Heather J. Sweeter v. Frank Bisignano,1 Commissioner of Social Security Administration

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3080
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Heather J. Sweeter
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Frank Bisignano,1 Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: June 10, 2025
Filed: September 17, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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1 Frank Bisignano is substituted as respondent under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 43(c)(2).

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PER CURIAM.
Heather J. Sweeter appeals the magistrate judge’s2 order affirming
termination of her disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration found that Sweeter
was disabled in September 2013 based on her asthma, diabetes, and chronic back
pain. Following a continuing disability review in July 2017, the Commissioner
found she was no longer disabled. Sweeter requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), where a doctor testified that Sweeter could now
perform “light work.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). But when Sweeter’s counsel
questioned the doctor, he said that he had not seen evidence in the record that her
conditions had improved. After reviewing the record, the ALJ found that Sweeter
had medically improved, could perform light work subject to postural and
environmental limitations, and concluded she was no longer disabled.
Sweeter sought review in federal district court, which held that the ALJ failed
to follow the sequential analysis prescribed for continuing disability review. See
Dixon v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 997, 1000–01 (8th Cir. 2003) (outlining steps); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). On remand, a different ALJ concluded that Sweeter was no
longer disabled. Sweeter sued in federal district court again, raising the same
arguments. This time the court granted the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on
the administrative record. Sweeter appeals. We review the district court de novo
and will affirm if the ALJ’s decision is free of legal error and supported by
“substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019,
1023–24 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review).
Sweeter first argues that the ALJ’s finding of medical improvement under step
three of the continuing disability review is not supported by substantial evidence on
2 The Honorable Douglas L. Micko, United States Magistrate Judge for the
District of Minnesota, to whom this case was referred for final disposition by consent
of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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the record as a whole. We disagree. The ALJ based his finding on a comparison of
Sweeter’s condition in 2017 with her condition in 2013. See Delph v. Astrue, 538
F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2008). As required, he identified improvements in
“symptoms, signs or laboratory findings associated with [her] impairment(s).” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1); see also § 220.113 (defining terms). In 2013, Sweeter had
reduced range of motion and sensitivity throughout the spine, severe back pain that
had required trips to the emergency room, and spinal abnormalities. By August
2017, her gait and reflexes were normal, her back pain was stable, and her spinal
examinations were largely normal. Her asthma was no longer severe, and her
diabetes was under control. The ALJ’s finding falls within the “available zone of
choice.” Kraus, 988 F.3d at 1024 (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, Sweeter argues that the ALJ’s finding was a “strictly medical
determination[]” and “especially egregious” because it conflicted with the doctor’s
testimony at the first hearing. See Willcockson v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 878, 881 (8th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ is not qualified to give a medical opinion.”). But it was the
ALJ’s responsibility—not the doctor’s—to decide whether there was medical
improvement under § 404.1594(f)(3). See Delph, 538 F.3d at 945–46. The ALJ
properly discounted the doctor’s unelaborated opinion where there was substantial
evidence in the record as a whole that Sweeter’s conditions had improved.
Pemberton v. Saul, 953 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 2020).
Sweeter next argues that the ALJ failed to follow the eight-step continuing
disability review process. Hill v. Colvin, 753 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2014) (“An
ALJ commits legal error if [he] fails to follow the sequential evaluation process.”).
She claims that the ALJ’s explanation for discounting the doctor’s opinion about
medical improvement relied on the doctor’s testimony about Sweeter’s residual
functional capacity,3 so the ALJ “jumped ahead” to step four to “justify a finding of
medical improvement” at step three.
3 Residual functional capacity is “the most a claimant can still do despite his
or her physical or mental limitations.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

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Again, we disagree. The ALJ clearly identified and addressed each step of
the continuing disability review process in order. See Pense v. Barnhart, 142 F.
App’x 954, 955 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). He discussed the doctor’s testimony
only after finding medical improvement based on substantial record evidence. To
the extent that the ALJ bolstered that finding with more evidence at step four, we
find no error, let alone reversible error. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1149
(8th Cir. 2001) (“Any arguable deficiency, which we do not find, in the ALJ's
opinion-writing technique does not require this Court to set aside a finding that is
supported by substantial evidence.”).
Affirmed.
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