeable up on th[e] witness stand” and “testified truthfully.” In
contrast, the Government asserted that Lazzaro was “wildly untruthful,” as his
testimony was “absurd” and “self-serving.” Lazzaro never objected. The case was
submitted to the jury, which found Lazzaro guilty on all counts.
After trial, Lazzaro renewed his vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1591, but
the district court concluded the statute was not void for vagueness. The court held
that the statute gave adequate notice that Lazzaro’s conduct was prohibited and that
the statute did not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. Thus, the district court denied
Lazzaro’s motion to dismiss.
The day before he was scheduled to be sentenced, and over four months after
the jury rendered its verdict, Lazzaro filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the
jurors had been dishonest when answering questions during voir dire and that the
Government had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. The court withheld its
decision and sentenced Lazzaro to 252 months’ imprisonment.
Several weeks later, after further briefing by the parties, the district court
addressed Lazzaro’s motion for a new trial. After trial, Lazzaro had retained an

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investigation firm to determine if the jurors had been truthful during voir dire.
According to Lazzaro, the investigation discovered that five seated jurors allegedly
concealed or were otherwise dishonest about material information. One juror (Juror
34) failed to disclose family members who were victims of sexual assault and
worked for sexual assault advocacy organizations. Another (Juror 45) failed to
disclose that that she was a supporter of the #MeToo movement; that her daughter
was the subject of various criminal cases in Minnesota; and that her sister had a
criminal history. After the trial, this same juror posted on social media that she “was
one of the lucky 12 to be picked” for the case. According to Lazzaro, other jurors
had similar non-disclosures: family members who volunteered with sexual assault
victims, served in law enforcement, or had criminal records.
Separately, Lazzaro asserted that the Government engaged in misconduct by
misrepresenting the “actual context of the communications” surrounding the
photograph he sent to G.L. and Castro Medina. He claimed that he only became
aware of the “true context” after receiving both the photograph and accompanying
text messages in a single display. Lazzaro acknowledged, however, that he received
both the photograph and text messages during discovery, and he further
acknowledged that he was the person who sent both the photograph and the text
messages. All the same, Lazzaro argued that the purported misrepresentation
constituted prejudicial misconduct by the Government.
The district court denied the motion. First, it noted that Lazzaro’s motion was
filed more than 14 days after the jury rendered its verdict, making it untimely unless
it was based on “newly discovered evidence.” Because the district court found that
the evidence raised in the motion was available and discoverable through due
diligence before and during trial, it denied the entire motion as untimely.
Even assuming timeliness, the district court went on to deny Lazzaro’s motion
on the merits. As to the alleged juror misconduct, the district court noted that none
of the jurors were asked questions that might have disclosed any of the alleged
dishonesty. Further, all the jurors affirmed their ability to render their verdict fairly

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and impartially, and none of the evidence discovered in the post-trial investigation
undermined those assurances. As to the prosecutorial misconduct claim, the district
court noted that Lazzaro had the photograph and accompanying text messages before
trial and that he was given the opportunity to argue his theory of the photograph to
the jury.
Lazzaro now appeals, raising multiple points of error. He argues that 18
U.S.C. § 1591 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct; that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that he violated § 1591; that he should have been permitted
to refer to the age of consent under Minnesota law; that his trial was infected with
prosecutorial misconduct; and that he is entitled to a new trial based on juror
misconduct. We address each point in turn.
II.
Lazzaro first argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is unconstitutionally vague. “We
review de novo whether a penal statute . . . is void for vagueness under the Fifth
Amendment.” United States v. Birbragher, 603 F.3d 478, 484 (8th Cir. 2010).
“The Fifth Amendment guarantees every citizen the right to due process.
Stemming from this guarantee is the concept that vague statutes are void.” United
States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2002). A vague statute is one that
“‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited,’
or . . . ‘is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.’” United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18 (2010)). A defendant bringing a
vagueness challenge must demonstrate that the statute is vague as applied to his
particular conduct, “for ‘[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 18-19).

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As relevant here, § 1591(a) has two elements: A defendant must knowingly
“recruit[], entice[], harbor[], transport[], provide[], obtain[], advertise[], maintain[],
patronize[], or solicit[] by any means a person,” and the defendant must do so with
knowledge, or with reckless disregard for the fact, that the victim is under 18 years
old and “will be caused” to engage in a “commercial sex act.”7 See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(1). According to Lazzaro, this statute fails to provide adequate notice and
lends itself to arbitrary enforcement. He is wrong on both points.
A.
First, the statute provides adequate notice of the conduct it covers. It prohibits
knowingly recruiting, enticing, transporting, obtaining, or soliciting another person
by any means. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). While these acts are not specifically defined,
Congress is “not required to define every term in a statute.” Adam & Eve Jonesboro,
LLC v. Perrin, 933 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 2019). Rather, the terms of a statute are
given their ordinary meaning. Id.
A person of ordinary intelligence would know that the statute covers
Lazzaro’s conduct. For example, a person “transports” something when they
“transfer or convey” that thing “from one place to another.” Transport,
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1330 (11th ed. 2020); see also
Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 329 (1927) (“To transport means to
convey or carry from one place to another.”); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S.
125, 134 (1911) (noting that “transport” does not necessarily imply “personal agency
[or] some degree of possession”). An ordinary person would know that driving a
person somewhere, or paying for cars to do so, fits that definition. Indeed, Lazzaro
admitted as much on cross examination at trial. So too would a person of ordinary
intelligence know that Lazzaro “recruited” the girls when he used Castro Medina to
identify, contact, and persuade them to meet with him. See Recruit, Merriam-
7 A “commercial sex act” is a sex act “on account of which anything of value
is given to or received by any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3).

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Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1041 (11th ed. 2020) (defining “recruit” as “to
secure the services of” and “to seek to enroll”). Again, Lazzaro himself used the
term to describe Castro Medina’s role—his “recruiter.”
The same goes for the other acts in subsection (a)(1). A person of ordinary
intelligence would know that Lazzaro “enticed” his victims by displaying
photographs of himself with expensive items and celebrities. See Entice,
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 417 (11th ed. 2020) (defining “entice” as
“to attract artfully or adroitly or by arousing hope or desire”); United States v.
Flechs, 98 F.4th 1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 2024) (“[T]o entice is to draw on by arousing
hope or desire.” (citation omitted)). So too can a person of ordinary intelligence
discern the scope of other acts listed, like “solicit,” see Solicit, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 1187 (defining “solicit” as “to approach with a request or plea”
or “to proposition . . . as or in the character of a prostitute”); Wisc. Dep’t of Revenue
v. William Wrigley, Jr. Co., 505 U.S. 214, 223 (1992) (“‘Solicitation,’ commonly
understood, means ‘[a]sking’ for, or ‘enticing’ to, something.” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)); or “obtain,” see Obtain, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
(“To bring into one’s own possession; to procure.”); see also United States v.
Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1076 (8th Cir. 2013) (rejecting sufficiency challenge where
defendant attempted to “obtain” a minor by attempting to get the minor “alone . . . in
a room”).
Similarly, § 1591(a)’s second element applies to defendants who commit such
acts knowing that a person under the age of 18 “will be caused” to engage in a
commercial sex act. Again, the statute does not define the phrase, but the same
analysis applies. A person of ordinary intelligence would know that flaunting cash
and valuables to minors, plying those minors with alcohol and drugs, and paying
them in cash or valuables after sex could “cause” those minors to engage in a
commercial sex act. Moreover, that a defendant must intend certain consequences
further undermines Lazzaro’s arguments. Section 1591(a) requires proof that a
defendant “mean[t] to ‘cause’ the minor to engage in commercial sex acts.” United
States v. Paul, 885 F.3d 1099, 1103 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). That state of

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mind narrows the statute’s application considerably yet still sweeps in Lazzaro’s
conduct here. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (noting that
“[w]hether someone . . . had an intent is a true-or-false determination”). Taken
together, neither element leaves doubt about § 1591’s scope, and a person of ordinary
intelligence would know that it covers Lazzaro’s conduct.
B.
Second, § 1591 does not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. Vagueness
concerns arise when statutory text “permit[s] ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.’”
Birbragher, 603 F.3d at 489 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)). That normally requires “wholly subjective
judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal
meanings.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. In contrast, that “someone held a belief or
had an intent” is an objective fact which presents a binary choice: Either the
defendant held that intent or did not. Id. Statutes including such binary choices do
not present vagueness concerns, as these mens rea requirements substantially
“narrow[] the [statute’s] scope . . . and limit[] prosecutorial discretion.” United
States v. Carlson, 810 F.3d 544, 550-51 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting McFadden v.
United States, 576 U.S. 186, 197 (2015)).
Section 1591(a) is such a statute. In addition to proving the knowing
commission of a prohibited act under subsection (a)(1), the Government must also
prove that the defendant took those actions intending to cause the victims to engage
in commercial sex. See Paul, 885 F.3d at 1103. Whether Lazzaro possessed that
intent “is a true-or-false determination,” one passed upon by courts and juries every
day. Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. A statute that ties culpability to such objective facts
does not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. See Birbragher, 603 F.3d at 489.

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C.
Lazzaro’s counterarguments are unconvincing. He asserts that the first
element of § 1591 “provides nothing whatsoever that might have alerted him that his
conduct could be construed as criminal.” As already discussed, however, ordinary
people can readily discern § 1591’s scope, which extends to Lazzaro’s conduct here.
Next, he asserts that the statute’s terms “describe perfectly ordinary, lawful conduct
that does nothing to provide sufficient notice of what is prohibited.” This misses the
point. Whether the law prohibits conduct that is not malum in se does not impact
whether the law adequately describes its prohibition. See, e.g., Slavin v. United
States, 403 F.3d 522, 523-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (rejecting vagueness
challenge to prohibition of the “knowing transportation of birds . . . for purposes of
having the birds participate in a fighting venture, regardless whether the fight would
be legal in the state where it was to occur”). That driving a minor across the city
might be perfectly lawful in and of itself has no bearing on whether § 1591 prohibits
that conduct when the defendant does so to facilitate commercial sex with that minor.
Lazzaro also suggests that the district court’s jury instructions impermissibly
broadened § 1591 to the point of vagueness. Referencing statements by individual
legislators, he claims that Congress intended § 1591 to apply only to individuals who
“control” minors into engaging in commercial sex. That argument is misplaced.
Apart from the fact that § 1591 says nothing about control when it comes to sex
trafficking minors, see United States v. Biancofiori, 94 F.4th 651, 653 (7th Cir.
2024) (noting that, under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), “trafficking of a minor [is] an
alternative to trafficking of ‘a person’ by ‘force, threats of force, fraud,
coercion . . . or any combination of such means’” (second alteration in original)
(citation omitted)), generalized notions of Congressional intent do not impact the
standard of conduct outlined in the text of the statute, regardless of the statements of
individual legislators. Id. at 654 (noting that a legislator’s statement that “does not
match the enacted statute . . . does not render invalid an enacted text whose meaning
is ascertainable”).

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Lazzaro argues that applying the statute to his conduct opens a host of
concerns for other, innocent dating patterns. He points to the definition of
“commercial sex act” in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3), asserting that the phrase “anything
of value” could cover “vast swaths of legal, consensual, non-commercial sexual
activity.” True, “commercial sex act” is extremely broad. See Cook, 782 F.3d at
988. That is not sufficient, however, to make the statute unconstitutionally vague.
The statute must instead fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what it covers, or it must be liable to arbitrary enforcement based on subjective
standards. Id. at 987. Neither is true here. A person of ordinary intelligence would
know that Lazzaro’s conduct falls within § 1591’s prohibition, and the statute does
not rest on “wholly subjective standards.” See Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. Whatever
uncertainties might exist at the margins, hypothetical vagueness is not enough.
Cook, 782 F.3d at 987. Lazzaro must instead demonstrate that § 1591 “is vague as
applied to the particular facts” of his case. Id. (citation omitted). He has not done
so. Accordingly, § 1591 is not vague as applied to Lazzaro.
III.
Lazzaro next argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support his convictions. We review his challenge de novo, taking the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, accepting all reasonable inferences and
resolving any conflicts in its favor. United States v. Euring, 112 F.4th 545, 555 (8th
Cir. 2024). We will reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Lazzaro knowingly had multiple sexual encounters with multiple girls under
the age of 18. He arranged to meet the girls at his condominium, and he gave them
alcohol, food, expensive personal items, and money. This much is undisputed.
Appellant Br. 3, 5. On appeal, Lazzaro only argues8 that there was insufficient
8 Lazzaro makes no distinction between his conspiracy and substantive sex
trafficking convictions. Accordingly, he appears to concede that his conspiracy
conviction rises or falls with the substantive counts.

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evidence to prove that he knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that his actions
would cause these minor girls to engage in commercial sex acts: “sex acts, on
account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3). We disagree
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict and viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, Jungers, 702 F.3d at
1075, the evidence was more than sufficient to prove that Lazzaro intended and knew
that each of the minor victims would be caused to engage in commercial sex.
Lazzaro followed a consistent pattern. With Castro Medina’s help, he would identify
and recruit young women by glamorizing “sugar dating”—a relationship by its
nature transactional. He crafted messages displaying his purported wealth to entice
his targets. He would offer his victims alcohol or drugs, while he remained sober.
He would display large amounts of cash and offer to pay the victims if they took off
their clothes, kissed, or played sexual truth-or-dare. He would then have sex with
them, and he would pay the girls after sex in cash or other valuable items every time.
Lazzaro argues that there was no evidence that he ever explicitly offered
anything for sex, and that he never “expressly discussed, negotiated, or considered
out loud” whether he would give the victims anything. That argument fails for two
reasons. First, the evidence shows that he did make such a statement. He explicitly
offered $400 to E.L., her sister, and their friend for sex, and when the friend became
uncomfortable, Lazzaro made clear that she would not get the money if she left.
Second, and more fundamentally, the jury was not required to find an explicit
agreement. Rather, the jury was entitled to use “reason and common sense in light
of their own observations and experiences.” See United States v. Owens, 966 F.3d
700, 709 (8th Cir. 2020). In particular, the jury could infer Lazzaro’s state of mind
“from circumstantial evidence.” See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615
n.11 (1994). Using that common sense, a reasonable jury could infer that all of
Lazzaro’s repeated conduct over an eight-month span—glamorizing “sugar dating,”
displaying cash and other valuables beforehand, explicitly offering money for acts

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of sexual foreplay, and invariably giving his victims money or valuables
afterwards—demonstrated an ongoing, implicit offer to pay for sex acts.
Finally, Lazzaro asserts that, while he gave money or valuables to every girl
he met with, sex acts did not always occur and thus his endeavors were “hit or miss.”
Whatever the truth of these statements, they are immaterial to his sufficiency
challenge. The Government did not need to prove that a commercial sex act did or
was virtually certain to occur. It only had to prove that Lazzaro “mean[t] to cause”
the minors to engage in commercial sex acts. See Paul, 885 F.3d at 1103 (citation
omitted). When coupled with the substantial evidence that Lazzaro recruited,
enticed, transported, obtained, or solicited the minor girls, the proof of intent we
have already described is enough to support his convictions. See id. Lazzaro argued
that he lacked the necessary state of mind, in part based on his apparent generosity,
but this is an argument for the jury. Our review is limited to determining whether a
“reasonable jury could find all the [crime’s] elements beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Paul, 885 F.3d at 1102 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A reasonable jury
could do so here. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support Lazzaro’s
convictions.
IV.
Next, Lazzaro argues that the district court should have permitted him to
introduce evidence of the age of consent under Minnesota law. We review the
district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Condon, 720 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2013). We give “substantial deference to a trial
court’s exclusion of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.” Id. (emphasis
omitted) (citation omitted). But we pay special attention to ensure that the exclusion
did not unfairly prevent Lazzaro from making his case. Id.

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“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 402. Further, relevant
evidence9 may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of, among other things, “confusing the issues” or “misleading the jury.” Fed.
R. Evid. 403. Evidence is likely to confuse the issues “if admission of the evidence
would lead to litigation of collateral issues.” Condon, 720 F.3d at 755 (citation
omitted).
Lazzaro argues that he should have been permitted to reference Minnesota
law because it was relevant to his “good faith . . . attempt[s] to conform his conduct
to what the law explicitly permitted.” Even assuming Minnesota’s age of consent
bore some relevance to Lazzaro’s case, its probative value was “substantially
outweighed” by a risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. See Fed. R.
Evid. 403. Lazzaro was charged with violating the federal sex trafficking statute.
Reference to whether he complied or attempted to comply with Minnesota law
would only confuse the issues. He was charged with violating § 1591, and the
relevant age under that statute is 18, regardless of what state law permits. See United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1977) (noting that, where federal law
applies, it does so “regardless of the laws of States with respect to the same subject”).
Nor is there any indication that the exclusion “unfairly prevent[ed]” Lazzaro
from presenting a complete defense. See Condon, 720 F.3d at 756. It is true that
excluding evidence might “deprive[ a defendant] of his fundamental constitutional
right to a fair opportunity to present a defense,” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
687 (1986), but that is not what happened here. Nothing from the district court’s
ruling prevented Lazzaro from putting the Government to its burden at trial, nor
would the age of consent “provide a defense for the crime” or “go to any element of
the offense.” See United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009).
Lazzaro’s asserted purpose—to show his alleged “good faith” attempts to abide by
the law—was not foreclosed by the district court’s ruling. He argued to the jury that
9 Evidence is relevant if it makes a fact of consequence “more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.

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he did not engage in commercial sex and that the money and things of value were
just evidence that he was a “generous guy.” That the jury rejected this argument
does not mean that Lazzaro was deprived of his ability to present a complete defense.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by precluding reference
to Minnesota’s age of consent.10
V.
Lazzaro next argues that he was entitled to mistrial—and a new trial under
Rule 33—due to prosecutorial misconduct. We review the district court’s denial of
both a mistrial and a post-trial Rule 33 motion for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Thao, 76 F.4th 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Boesen, 599 F.3d 874,
876 (8th Cir. 2010). When a defendant fails to raise the claims in the district court,
however, those “unpreserved allegations of prosecutorial misconduct” are reviewed
for plain error. United States v. Foreman, 588 F.3d 1159, 1164 (8th Cir. 2009).
“Accordingly, [w]e will only reverse under exceptional circumstances.” United
States v. Redd, 81 F.4th 822, 831 (8th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
Lazzaro focuses on the Government using the word “underage” when
referring to his victims, introducing the photograph of Lazzaro meant to convey his
willingness to pay for sex, referring to Lazzaro as a “predator,” vouching for Castro
Medina as having testified “truthfully,” and attacking Lazzaro’s testimony as
“wildly untruthful.” But Lazzaro only objected to and moved for a mistrial based
on the “underage” comments, and he moved for a new trial based on the photograph
10 Lazzaro argues that he should have been permitted to introduce the evidence
to “defend himself from the improper prosecutorial arguments that sex with all
minors [is] a crime.” To the extent that point is even relevant here, the district court
counseled the jury that having sex with a 16-year-old girl was not, by itself, a
violation of federal law. These types of cautionary instructions are usually sufficient
to dispel any prejudice. See United States v. Davidson, 122 F.3d 531, 538 (8th Cir.
1997).

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some four months after the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, though we examine “the
cumulative effect of [any] improprieties,” United States v. Cameron, 99 F.4th 432,
437 (8th Cir. 2024), the latter three arguments are reviewed for plain error. See
Foreman, 588 F.3d at 1164.
A.
For the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct based on the reference to
Lazzaro as a “predator,” the comments on Castro Medina’s truthfulness, and the
attacks on Lazzaro’s lack thereof, Lazzaro neither objected at trial nor filed any
post-trial motions for relief.11 Thus, reviewing for plain error, we will reverse only
if the district court committed a clear or obvious error that affected Lazzaro’s
substantial rights and “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” See United States v. Troyer, 677 F.3d 356, 359 (8th Cir.
2012) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Under this
standard, Lazzaro “must therefore demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different absent the alleged error.’” See United States v.
Darden, 688 F.3d 382, 390 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Considering the record
as a whole, we conclude Lazzaro cannot meet this standard. Even assuming the
Government made improper arguments in closing, it presented a wealth of evidence
at trial, as already recounted. Because that evidence “indicates that the result at trial
would not have been different,” id., the district court did not plainly err in denying
Lazzaro a new trial on these grounds.
11 Lazzaro also raised some of these arguments in a pro se letter more than two
months after the verdict. Even if we were to treat that letter as a motion for a new
trial, see Lamar v. Payne, 111 F.4th 902, 907 n.2 (8th Cir. 2024) (noting that pro se
filings are liberally construed), the outcome would not differ, as Lazzaro knew or
could have discovered the alleged misconduct well before the 14-day deadline under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2). See United States v. Delgrosso, 852
F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 2017).

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B.
Though Lazzaro did not object to the introduction of the photograph or the
Government’s related questioning, he did raise the alleged misrepresentation of the
photograph’s context as a basis for his post-trial Rule 33 motion. As a threshold
matter, however, the district court denied Lazzaro’s motion as untimely, a
conclusion we review de novo. See Boesen, 599 F.3d at 876. A defendant may
move for a new trial within 3 years of the jury’s verdict so long as that motion is
“grounded on newly discovered evidence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). When the
motion rests on other grounds, however, it must be filed within 14 days after the
verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2). Because Lazzaro filed his motion almost four
months after that deadline,12 his motion must rest on newly discovered evidence to
be timely.
Evidence is not newly discovered when “the evidence could have been
discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence.” United States v. Bell, 761 F.3d
900, 911 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Thus, where the factual basis for the
motion existed, and ordinary diligence could have uncovered it, that evidence is not
“newly discovered.” Id. Here, Lazzaro’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct based
on the photograph rests entirely on evidence that was actually known to him, easily
discoverable through ordinary diligence. Lazzaro would have known about the
photograph and text messages when he sent them. The Government also supplied
Lazzaro with both during discovery and introduced them at trial. At the very latest,
Lazzaro became aware of the photograph and its context when he was cross-
examined about it. The fact that he knew the evidence existed demonstrates his
motion’s tardiness. See Delgrosso, 852 F.3d at 827 (8th Cir. 2017) (denying motion
12 Once again, Lazzaro raised this purported misrepresentation in another pro
se letter to the district court a month before his motion for a new trial. To the extent
that filing was intended as a motion for a new trial, see Payne, 111 F.4th at 907 n.2,
it was untimely under Rule 33(b)(2), as the letter was filed more than three months
after the jury rendered its verdict.

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for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct as untimely where defendant “was
aware of [the Government’s] alleged misconduct during the trial”).
Lazzaro claims that he could not have known the “actual context” of the
photograph until after trial because the discovery software did not display “the
images and the texts together in context.” This claim is meritless. Even assuming
he was unaware of the “actual context” until this point, “Rule 33 does not authorize
district courts to grant new trials on the basis of such evidence since it is not newly
discovered, but merely newly available.” See Bell, 761 F.3d at 911 (citation
omitted). Lazzaro had the evidence well before the 14-day deadline under Rule
33(b)(2). That he now wishes to present that photograph in a different light does not
make it “newly discovered.” Accord United States v. Wiese, 750 F.2d 674, 678 (8th
Cir. 1984) (finding no abuse of discretion in refusal to grant mistrial based on
evidence that “existed and was known to [defendant]’s trial counsel at the time of
trial”). Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct was untimely, and the
district court did not err in denying the motion on that basis.
C.
In contrast to his other claims of prosecutorial misconduct, Lazzaro timely
objected to and moved for a mistrial based on the Government’s use of the term
“underage” during its opening statement. Thus, we review for abuse of discretion,
see Thao, 76 F.4th at 779, and Lazzaro must show “both that the prosecutor’s
remarks were improper and that the remarks prejudiced his right to a fair trial.”
United States v. Patterson, 68 F.4th 402, 419 (8th Cir. 2023). In assessing prejudice,
we examine the cumulative effect of any misconduct, the strength of the evidence,
and any curative action taken by the court in response to the impropriety. Cameron,
99 F.4th at 437.
Applying that standard here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Lazzaro’s motion for a mistrial after the Government’s opening statement.
Any potential prejudice was adequately dispelled when the district court

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immediately cautioned the jury that having sex with minors is not, by itself, a
violation of federal law. Usually, these types of cautionary instructions “remedy any
potential prejudice” resulting from improper remarks by the Government. Thao, 76
F.4th at 780. We see no reason to depart from that general rule here. Accordingly,
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Lazzaro’s motion for a
mistrial based on the references to his victims as “underage.”
VI.
Finally, Lazzaro also argues that the district court should have granted him a
new trial based on purported juror misconduct. On appeal, Lazzaro points to two
jurors: Juror 34 and Juror 45.13 We review the denial of a motion for a new trial
based on alleged juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion, while juror honesty
and bias are factual issues reviewed for clear error. United States v. Sledge, 108
F.4th 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2024).
A.
As already noted, the district court denied Lazzaro’s motion as untimely.
Because Lazzaro filed his motion well after the 14-day deadline under Rule 33(b)(2),
Lazzaro’s motion must be based on newly discovered evidence of juror misconduct.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b). “[E]vidence [that] could have been discovered earlier
in the exercise of due diligence” does not fit that description. Bell, 761 F.3d at 911
(citation omitted). The district court held that Lazzaro’s evidence was not newly
discovered. We agree.
Here, the bulk of Lazzaro’s claims focus on facts that were in existence at the
time of jury selection. That Juror 34 had extended family members who were
victims of sexual assault, or worked for a sexual assault advocacy group, were facts
13 Lazzaro focuses his argument on appeal on Juror 34 and Juror 45. To the
extent he intends to renew his arguments concerning other jurors, those claims fail
for the same reasons as those he explicitly renews here.

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then in existence. So too were most of Juror 45’s alleged faults. Her support for the
#MeToo movement and her daughter’s criminal history existed at the time of voir
dire and throughout trial.
Lazzaro claims the jurors concealed these facts, thus causing “his ‘right to a
peremptory challenge [to be] prejudicially impaired.’” But he discovered this
information through the exercise of ordinary diligence, and there is no reason that
he could not have used that same diligence to discover those same facts before or
during trial. Lazzaro has no response to these points. Indeed, he did not even address
the timeliness issue on appeal. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the
bulk of his Rule 33 motion was based on evidence that was not “newly discovered.”
The district court did not err in denying the motion on that basis.
B.
There is, however, one piece of evidence that was “newly discovered” within
the meaning of the rule: Juror 45’s social media post stating that she “was one of the
lucky 12 to be picked for the Anton Lazzaro federal child sex trafficking case.” This
evidence is certainly “newly discovered,” as even the exercise of ordinary diligence
could not have uncovered the social media post before it was made. According to
Lazzaro, the post is just further evidence of Juror 45’s “strident support for the
‘#MeToo movement,’” something Lazzaro claims was improperly concealed during
voir dire.14 He asserts that Juror 45’s affirmation that she could remain impartial
was thus false.
To prevail on his claim, Lazzaro must show “(1) that the juror answered [a
question during voir dire] dishonestly, not just inaccurately; (2) that the juror was
motivated by partiality; and (3) that the true facts, if known, would have supported
striking the juror for cause.” See United States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d 762, 770 (8th Cir.
14 We thus assume that Lazzaro’s claim of juror misconduct as to Juror 45
based on her alleged support for the #MeToo movement was timely, but we do so
for the sake of argument only.

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2006); see also McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556
(1984) (articulating the framework). The district court concluded that none of the
jurors, including Juror 45, ever answered a material question dishonestly. This was
not clear error. Even setting aside the fact that Juror 45 was never asked about her
support for the #MeToo movement, see Sledge, 108 F.4th at 671, her assurances that
she could be fair or impartial effectively doom Lazzaro’s claim. See United States
v. Needham, 852 F.3d 830, 839 (8th Cir. 2017) (requiring a juror to “profess his
inability to be impartial” to overcome presumption of impartiality). Nothing about
Juror 45’s social media post suggests her affirmation was false or dishonest.
Lazzaro’s focus on the social media post itself is similarly misplaced. As the
district court put it, the mere fact that she stated she was “lucky” to serve on the jury
does not suggest that she was biased absent some further evidence of dishonesty and
impartiality. Lazzaro provides no such evidence here. See also Sledge, 108 F.4th at
671 (affirming district court finding that juror did not answer dishonestly despite, in
a drug prosecution, failure to disclose family members with issues with opioids,
addiction, or overdoses). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in
concluding that Juror 45 never answered a material question dishonestly, and
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Lazzaro’s motion for a new trial.15
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Lazzaro’s convictions.
______________________________
15 For those same reasons, there was no abuse of discretion in denying
Lazzaro’s request for an evidentiary hearing as he “failed to carry [his] burden under
the McDonough Power framework.” Sledge, 108 F.4th at 672 (citation omitted).

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