United States of America v. Jerome Wesseh Koon, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2369
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Jerome Wesseh Koon, Jr.
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Eastern
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Submitted: February 12, 2025
Filed: June 12, 2025
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Before LOKEN, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Jerome W. Koon Jr. moved to dismiss the indictment against him, asserting a
speedy-trial violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA). After
an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion to dismiss, without
prejudice. The government appeals. Having jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731,
this court reverses and remands.

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This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal of an indictment under
the IADA. United States v. Dooley, 580 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2009). This court
reviews the factual findings for clear error. Id.
While serving a sentence in state prison, Koon was indicted by a federal grand
jury for a drug-trafficking conspiracy. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
informed him of the federal charges by sending a detainer to Koon via his
custodian—the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(DOCR). Consistent with the IADA, the detainer said that Koon had a right to a
speedy trial within 180 days after his written demand is “actually . . . delivered to
the appropriate U.S. Attorney and the appropriate U.S. District Court.” See United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 362-63 (1978) (“Once the Federal Government
lodges a detainer against a prisoner with state prison officials, the Agreement by its
express terms becomes applicable and the United States must comply with its
provisions.”). Koon demanded a speedy trial. The detainer told DOCR to send his
demand to the U.S. Attorney and the district court, and to return a copy to the DEA.
The DOCR sent a copy to the DEA, but nothing to the district court or U.S. Attorney.
Koon was not brought to trial within 180 days after his demand.
Koon argues that this violated his right to a speedy trial under the IADA.
Under the IADA: “If a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged ‘requests’
a ‘final disposition’ of the relevant charges, he must be brought to trial within 180
days; otherwise, the relevant ‘indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of
any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same.’”
United States v. Daily, 488 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2007), quoting 18 U.S.C. App.
2, § 2, art. III(d).
Koon contends the district court eventually found that the U.S. Attorney
received “some notification” of the detainer two days after he signed it. But even if
true, the district court also found that “no one disputes that the detainer was not
delivered to the Court or United States Attorney’s office.” This finding, supported
by substantial evidence, is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. White, 41

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F.4th 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 2022) (this court reverses a finding of fact “only if, despite
evidence supporting the finding, the evidence as a whole leaves us with a definite
and firm conviction that the finding is a mistake”).
This fact dooms Koon’s appeal because “the 180–day time period in Article
III(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition
of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting
officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.” Fex v. Michigan,
507 U.S. 43, 52 (1993) (emphasis added). See 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 4 (defining
“appropriate court” as the district court for IADA purposes).
Koon emphasizes that the non-delivery was not “attributable to” him. In
Daily, the prisoner “fulfill[ed] his obligation under the IADA” but the custodian
“failed to forward his request to the United States Attorney’s office and the district
court.” Daily, 488 F.3d at 801. This court held: “While this failure on the prison
officials’ part is unfortunate, it does not change the meaning of ‘actually been
delivered.’” Id. “[E]ven where a prisoner has made a good-faith effort to invoke
his rights under the IADA, he is not entitled to relief unless adequate notice was
actually received.” Dooley, 580 F.3d at 685. Despite Koon’s good-faith effort, his
detainer was not actually delivered and received.
Koon endorses the district court’s theory of constructive delivery. The district
court theorized that delivery to the DEA, as an agency of the “prosecuting state,”
was sufficient. The district court’s theory ignores the plain language of the IADA:
the IADA requires notice to the “prosecuting officer” or the “prosecuting official” –
not to the “prosecuting state.” See 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, art. III(a), (b), (d). In
sum, Fex’s requirement of “actual delivery forecloses . . . constructive delivery.”
Daily, 488 F.3d at 801. See United States v. Washington, 596 F.3d 777, 781 (10th
Cir. 2010) (holding that delivery to the United States Attorney’s Office but not to
the district court did not constitute delivery under the IADA); United States v.
Brewington, 512 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Paredes-
Barista, 140 F.3d 367, 372–74 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that delivery to the U.S.

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Marshal did not constitute delivery under the IADA); United States v. Collins, 90
F.3d 1420, 1426 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. White, 185 Fed. Appx. 504,
507-09 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (holding that delivery to prison officials did
not constitute delivery under the IADA). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 196 F.3d
1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that delivery to the U.S. Marshal satisfied the
IADA where the detainer erroneously instructed the prisoner to return the speedy
trial demand to the Marshal), abrogating United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding, pre-Fex, that a prisoner complied with his IADA obligation by
signing Form USM-17 and giving it to jail officials).
As Koon stresses, DOCR’s failure to send his request to the court and U.S.
attorney—and the DEA’s indifference or incompetence—violate the spirit of the
IADA. See 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, art. I (stating the IADA’s purpose for
“expeditious and orderly disposition” of charges by “cooperative procedures”); 18
U.S.C. App. 2, § 5 (requiring all federal agencies to “cooperate with one another
and with all party states” to effectuate the IADA purposes). These failures are
“unfortunate” but do “not change the meaning of ‘actually delivered.’” Daily, 488
F.3d at 801. “We are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Fex that the 180-day
period does not commence until the prosecutor and the district court actually receive
notice.” Id. Because the district court and U.S. Attorney did not actually receive
notice of the demand, the IADA’s 180-day period was not triggered. The district
court erred by dismissing the indictment against Koon.
* * * * * * *
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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