United States of America v. Sam Boyd

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1314
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Sam Boyd
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
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Submitted: December 20, 2024
Filed: May 30, 2025
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Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Sam Boyd of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance,
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, and of being a prohibited person in
possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
Boyd moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his Speedy Trial Act rights were
violated, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., and separately moved to sever the gun counts

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from the conspiracy count, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), 14(a). Because the motions
were properly denied, we affirm.
First, the Speedy Trial Act. On November 7, 2022, Boyd filed motions to
dismiss or in the alternative to suppress evidence (the November Motions) based on
allegations that the confidential informant’s misconduct was “so outrageous it
violated [Boyd]’s Due Process right [sic] contained within the 5th and 14th
Amendments.” R. Doc. 104 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)); R. Doc. 105. The same day, the
district court1 issued a text order continuance, setting a hearing date and stating that
“[b]ased on the ends of justice and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), the deadlines and trial
date are canceled pending resolution of [R. Doc.] 105 Motion to Suppress and [R.
Doc.] 104 Motion to Dismiss.” R. Doc. 106. The hearing was delayed by disputes
over the witness list and difficulties in procuring testimony. On Boyd’s motion, the
court ordered post-hearing briefing based on new information from the live
testimony.
On February 9, 2023, as part of the post-hearing briefing, Boyd filed a
document stylized as a memorandum “in support of” the November motion to
dismiss along with a motion to compel discovery (together the February Filings).
The magistrate judge recommended that Boyd’s November Motions and February
Filings be denied on June 2. All reasonably expected filings were submitted by June
16. The district court finally adopted the report and recommendation on August 24.
After the district court denied Boyd’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation
1 The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District
of South Dakota, now retired, issued the continuance. The Honorable Karen E.
Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, denied the
motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The Honorable Daneta
Wollmann, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota, denied
the motion to sever. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The Honorable James M.
Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting
by designation, overruled Boyd’s objection to Magistrate Judge Wollmann’s denial
and presided over trial and sentencing.

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of his Speedy Trial Act rights and motion to sever the firearm counts from the drug
conspiracy count, the case went to trial where the jury heard evidence that Boyd
possessed multiple firearms, with ammunition, and used them during the drug
conspiracy.
The Speedy Trial Act “requires that trial begin within 70 days after a
defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance.” United States v. Lucas, 499
F.3d 769, 782 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc). But certain periods of delay “shall be
excluded” from the speedy trial calculation. § 3161(h). So the speedy trial clock
runs only if none of § 3161(h)’s eight enumerated exclusions apply. See Bloate v.
United States, 559 U.S. 196, 206–07 (2010). “In the context of Speedy Trial Act
rulings, we review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings
for clear error, and its ultimate determination for an abuse of discretion.” Lucas, 499
F.3d at 782.
Everyone agrees that 54 days accrued to Boyd’s speedy trial clock, but Boyd
insists that an additional 39 days accrued between June 17, when the report and
recommendation for the February Motions was “under advisement,” and August 24,
when the court decided the motions. § 3161(h)(1)(H); see also Henderson v. United
States, 476 U.S. 321, 329 (1986) (stating a motion is under advisement after “the
court receives all the papers it reasonably expects”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(A).
He argues that § 3161(h)(1)(H) is limited to 30 days and that no other exclusion
could apply. Under Boyd’s theory, after the 30 excludable days expired, 39 days
ran.
The question then is whether the district court validly issued its ends of justice
continuance on November 7 because if it did, the 39 days are excludable. See
§ 3161(h) (flush language). For an ends of justice continuance to be proper under
that text order, the district court “must ‘set forth, in the record of the case, either
orally or in writing, its reasons’ for finding that the ends of justice are served and
they outweigh other interests.” United States v. Johnson, 990 F.3d 661, 667 (8th
Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 506 (2006)

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(quoting § 3161(h)(7)(A))). The findings don’t need to be made when the district
court issues the continuance but must be “on the record by the time a district court
rules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2).” Zedner, 547 U.S. at
507. There is a non-exhaustive list of factors it must consider when granting an ends
of justice continuance. § 3161(h)(7)(B).
Boyd argues that the district court’s on-record findings were not enough to
support its sua sponte continuance. While he concedes that the district court is not
required to make “extensive elaboration[s],” United States v. Bonilla-Filomeno, 579
F.3d 852, 857 (8th Cir. 2009), he emphasizes the statute requires on the record
findings, § 3161(h)(7)(A). And he argues that neither the one sentence text order
nor the order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment explains the court’s
reasoning. See § 3161(h)(7)(B) (listing required considerations).
The text order is short. But when we consider the record within which the
continuance was granted, we understand the reasons for the continuance. See United
States v. Fogg, 922 F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 2019) (upholding a short ends of justice
continuance after examining the record in which it was issued); United States v.
Villarreal, 707 F.3d 942, 954–55 (8th Cir. 2013) (same). The November Motions
were factually complex, and the text order tells us that the district court granted the
continuance so that those motions could be resolved. See § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii)
(requiring the court to consider complexity). The record also reveals that witness
issues caused the hearing on the motions to be delayed, and when it was finally held,
Boyd asked for more briefing, which led to the February Filings. When considered
in this context, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred when it found that
the ends of justice would be served by a continuance. And we hold the district court
did not abuse its discretion by granting the continuance and denying the motion to
dismiss.2
2 Because the ends of justice continuance was tied to the resolution of the
November Motions and the district court acted with reasonable diligence in
addressing the combined motions, we do not address the “open-ended continuance”
arguments.

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Boyd next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to sever
the drug charge from the firearm charges. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), 14(a). We can
reverse the denial of a motion to sever only if “the defendant shows an abuse of
discretion resulting in severe prejudice.” United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983,
988 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). But “[a] defendant cannot show prejudice
when evidence of the joined offense would be properly admissible in a separate trial
for the other crime.” Id. (citation omitted). The guns and ammunition were found
within Boyd’s constructive possession, within the drug conspiracy’s time frame, at
or near where Boyd had methamphetamine, so they would be admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence of “a plan to possess and distribute
drugs” given the charges are temporally connected. United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d
967, 982 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also id. at 982–83; Fed. R. Evid.
404(b). Similarly, evidence of the drugs in a separate gun case would be admissible
under the same rule to prove knowing possession. See Boyd, 180 F.3d at 982–83;
see also United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 61–62 (8th Cir. 1989). Because the
guns and drugs would be admissible in separate gun and drug trials, there was no
prejudice.
Affirmed.
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