United States of America v. Jimmy Fant, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2115
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jimmy Fant, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas
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Submitted: September 15, 2025
Filed: November 21, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Jimmy Fant, Jr., pled guilty to wire fraud and money laundering. He now
appeals his 108-month sentence arguing the district court1 improperly applied the
1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, then United States District Judge for the
Western District of Arkansas, now Chief Judge.

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sophisticated means enhancement and imposed a substantively unreasonable
sentence. We affirm.
Beginning in 1999, Fant was employed as an accountant by White River
Hardwood and Woodworking, Inc. (White River). Fant was later promoted to chief
financial officer in 2015 and managed the finances of White River and two related
entities: Matrix Investment, LLC and Castle Dromborg, LLC. Between 2014 and
January 2023, Fant used various schemes to defraud his employers of $5.2 million.
In January 2023, Fant left his position with White River. After White River hired a
new accountant, it uncovered Fant’s fraud.
The government charged Fant with one count of wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343 and one count of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
Fant pled guilty to both charges and the district court accepted his knowing and
voluntary plea.
Fant’s sentencing range was calculated at 57 to 71 months based on a total
offense level of 25 and a criminal history score of I. The district court applied a two-
level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines). U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). After
considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court varied above the
Guidelines range and imposed a sentence of 108 months of imprisonment.
On appeal, Fant argues the district court procedurally erred by applying the
sophisticated means enhancement and that it imposed a substantively unreasonable
sentence. Neither argument prevails.
First, we consider Fant’s challenge to the sophisticated means enhancement.
The Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement when an offense, “involved
sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the
conduct constituting sophisticated means[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).
“Sophisticated means” is defined as “especially complex or especially intricate
offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1, comment. n.9(B). “The sophisticated-means enhancement is proper when

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the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, ‘was notably more intricate than that of the
garden-variety [offense].’” United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir.
2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hance, 501 F.3d 900, 909
(8th Cir. 2007)). “Repetitive and coordinated conduct, though no one step is
particularly complicated, can be a sophisticated scheme.” United States v. Finck,
407 F.3d 908, 915 (8th Cir. 2005).
We review the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo. Finck,
407 F.3d at 913. And we review “the factual finding of whether a . . . scheme
qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950,
958 (8th Cir. 1999).
Fant contends his fraud was not complex, was easily discoverable, and
therefore, the district court erred in applying the sophisticated means enhancement.
We disagree. The record demonstrates Fant used his position as an accountant and
chief financial officer to devise, implement, and conceal multiple schemes to defraud
White River of $5.2 million over eight years. Viewed holistically, Fant’s repetitive
and coordinated conduct, though simple in nature, was notably more intricate than
that of a garden-variety fraud scheme. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly
err in finding Fant used sophisticated means to commit his fraud and did not
otherwise err in applying the enhancement.
Second, Fant argues the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable
sentence by failing to give proper weight to mitigating factors such as his acceptance
of responsibility, age, and poor health.
We review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard[.]” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007). In
arriving at Fant’s 108-month sentence, the district court considered the factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It considered his lack of criminal history, lack of violence,
early acceptance of responsibility, poor health, and age as particularly mitigating.
However, the district court found the severity of Fant’s offense, his abuse of his
positions of trust, and lack of remorse especially aggravating. Considering these
factors, the district court imposed a sentence above the Guidelines range.

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by weighing the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors differently than Fant would have preferred or by imposing a
sentence above the Guidelines range. See United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374,
379 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in
determining an appropriate sentence.”). “[I]t will be the unusual case when we
reverse a district court sentence – whether within, above, or below the applicable
Guidelines range – as substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572
F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing to United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.
3d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Obi, 25 F.4th 574, 581—
82 (8th Cir. 2022) (upholding a sentence above a Guidelines range sentence). Fant
has failed to convince us this is one of those times. The 108-month sentence was
not substantively unreasonable.
For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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