United States of America v. Darrell Ray Sanders

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2514
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United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Darrell Ray Sanders,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: September 19, 2025
Filed: October 29, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
Darrell Sanders pleaded guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B). At sentencing, the district court1 applied
1The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri, now retired.

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a five-level increase under the sentencing guidelines for engaging in a pattern of
activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The court sentenced
Sanders to 132 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Sanders argues the district court
committed a procedural error by applying the increase, and that the district court
clearly erred by adopting two disputed facts from the presentence report. We
conclude that there is no reversible error, and affirm the judgment.
I.
On April 12, 2022, in Kirkwood, Missouri, Sanders circled the area near
Keysor Elementary School several times in his minivan. Sanders stopped twice to
communicate with children whose initials are C.B. and P.H.
According to C.B., Sanders approached her in his minivan while she was
walking from school to dance class. Sanders asked C.B. to see her feet. When C.B.
said “no,” Sanders moved on.
The second child, P.H., was playing outside with her friends when she rode her
scooter toward the street after hearing what she thought was a vehicle crash. Sanders
drove up next to P.H. and asked her to come to his van. According to a detective who
investigated the incident, one of P.H.’s friends heard Sanders say to P.H., “Let me
show you that.” Sanders then drove on.
Police arrested Sanders the next day and questioned him. Sanders admitted that
he drove around the school and communicated with C.B. and P.H. Sanders
acknowledged that he asked to see C.B.’s feet and possibly offered to pay her to do
so. Sanders said he did not know what he would have done if either girl had come
over to him. Sanders admitted that his interactions with the minors made him feel
excited and scared.
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When asked if he had urges for younger girls, Sanders said that he always has
“wrong” and “bad” thoughts in the back of his mind. Sanders said that he did not
want to act on those thoughts, but his contacts with C.B. and P.H. were “close.”
Sanders denied having acted on his “bad” thoughts, but admitted that he had
participated in online role-playing chat rooms with people who pretended to be
younger girls.
Sanders then admitted to possession of child pornography. A search of
Sanders’s devices revealed thirty images and fourteen videos of child pornography
on two cellular telephones. One video depicted a minor girl performing a sexual act
on an adult male. Sanders admitted that he viewed child pornography on the same
day that he communicated with C.B. and P.H.
Sanders pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography and one
count of possession of child pornography. At sentencing, based on Sanders’s
encounters with C.B. and P.H., the district court applied a five-level increase under
USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse
or exploitation of a minor. The court determined an advisory guideline range of 121
to 151 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Sanders to 132 months. We review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the sentencing
guidelines de novo. United States v. Chambers, 878 F.3d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 2017).
II.
The sentencing guidelines provide for a five-level increase in a defendant’s
offense level if the district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or
exploitation of a minor. USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5). A pattern consists of two or more
separate instances of sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. USSG § 2G2.2,
comment. (n.1). As relevant here, “sexual abuse or exploitation” includes conduct
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described in 18 U.S.C. § 2422 or an offense under state law that would have been an
offense under § 2422 if the offense had occurred within the special maritime or
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. The provision also includes an
attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses. Id.
Section 2422(b) prohibits knowing enticement of a minor to engage in any
sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense. Missouri
law prohibits enticement of a child for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.151. The elements of an attempt offense are intent to commit
the predicate offense, and conduct that is a substantial step toward its commission.
United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2010).
The district court ruled that Sanders’s interactions with P.H. and C.B.
constituted attempted enticement of a child under Missouri law, which would be an
attempt offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) if the offense had occurred within federal
jurisdiction. The court explained that “[d]uring his brief and separate communication
with the minor females, Sanders admittedly had sexual thoughts about children,
possessed images and videos of children performing sexually explicit acts on his cell
phone, and was left feeling excited and scared by each interaction.”
Sanders argues that the district court erred in concluding that his conduct
qualified as attempted enticement. He argues the government did not establish that
he intended to persuade C.B. or P.H. to engage in sexual activity or that he took a
“substantial step” toward persuasion.
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Sanders’s conduct towards
P.H. constituted attempted enticement. Sanders circled the elementary school, asked
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P.H. to come to his minivan, and said, “Let me show you that.”2 Sanders possessed
child pornography on his phone, viewed child pornography on the day that he
approached the girls, and admitted that he came “close” to acting on his “wrong” and
“bad” thoughts about young girls. A defendant’s intent may be inferred from the
surrounding facts and circumstances. Under these circumstances, it was not clear
error for the district court to infer that Sanders’s statement to P.H. was sexual in
nature, and that he intended to engage in sexual conduct if the enticement was
successful and the opportunity presented itself. Sanders’s actions in driving around
the school and asking the girl to approach his van constituted a substantial step
toward commission of the offense. His actions extended beyond mere preparation
and corroborated his intent to entice P.H.
For similar reasons, the district court did not clearly err in determining that
Sanders attempted to entice C.B. Sanders argues that asking to see C.B.’s feet may
have been “creepy,” but that seeing or touching a minor’s feet is not forbidden under
Missouri law. The circumstantial evidence, however, supports an inference that
Sanders intended to do more than see C.B.’s feet if his efforts to lure her into the
vehicle were successful. His possession and viewing of child pornography depicting
sexual conduct and his admission about coming close to acting on bad thoughts
buttress the court’s finding that his proposition to C.B. was a first step toward
intended sexual conduct. His actions in circling the school and approaching C.B.
constituted a substantial step toward commission of the enticement offense.
Sanders argues that resentencing is required because the district court overruled
his objection to one erroneous factual statement in the presentence report. The report
said that Sanders stopped his vehicle near C.B. and asked if he could “lick her toes.”
2Sanders argues that the court should disregard his statement to P.H., but the
finding is supported by the detective’s testimony about her interviews, and the district
court permissibly credited the testimony and deemed the hearsay reliable. See USSG
§ 6A1.3(a); United States v. Woods, 596 F.3d 445, 448 (8th Cir. 2010).
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The evidence does not support that statement, but we conclude that the error in the
report is harmless because it did not substantially influence the outcome of the
proceeding. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
764-65 (1946).
In explaining the reasons for the sentence imposed, the district court stated:
Between April 1st, 2022, and April 13th, 2022, Sanders
knowingly received and possessed child pornography using the internet
. . ., and the images and videos depicted, in part, minors under the age
of 12 engaged in sexually explicit conduct, to include sadistic and
masochistic conduct.
The discovery of child pornography on the Defendant’s cell phone
was precipitated by his arrest by the Kirkwood Police Department.
Sanders was arrested and brought in for questioning by the Kirkwood
Police Department regarding allegations that he had attempted to entice
two minor females to approach his van on April 12th, 2022.
During his brief and separate communication with the minor
females, Sanders admittedly had sexual thoughts about children,
possessed images and videos of children performing sexually explicit
acts on his cell phone, and was left feeling excited and scared by each
interaction.
The court did not refer to a request from Sanders to C.B. to “lick her toes”
when it found that Sanders initiated contact with the girl in an effort to lure her into
his van with intent to engage in sexual conduct. The district court’s finding about
intent is supported by the possession of child pornography that he viewed on the same
day, admissions about coming close to acting on bad and wrong thoughts, and the
circumstances of an adult male approaching young girls after circling an elementary
school. We are confident that the district court would have reached the same result
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if the statement about licking toes had been excised from the presentence report. A
remand is not warranted.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The motion to supplement the
record is denied.
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