United States of America v. Brandon Loss Farmer

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1490
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Brandon Loss Farmer
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Northern
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Submitted: March 17, 2025
Filed: June 12, 2025
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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Brandon Farmer pled guilty to one count of distribution of methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). The district court1 sentenced him
to 240 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release after
1 The Honorable D. P. Marshall Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

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concluding Farmer qualified as a career offender under United States Sentencing
Guideline (USSG) § 4B1.1(a). Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
Farmer argues that the district court erred in determining that he was a career
offender, but he did not object to this classification at sentencing. He claims that
this Court can review his challenge for plain error, but the Government contends that
Farmer has waived his right to challenge the application of USSG § 4B1.1(a) on
appeal. As we have stated, “[t]he plain error standard only applies when a defendant
inadvertently fails to raise an objection in the district court.” United States v.
Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 2002). Otherwise, “[t]he doctrine of invited
error applies when the trial court announces its intention to embark on a specific
course of action and defense counsel specifically approves of that course of action.”
United States v. Campbell, 764 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
In Campbell, this Court held that defendants’ stipulations to a sentencing
enhancement in their plea agreements prohibited them from arguing that the district
court erred by “‘embark[ing] on a specific course of action’ that ‘defense counsel
specifically approve[d].’” Id. at 879 (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted). Farmer acknowledged in his sentencing memorandum that he qualified as
a career offender under § 4B1.1(a). R. Doc. 34, at 2 (“Unfortunately, as Mr. Farmer
has been convicted of two or more felonies for a crime of violence . . . he was
determined to be a career offender.”). Rather than argue that § 4B1.1(a) was
inapplicable, Farmer instead argued for a downward variance based on the
applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Then, at sentencing, Farmer’s counsel
conceded that Farmer was “not [t]here to deny that he[ had] a criminal history or to
suggest that the [c]ourt should not take that into consideration,” and Farmer did not
object when the Government highlighted his status as a “quintessential career
offender.” Counsel even acknowledged that Farmer’s felonies were crimes of
violence, arguing instead that, because they were so remote, the court should vary
downward. R. Doc. 48, at 8 (“[W]e see no violent felonies, no controlled substance

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felonies in 14 years, . . . . [W]hat you see from his criminal history is a
de[-]escalation.”). These acknowledgements establish that Farmer “knowingly and
voluntarily waive[d his] right” to challenge the application of § 4B1.1(a), and, thus,
any alleged “error is unreviewable on appeal.” Campbell, 764 F.3d at 878. Even
though Farmer “did not propose the . . . enhancement, . . . he agreed that the court
could proceed” with applying § 4B1.1(a). Id. at 879. Because “[a]n erroneous ruling
generally does not constitute reversible error when it is invited by the same party
who seeks on appeal to have the ruling overturned,” Farmer is unable to utilize plain
error review. Roth v. Homestake Mining Co., 74 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir.1996).
We thus affirm the judgment of the district court.
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