United States of America v. Jeffery Lee Boyd

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1190
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jeffery Lee Boyd
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: January 13, 2025
Filed: August 13, 2025
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Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Beginning in February 2021, Iowa and Minnesota undercover drug trafficking
investigators purchased methamphetamine from two distributors and identified
Jeffery Lee Boyd as one of their customers. During a warrant search of Boyd’s
residence in Albion, Iowa in September, Boyd directed investigators to the location
of incriminating evidence -- a loaded Smith & Wesson .380 Bodyguard Pistol and its
ammunition in a lock box on the kitchen counter, 2.33 grams of methamphetamine

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in the adjacent living room, and a scale with methamphetamine residue in the
bedroom. In a February 2022 interview, Boyd admitted purchasing at least four
pounds of methamphetamine from one distributor, using some of the drugs himself
and selling the rest to his friends. He admitted purchasing the Smith & Wesson
firearm. When asked why he bought the gun, Boyd stated, “if the world went to shit,
[I] didn’t want to be the only one without a gun.”
Boyd was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846 and
in addition to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. He pleaded guilty
to the conspiracy count. The offense calls for a mandatory minimum sentence of 120
months imprisonment unless Boyd qualifies for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f) and § 5C1.2 of the advisory sentencing guidelines. In the plea agreement,
the parties stipulated “as a recommendation to the District Court that the two-level
upward adjustment [for possession of a dangerous weapon] under USSG
§2D1.1(b)(1) applies.” The government agreed to dismiss the firearm count that
charged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 922(g)(3), and 924(a)(2).
“Safety-valve relief allows the district court to disregard an applicable statutory
minimum if certain requirements are met.” United States v. Voelz, 66 F.4th 1155,
1159 (8th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). To qualify for safety-valve relief, the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets the five
criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). See United States v. Morones, 181 F.3d 888, 890 (8th
Cir. 1999). One criterion for safety-valve relief is that the defendant must prove that
he did not “possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon . . . in connection with the
offense.” § 3553(f)(2). Section 5C1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines “reflect[s]
this statutory provision.” Voelz, 66 F.4th at 1159. The Presentence Investigation
Report (PSR) calculated Boyd’s total offense level at 35, including the two-level
enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) and a three-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1(a) and (b), resulting in an advisory
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guidelines sentencing range of 188-235 months imprisonment. At sentencing, the
district court adopted the PSR’s guidelines calculation and granted the government’s
motion for a 10% downward departure from the guidelines range, resulting in an
advisory guidelines range of 169-211 months imprisonment.
The district court overruled Boyd’s timely objection to the PSR determination
that he is ineligible for safety-valve relief due to his possession of a firearm. The
two-level adjustment under § 2D1.1(b)(1) applies “if the weapon was present, unless
it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” USSG
§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.11(A)). Boyd stipulated that he possessed the firearm and the
upward adjustment is applicable, “meaning the defendant stipulated that it was not
clearly improbable that the firearm he possessed was connected to his drug offense.”
Boyd argued that the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement did not foreclose safety-valve
relief because the safety-valve standard should be proof by preponderance of the
evidence, not the § 2D1.1(b)(1) clearly improbable standard. But the court found that
even under the preponderance of the evidence standard, Boyd could not prove that
he did not “possess a firearm . . . in connection with” his drug offense:
Here we have the gun in the same residence where the drugs are
routinely stored and processed and where drug proceeds were kept. This
isn’t a shotgun or a rifle, it’s a handgun. The gun’s easily accessible in
the kitchen of the home. It’s the room directly adjacent to where the
methamphetamine was located.
Defendant offers no real explanation for why he has the gun . . . . He’s
not claiming to be . . . a hunter, he’s not claiming that he enjoys target
shooting, he’s not claiming that he inherited this gun from a relative or
that it’s an antique of some kind. He went and bought it illegally for
$200.
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After careful consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including Boyd’s age
(68), long struggle with drug and alcohol addiction, lack of evidence “he ever really
used the gun,” and the court’s policy disagreement with harsh drug guidelines, the
district court varied downward and sentenced Boyd to the mandatory minimum 120
months imprisonment.
Boyd appeals the denial of safety-valve relief. We review the district court’s
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and USSG § 5C1.2 de novo and its factual
findings regarding safety-valve eligibility for clear error. See Voelz, 66 F.4th at 1159
(quotation omitted). We affirm.
On appeal, Boyd argues the district court erred in ruling that his plea agreement
stipulation “automatically” precludes safety valve relief because “[d]ifferent standards
apply to determine whether an enhancement applies under [§ 2D1.1(b)(1)] and
whether a defendant is eligible for safety valve.” Under Voelz and earlier cases, he
argues, “the clearly-improbable standard has slipped into safety-valve jurisprudence
with no actual analysis of the governing statutory language.” Boyd cites to cases
from other circuits acknowledging that because these standards are different, “not all
defendants who receive the [firearm] enhancement . . . are precluded from relief.”
United States v. Carrasquillo, 4 F.4th 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021).
This contention might make for a challenging law school exam question, but
it ignores a critical part of the record on appeal -- the district court did not simply
hold that Boyd’s plea agreement stipulation automatically precludes safety valve
relief. It analyzed the sentencing record and found that Boyd could not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he did not “possess a firearm . . . in connection
with” his drug offense. The court summarized affirmative evidence in the record
supporting that finding -- Boyd possessed the gun “in the same residence where the
drugs are routinely stored and processed and where drug proceeds were kept.” The
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handgun was “easily accessible in the kitchen of the home. It’s the room directly
adjacent to where the methamphetamine was located.”
Like many circuits, we have held “that constructive possession is sufficient to
preclude application of safety valve relief.” United States v. Jackson, 552 F.3d 908,
909 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Here, as in United States v. Dunn, “the
district court did not clearly err in finding that [Boyd] exercised ownership, dominion,
or control over the premises where the [gun was] found, and that the weapon was
found in the same location where drugs or drug paraphernalia were stored, or where
part of the conspiracy took place.” 723 F.3d 919, 930 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation
omitted), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1145 (2014). “A defendant possesses a firearm in
connection with an offense if the evidence shows that the weapon facilitated or had
[the] potential to facilitate the drug offense. . . . The presence of a firearm in a
location where it could be used to protect drugs can be sufficient evidence to prove
the requisite connection.” United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 844 (8th Cir.
2006) (quotations omitted).
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Boyd was ineligible for
safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) and USSG § 5C1.2(a)(2) because he
could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not possess a firearm
or other dangerous weapon in connection with the drug offense. As the court noted,
Boyd bears the burden of proving it is more likely than not that the Smith & Wesson
found on the kitchen table was not possessed in connection with the drug offense.
The court further explained:
[Boyd] offers no real explanation for why he has the gun, other than he’s
worried about the world going, you know, wrong and that he wants to
have a gun if it does. He’s not claiming to be . . . a hunter, he’s not
claiming that he enjoys target shooting, he’s not claiming that he
inherited this gun from a relative or that it’s an antique of some kind.
He went and bought it illegally for $200.
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Consistent with the district court’s analysis, our panel in Voelz also found that
“sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that Voelz possessed the weapons in
connection with the offense.” 66 F.4th at 1161. The firearms “were all near drugs
or drug paraphernalia. . . . At a minimum, Voelz constructively possessed some of
these weapons in connection with the drug offense.” Id. Voelz is binding on our
panel. Moreover, in Carrasquillo, on which Boyd heavily relies, the Eleventh Circuit
also affirmed the denial of safety-valve relief because the district court’s findings
under § 2D1.1(b)(1) established a connection between the firearm and the drug
offense that foreclosed safety-valve relief under § 5C1.2(a). The court noted:
As we have remarked, the number of defendants who are subject to
the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement and who can also satisfy § 5C1.2(a)(2)
will undoubtedly be rare. Given the district court’s § 2D1.1(b)(1)
factual findings, Mr. Carrasquillo does not fall into that narrow category
of defendants.
4 F.4th at 1274 (citation and quotation omitted). It is noteworthy that Boyd does not
cite a single case where a defendant fell into the “narrow category” that the Eleventh
Circuit has said may exist because of the different evidentiary standards and
placement of the burden of proof under §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) and 5C1.2(a)(2).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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