United States of America v. Reginald Robinson, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2416
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Reginald Robinson, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Southern
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Submitted: March 21, 2025
Filed: June 23, 2025
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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Reginald Robinson, Jr., entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of being
a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
(g)(3), and 924(a)(2), preserving his right to appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss

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the indictment and a motion to suppress. The district court1 sentenced Robinson to
60 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Robinson now
appeals, asserting that the district court2 erroneously denied his motion to suppress
based on an invalid Miranda3 waiver and the lack of reasonable suspicion, and
erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, which challenged the
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3). Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm.
I.
On January 17, 2021, Sioux Falls, South Dakota Police Officer Joshua Siferd
responded to a call from a local Walmart where employees had detained two
individuals suspected of shoplifting. When Officer Siferd arrived, he met with a
Walmart loss prevention employee, who reported that two individuals, later
identified as Robinson and Yolanda Crawford, were observed using a self-checkout
station and failing to scan every item in their carts. The employee explained that
Walmart employees stopped Robinson and Crawford at the exit and detained them
in the loss prevention office. The loss prevention employee also provided Officer
Siferd with statements from Robinson and Crawford and citizen arrest forms.
However, Officer Siferd did not ask to see video footage of the incident, nor did he
ask for a copy of the video footage.
Officer Siferd spoke with Robinson and Crawford and asked them to provide
identification, after which Robinson volunteered that he was “willing to pay for [the
items].” Officer Siferd told Robinson that they were past the point where paying for
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.
2 The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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the items would remedy the situation and continued to ask Robinson and Crawford
biographical questions. As Officer Siferd radioed dispatch to conduct a records
check, Robinson offered a statement about being “fresh off parole.” Officer Siferd
continued to speak with Robinson and Crawford about the suspected shoplifting, and
Robinson again offered to pay for the items that had not been rung up. Roughly 15
minutes into the encounter, after Officer Siferd had been joined by a second officer,
Officer Siferd told Robinson that he could smell the odor of marijuana emanating
from him. Officer Siferd later testified that he had smelled the odor of marijuana on
Robinson immediately upon their encounter but had waited to question Robinson
about it until a back-up officer arrived before confronting him, consistent with
department policy. Robinson responded to Officer Siferd’s statement by admitting
that he had smoked marijuana just prior to coming to Walmart, but, when Officer
Siferd asked if he had any marijuana on him, Robinson stated that he did not.
Officer Siferd asked Robinson to place his hands on the wall to allow Officer
Siferd to pat Robinson down. After beginning the pat down and feeling something
in Robinson’s pants, Officer Siferd asked Robinson if he had a pipe, and Robinson
responded that he did not. Officer Siferd then asked Robinson to put his hands up,
told him he was going to handcuff him, and placed Robinson in handcuffs. Officer
Siferd then asked Robinson where the firearm was, Robinson answered that he did
not know, and Officer Siferd asked Robinson, “so you don’t have a firearm on you?”
to which Robinson offered no response. Officer Siferd then removed a firearm from
a holster in the front of Robinson’s pants.
Officer Siferd asked Robinson if he was on probation or parole. Robinson
responded, “not anymore,” and affirmatively answered Siferd’s next
inquiry—whether he had ever been convicted of a felony—by responding “yes, sir.”
When Officer Siferd asked if Robinson knew he was not allowed to possess a
firearm, Robinson answered, “yes, yes, yes sir.” A few moments later, Robinson
told Siferd that he wanted to “talk more.” Officer Siferd responded that they would
“talk more outside,” told the other officer that he still needed to Mirandize Crawford
and then escorted Robinson out of the store to his patrol vehicle. Once outside,

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Officer Siferd told Robinson that he needed to complete his pat down search, and
while doing so, Officer discovered a baggie of marijuana in Robinson’s shirt pocket.
As Officer Siferd pulled the baggie out of Robinson’s pocket, Robinson stated, “I’m
a big smoker.” Robinson also had a large amount of currency on his person, totaling
approximately $5,000. Officer Siferd then placed Robinson in the back of the patrol
car and confirmed with Robinson that he had a felony conviction. Robinson
affirmed that he had just been released from prison after serving four years and two
months.
Officer Siferd then told Robinson he was going to read him his Miranda
warnings before he asked him any more questions. As Officer Siferd read the
warnings, Robinson interrupted at two separate points. First, after Officer Siferd
stated, “anything you say can be used as evidence against you,” Robinson answered
“yes.” Second, while Officer Siferd was advising Robinson of his right to an
attorney and stating that “if you cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
you,” Robinson began speaking, explaining that his girlfriend was pregnant and that
he had a baby on the way. Despite this crosstalk, Officer Siferd asked Robinson if
he understood his Miranda warnings, and Robinson responded with “I understand
everything.” Officer Siferd then asked Robinson if he wished to waive his Miranda
rights and Robinson replied, “yeah, I’ll waive that shit yo, I’ll waive that shit.”
Officer Siferd then proceeded to question Robinson about the firearm and how he
came to be in possession of such a large amount of cash.
Robinson was subsequently charged with one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Robinson filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his
statements about a prior felony conviction and his right to possess a firearm should
be suppressed because some occurred while he was in custody but before he was
given his Miranda warnings and others occurred after Officer Siferd gave incomplete
Miranda warnings, vitiating any waiver of Robinson’s rights. Further, according to
Robinson, his post-Miranda statements should be suppressed because Officer Siferd
deliberately attempted to circumvent Miranda by eliciting incriminating responses
from Robinson before advising him of his Miranda rights. Robinson also sought

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suppression of the firearm and all other items found on his person on the basis that
Officer Siferd did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him for shoplifting.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that
the district court deny the motion. First, the magistrate judge noted that the
Government did not resist the motion to suppress as it related to statements Robinson
made after he was in handcuffs but before he was given his Miranda warnings
provided that the Government could still use the statements, as necessary, for
impeachment purposes at trial. The magistrate judge next considered Robinson’s
challenge to the statements he made after he had been given Miranda warnings,
concluding that Officer Siferd accurately conveyed Robinson’s Miranda rights to
him. The magistrate judge further concluded that Robinson made a knowing and
voluntary waiver of those rights despite any crosstalk because he was familiar with
Miranda rights from both his previous criminal convictions and their ubiquitous
nature in television and movies and because there was no evidence that Robinson’s
interjection rendered him unable to hear Officer Siferd’s recitation of the Miranda
warnings.
The magistrate judge also concluded that Officer Siferd’s failure to offer
Miranda warnings earlier in the encounter did not taint any later admissions made
after Robinson was advised of his Miranda rights because there was no evidence of
an orchestrated effort by Officer Siferd to circumvent Miranda by eliciting
incriminating responses from Robinson before reading his Miranda warnings.
Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that Officer Siferd had reasonable suspicion
to seize and conduct the pat-down search of Robinson based on the Walmart
employee’s report of Robinson stealing items; Robinson’s statements tacitly
admitting to the theft; and Officer Siferd detecting the odor of marijuana coming
from Robinson’s person. Robinson filed objections to the report and
recommendation, and the district court denied the objections, adopting the report and
recommendation with one limited exception regarding the magistrate judge’s
statement that Miranda warnings are familiar to everyone from television and
popular culture as a basis for supporting a waiver of Miranda rights.

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Robinson also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting that 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3) are unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that prior Eighth Circuit precedent,
United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir. 2023), vacated by Jackson v. United
States, 144 S. Ct. 2710 (2024), aff’d on remand, United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th
1120 (8th Cir.), and United States v. Cunningham, 70 F.4th 502 (8th Cir. 2023),
vacated by Cunningham v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2713 (2024), aff’d on remand,
United States v. Cunningham, 114 F.4th 671 (8th Cir.), foreclosed Robinson’s
challenges to § 922(g)(1). The district court further concluded that Robinson’s facial
challenge to § 922(g)(3) was without merit, stating that Eighth Circuit precedent
upholding the statute was consistent with New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc.
v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and thus remained binding authority. Finally, the
district court held in abeyance Robinson’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3)
“awaiting a determination of the relevant facts.”
Robinson then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal
the denial of his motion to dismiss and motion to suppress. The district court
sentenced Robinson to 60 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised
release, and Robinson now exercises his right to appeal these adverse rulings.
II.
Robinson first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Robinson asserts that Officer Siferd intentionally circumvented Miranda by eliciting
incriminating responses from Robinson before advising Robinson of his Miranda
rights and that Robinson’s waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing and
voluntary because Robinson was speaking at the same time Officer Siferd was giving
the Miranda warnings and thus did not fully appreciate the rights that he was
waiving. Robinson further asserts that Officer Siferd did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain Robinson. We “analyze[] the denial of a motion to suppress
under a ‘mixed standard,’ reviewing findings of fact for clear error and legal findings

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de novo.” United States v. Avalos, 984 F.3d 1306, 1307 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted).
A.
We begin with Robinson’s claim that the district court erred when it concluded
that Officer Siferd did not circumvent Miranda by obtaining incriminating responses
from Robinson before providing the warnings and that Robinson’s waiver of his
rights was knowing and voluntary. “Miranda warnings ‘are required when
interrogation is “initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.”’” United States v. Rooney, 63 F.4th 1160, 1167 (8th Cir. 2023) (citations
omitted). An officer must give these warnings before initiating “a custodial
interrogation ‘when an officer’s interaction with the suspect is “likely to elicit an
incriminating response.”’” Id. (citations omitted). “If a suspect makes a knowing
and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights after receiving Miranda
warnings, his inculpatory statements are admissible at trial.” United States v. Wise,
588 F.3d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 2009).
However, “[i]n Missouri v. Seibert, [542 U.S. 600 (2004),] the Supreme Court
held that if officers question a suspect in two parts and delay reciting the Miranda
warnings to induce a confession, any statements made after the warnings are
inadmissible.” Rooney, 63 F.4th at 1167. In determining the admissibility of
statements made post-Miranda but as part of a two-part interrogation, we consider
“different factors . . . such as the timing and content of the different stages of
questioning.” Id. But “[w]hen officers have made no such calculated effort to elicit
a confession, Seibert is not implicated, and the admissibility of postwarning
statements is governed by the principles of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).”
United States v. Morgan, 729 F.3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 2013). Under Elstad,
[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the
initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned

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admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A
subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has
given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to
remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.
United States v. Walker, 518 F.3d 983, 985 (8th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314).
We find no evidence that Officer Siferd engaged in an orchestrated effort to
circumvent Miranda by delaying the warnings until after Robinson made
incriminating statements. Officer Siferd began speaking with Robinson while
conducting a routine investigation into a shoplifting complaint. Robinson’s
incriminating statements were made as the investigation developed, and Robinson
voluntarily responded to Officer Siferd’s inquiries that were free from any hint of
coercion. While Officer Siferd did not immediately give Robinson Miranda
warnings after handcuffing him, we view any such failure as nothing more than the
“arguably innocent neglect of Miranda.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. Simply stated,
“[w]hatever the reason for [Officer Siferd]’s oversight, the incident had none of the
earmarks of coercion.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. As Officer Siferd did not use a
deliberate two-step process to circumvent Miranda, the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress on this basis. See Morgan, 729 F.3d at 1091-92
(concluding there was no deliberate two-step process implicating Seibert when
officers handcuffed detainee but did not Mirandize him until after detainee made
incriminating statement about involvement in drug activities); United States v.
Walker, 518 F.3d at 985 (applying Elstad where detainee answered questions while
in handcuffs but before being Mirandized because there was no evidence of
deliberately coercive or improper tactics used to elicit incriminating responses
before providing Miranda warnings).
Robinson asserts that, even if Officer Siferd did not intentionally circumvent
Miranda, Robinson’s waiver of his rights was not knowing or voluntary because he
was not fully aware of the rights he was waiving or the consequences of waiving
those rights when he did not hear a complete recitation of the Miranda warnings.

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“There are ‘two distinct dimensions’ to the inquiry whether a suspect’s waiver of his
Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” United States v. Vinton,
631 F.3d 476, 483 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he waiver ‘must have been
voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception,’” and “the suspect must have waived his
rights ‘with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” United States v. Rose, 124 F.4th 1101,
1107 (8th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). “We consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether a suspect’s waiver is valid.” Vinton, 631 F.3d
at 483.
Here, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Robinson made a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. As the district court noted, the record
demonstrates that Officer Siferd provided the full Miranda warnings but does not
conclusively demonstrate that Robinson was unable to hear the entirety of the
Miranda warnings because of his interruptions while Officer Siferd was reciting
them. And, after Officer Siferd finished reading the warnings, Robinson affirmed
that, despite any crosstalk, he “underst[oo]d everything” before twice stating that he
wished to waive his rights. Further, Robinson had multiple “past interactions with
law enforcement, and ‘[a] history of interaction with the criminal justice system
supports an inference that an interviewee is familiar with his constitutional rights
and that his statements to the police are voluntary.’” See Rooney, 63 F.4th at 1168
(alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Adams, 820 F.3d
317, 324 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a suspect’s familiarity with Miranda
warnings and police interrogations may support a knowing waiver). The district
court thus did not err in concluding that Robinson waived his Miranda rights.
B.
We next consider Robinson’s argument that the district court erred in
concluding that Officer Siferd lawfully seized Robinson. “A police officer ‘may,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the

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officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’”
United States v. Fields, 832 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). We
consider whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain an individual by
considering “the totality of the circumstances, taking into account an officer’s
deductions and rational inferences resulting from relevant training and experience.”
Id. (citation omitted).
First, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Siferd had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Robinson had engaged in shoplifting. Officer Siferd
responded to a call from a Walmart employee that two shoppers had been detained
for shoplifting, and when he arrived a loss prevention specialist detailed to Officer
Siferd what he had observed, providing Officer Siferd with statements from
Robinson and Crawford and citizen’s arrest forms. When discussing the suspected
shoplifting with Officer Siferd, Robinson asked if he could pay for the items, tacitly
admitting that he had taken the items without paying for them. Second, separate and
apart from the evidence that Robinson had been engaged in shoplifting, Officer
Siferd’s observation of the odor of marijuana emanating from Robinson’s person
was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. See
United States v. Wright, 844 F.3d 759, 762-63 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Once the uniformed
officer detected an odor of marijuana coming from [defendant]’s person, the officer
had probable cause to arrest [defendant] and, a fortiori, reasonable suspicion to
detain him for further investigation.”); cf. United States v. Williams, 955 F.3d 734,
737-38 (8th Cir. 2020) (“We have repeatedly held that the odor of marijuana
provides probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle under the automobile
exception.”). Thus, Officer Siferd had reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain
Robinson based either on Robinson’s suspected theft or Officer Siferd’s observation
of the odor of marijuana. The district court thus did not err in denying Robinson’s
motion to suppress.

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III.
Robinson also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
the indictment. Robinson challenges the constitutionality of both § 922(g)(1) and
(g)(3), asserting that each provision is unconstitutional both facially and as applied
to him. “We review the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment de novo.” United
States v. Wilson, 939 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 2019). Further, “[w]e review the
constitutionality of [a] statute de novo.” United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 923
(8th Cir. 2010). Robinson concedes that his argument regarding both his facial and
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United
States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024); United States v. Cunningham, 114
F.4th 671 (8th Cir. 2024). Robinson likewise concedes that his facial challenge to
§ 922(g)(3) is foreclosed. See United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906 (8th Cir. 2024).
Further, with respect to Robinson’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3), where, as
here, the defendant is charged in a single count, sustaining any one of the § 922(g)
categories supports the indictment and the Court need not address a challenge to
another § 922(g) category. See United States v. Marin, 31 F.4th 1049, 1054 n.2 (8th
Cir. 2022). Because Robinson was charged in the same count with being a
prohibited person in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3), the failure
of his constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) alone is sufficient to sustain the
indictment. The district court thus did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the
indictment.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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