United States of America v. Clint Robert Schram

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-3504
___________________________
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Clint Robert Schram
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - St. Joseph
____________
Submitted: January 14, 2025
Filed: February 12, 2025
____________
Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
____________
ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
After a jury convicted Clint Schram of multiple offenses stemming from his
operation of child pornography websites, the district court1 sentenced him to a life
term and four concurrent thirty-year terms of imprisonment. He contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the district court
1The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

-- 1 of 9 --

improperly admitted multiple images of child pornography into evidence, and that
the district court erred in calculating his guidelines sentencing range and imposing
an overlong sentence. Because we discern no reversible error, we affirm.
In 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment, which, in relevant part,
charged Schram with four counts of advertising child pornography and one count
of engaging in a child exploitation enterprise. Advertisement is shorthand for
knowingly making, printing, publishing, or causing to be made, printed, or
published a “notice or advertisement seeking or offering” to “receive, exchange,
buy, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce, any visual depiction, if the
production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(d)(1). As charged, a child exploitation enterprise, in turn, consists of a
series of advertising offenses committed “in concert with three or more other
persons” that constitute “three or more separate incidents” and involve “more than
one victim.” Id. § 2252A(g)(2).
Schram stood trial, and the government presented evidence that he
administered four sites where he and other users shared links to what appeared to
be child pornography. The jury then found Schram guilty on the five counts at
issue.
Schram insists that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, but we are
unconvinced. The gap in the evidence, according to Schram, was proof that he
advertised depictions of real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The
parties do not dispute that advertising depictions of real children, rather than
computer-generated facsimiles, was essential to Schram’s convictions. But we
agree with the government that the record was against Schram.
It is enough to uphold the convictions if any reasonable jury could have
found Schram guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d
--22--

-- 2 of 9 --

470, 478 (8th Cir. 2010). That is a matter we review de novo, id., notwithstanding
some suggestion that Schram failed to dispute the sufficiency of the evidence in
the district court. If the suggestion were true, we would review only for plain
error, see United States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2009), but there is
no need to pursue the point since the evidence was sufficient regardless of how we
look at it.
That is so because the jury saw excerpts from pornographic content Schram
advertised on his websites, all of which featured children. It could, therefore,
inspect those excerpts and decide for itself that the children were real. We have
said as much before, and so have our sister circuits. Koch, 625 F.3d at 479; see,
e.g., United States v. Pawlak, 935 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 2005); cf. also United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d
443, 449 (8th Cir. 1999).
With improvements in image-generation technology, we may someday have
to revisit our precedent, cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 259
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), but Schram has not convinced us
that today is that day. We will suppose, for present purposes, that we could
disregard our court’s prior decisions if changes in technology undermined their
assumption that jurors can reliably distinguish images of real children from images
of virtual children. But see United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 442
(1st Cir. 2007). The trouble for Schram is that the record here, far from
undermining that assumption, is entirely consistent with it.
Until this appeal, that was obvious because the record was devoid of
evidence about the distinguishability of real and virtual children. And it is only
slightly less obvious now, after Schram pointed us to a handful of webpages about
computer image generation. Those webpages, which we assume we can consider,
are less than illuminating. They reveal, at most, that computer programs could
generate images of virtual people at the time of Schram’s offense and that their
--33--

-- 3 of 9 --

realistic output was becoming ever more realistic. Few could dispute that, but it is
beside the point. What matters is how accurate jurors are in distinguishing realistic
images of virtual children from images of real children. See id. at 443 n.8. And on
that question, the webpages are silent.
Without more, we are not prepared to depart from our court’s precedent
allowing juries to decide whether images depict real children based on the images
themselves. At the foundation of that precedent is the principle that the
government need not produce evidence to negate a speculative assertion that a
child in an image is virtual. Vig, 167 F.3d at 450. That principle is as true today as
it was when we announced it—three years after Congress found that one could
make images of virtual children almost “indistinguishable to the unsuspecting
viewer” from images of actual children. Child Pornography Prevention Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996). And it requires us to reject
Schram’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. On the nearly empty record
here, Schram’s concern that images shown to the jury depicted virtual children is
just speculation unsupported by any concrete facts.
Though our conclusion does not depend on it, we note as well that research
on detecting images of virtual children leaves considerable doubt about the risk
that the jury mistook an image of a virtual child for an image of a real child here.
Even years after Schram’s offenses, less than one percent of child sexual abuse
material was both computer generated and photorealistic. At least that was the
percentage reported by the Stanford Internet Observatory and the nonprofit Thorn
based on files Thorn sampled from “communities dedicated to child sexual abuse.”
David Thiel et al., Generative ML and CSAM: Implications and Mitigations, at 2
(2023). And of that percentage, only about two-thirds of files were “highly
photorealistic,” though even those could still be “visually distinguished as being
generated.” Id. at 3. In our view, this is confirmation that the danger of confusing
virtual children with real children at Schram’s trial was speculative, however
serious it might be at some later date.
--44--

-- 4 of 9 --

We are also unpersuaded that we should reverse Schram’s convictions
because the district court admitted multiple images of child pornography into the
record. We review the admission of the images of child pornography for abuse of
discretion, United States v. Becht, 267 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2001), again
declining to decide whether plain error review might apply since it would not
change our conclusion. Schram contends that admitting the child pornography
violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides in relevant part that a
district court may exclude evidence if the danger that the evidence would be
needlessly cumulative or unfairly prejudicial substantially outweighs its probative
value. The district court, however, had the discretion to determine that the child
pornography helped prove Schram’s advertisement offenses without unduly
prejudicing Schram or duplicating the effect of other evidence.
As to some of the admitted child pornography, this was an easy
determination to make. The government introduced a screenshot of one of
Schram’s websites displaying an image of naked children and five exhibits
containing images of child pornography from pictures or videos Schram linked on
his websites. All these images were evidence that Schram used his websites to
advertise child pornography, something the government had to prove to convict
him. Schram protests that the government could have proven the same thing with
just four images—one for each website on which he advertised—but nothing in
Rule 403 forced the government to pick a single image from each website and
discard the rest. Rule 403 does not require the government to produce only the
minimum amount of evidence necessary to prove its case. What it requires is that
the district court strike a balance between the probative value of the evidence that
was offered and its tendency to encourage a verdict on improper grounds or make
litigation inefficient. We have accordingly held that the government need not
restrict its presentation of child pornography to one image for each device on
which a defendant stores it. See United States v. Blanks, 985 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th
Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Naidoo, 995 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 2021)
(per curiam). And here we similarly hold that the government’s presentation of
--55--

-- 5 of 9 --

Schram’s child pornography could feature more than one image from each of his
websites. The images the government showed were few and highly probative, and
the district court’s decision to admit them was reasonable.
Other images of child pornography that the government introduced were
less probative, but we do not believe the district court committed reversible error
in admitting them. The government showed the jury exhibits containing
screenshots from videos found on Schram’s hard drive. The screenshots depicted
girls exposing their vaginas or anuses, sometimes while digitally penetrating
themselves. Unlike the images from Schram’s websites, only some of the
screenshots were from videos linked on Schram’s websites, and the government
does not contend that Schram himself obtained any of the videos from his websites
or linked them there. The screenshots thus did not evidence any particular child
pornography advertisement Schram made. But they did further the government’s
case less directly, and we are confident that any mistake in admitting them did not
influence Schram’s convictions.
The screenshots tended to prove Schram’s propensity to advertise child
pornography, for the jury could find, as Schram’s trial counsel conceded, that
Schram collected the screenshots because he was “a coveter and a keeper of child
pornography.” And if it so found, the jury would have had greater reason to infer
that Schram used his website to obtain or exchange child pornography, which
would have qualified as prohibited advertising. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A); see
United States v. Heatherly, 985 F.3d 254, 269 (3d Cir. 2021).
Supporting this inference was a proper purpose for introducing the
screenshots. Though we typically frown on offering evidence of a defendant’s
uncharged misdeeds to show his propensity to commit charged misdeeds, see
United States v. Furman, 867 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2017), we do not do so here.
Federal Rule of Evidence 414(a) explains why. It authorizes district courts to
admit evidence that a criminal defendant accused of “child molestation”
--66--

-- 6 of 9 --

committed any other act of “child molestation,” and it permits consideration of the
evidence “on any matter to which it is relevant.” Since child molestation includes
both possessing child pornography and advertising it, Fed. R. Evid. 414(d)(2)(B),
introducing screenshot evidence that Schram possessed child pornography as part
of the proof that he advertised child pornography falls squarely within the rule.
We must still consider whether the screenshots were so unfairly prejudicial
or unduly cumulative that their admission was improper under Rule 403, see
United States v. Splettstoeszer, 956 F.3d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 2020), but we think
that doubtful. As to unfair prejudice, it is true that images “depicting child
pornography are by their very nature disturbing, and viewing such depictions is
highly likely to generate an emotional response. But that alone cannot be the
reason to exclude the evidence.” United States v. Evans, 802 F.3d 942, 946 (8th
Cir. 2015). The screenshots were not especially graphic or upsetting. See id.; cf.
Heatherly, 985 F.3d at 267–68. The jury had also seen worse images linked by
Schram on his websites, including depictions of men having vaginal intercourse
with girls and ejaculating in and on them. And the district court cautioned the jury
not to convict Schram simply because he may have committed an uncharged child
pornography crime. See United States v. Burch, 113 F.4th 815, 820 (8th Cir.
2024).
We are slightly more troubled by the redundancy of the screenshots with the
images of child pornography from Schram’s websites that the jury also viewed.
Yet we hesitate to say that the screenshots were too cumulative to admit. There
were only nine exhibits containing screenshots, only a few screenshots in each
exhibit, and only a few seconds for the jury to see each screenshot when
published. See United States v. Worthey, 716 F.3d 1107, 1114–15 (8th Cir. 2013).
Considering the limited presentation of screenshots and the more disturbing child
pornography already in the record, any error in admitting the screenshots was, at
the very least, harmless.
--77--

-- 7 of 9 --

Schram next challenges his sentence, though no more persuasively than he
challenged his convictions. Without reaching its merits, we can first reject
Schram’s argument that the district court improperly enhanced the offense level
used to calculate his guidelines sentencing range. According to Schram, the
district court erred by applying USSG § 3C1.1, which prescribes a two-level
enhancement for willfully obstructing, impeding, or attempting to obstruct or
impede “the administration of justice with respect to the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing” of an offense of conviction. We are more than a little
skeptical of this argument since, before trial, Schram sent a letter to the magistrate
judge assigned to his case in which he threatened to kill her if she did not dismiss
the charges against him. See United States v. Eye, 520 F. App’x 852, 853 (11th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam); cf. United States v. Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d 538, 544 (8th
Cir. 2009). But in any event, Schram had earned the maximum offense level even
before the district court applied the enhancement, so the enhancement caused him
no harm. United States v. Jensen, 834 F.3d 895, 902 (8th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Hamilton, 929 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 2019).
Just a little more discussion is necessary to reject Schram’s argument that
his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The substantive reasonableness of a
sentence is something we review for abuse of discretion, and, because Schram’s
sentence was within the guidelines range, it was presumptively reasonable. United
States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d 917, 925–26 (8th Cir. 2013). Nothing in the record
rebuts that presumption; in fact, the record more than amply supports Schram’s
sentence. Schram ran four websites used to share child pornography. His other
behavior confirmed his sexual interest in children while also revealing his violent
tendencies. In addition to his threats against the magistrate judge, there is evidence
that Schram planned to kidnap, enslave, rape, and perhaps to kill an eight-year-old
girl; threatened to kill a coworker, rape his children, and kill his family; and
plotted to bomb a union hall. While incarcerated, Schram threatened to kill a
prison guard, tried to strangle a cellmate, kicked a fellow inmate, and drew
sexually explicit images of children on his cell walls and in a booklet. On one
--88--

-- 8 of 9 --

occasion, he asserted that he had raped and murdered multiple children in the past.
Giving due weight to Schram’s lack of prior convictions and his mental health and
substance abuse problems, the district court could readily determine that a lengthy
sentence was necessary to reflect the seriousness of Schram’s offense and
eliminate the danger he posed to the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C);
cf. United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716, 719, 723 (8th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Cottrell, 853 F.3d 459, 463 (8th Cir. 2017).
Though Schram emphasizes it, the fact that users of his websites received
shorter sentences than his does not undermine this conclusion. For one thing,
when we consider sentencing disparities, we are, with an exception inapplicable
here, concerned only with national disparities. United States v. Heard, 91 F.4th
1275, 1280 (8th Cir. 2024). But even if we set that point aside, “disparate
sentences among dissimilar defendants are not unwarranted,” United States v.
Driscoll, 122 F.4th 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2024), and Schram and the users were
highly dissimilar. The users were at most staff members of Schram’s websites.
Each pleaded guilty to a single count of advertising child pornography, and each
received a sentence of about twenty years’ imprisonment. Schram, by contrast, ran
all four websites, stood trial, and was convicted of four counts of advertising child
pornography, plus another count of engaging in a child exploitation enterprise.
Even disregarding Schram’s troubling uncharged conduct, we would expect his
sentence to be much longer than the users’.
Since Schram has no further objections to his sentence, we conclude that the
district court did not commit reversible error in imposing it. Schram’s convictions
and sentence must stand.
Affirmed.
______________________________
--99--

-- 9 of 9 --