United States of America v. Rhawnie Marcellais

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3441
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Rhawnie Marcellais
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Eastern
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Submitted: October 22, 2025
Filed: December 1, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Rhawnie Marcellais’s husband had been seeing another woman. The other
woman reported Marcellais for child abuse and gave police supporting video
evidence. A few months later, Marcellais attacked the woman, causing serious
injuries. She was charged with two counts of child abuse, 18 U.S.C. §§ 13 and 1153;
one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C §§ 113(a)(3) and 1153; one

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count of malicious mischief, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1363 and 1153; and two counts of
retaliating against a witness, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2). The retaliation charges were
dropped. On the morning of trial, Marcellais moved to sever the remaining child
abuse counts from the assault and mischief counts. The district court1 denied her
motion but later granted an acquittal on one of the child abuse counts. A jury
convicted her on the other counts. Marcellais challenges the denial of her motion to
sever.
“When a defendant moves for severance, a district court must first determine
whether joinder is proper under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.” United
States v. Ruiz, 412 F.3d 871, 886 (8th Cir. 2005). Even if properly joined, the district
court has discretion to sever counts where joinder “appears to prejudice a
defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). “We review whether joinder was proper de
novo, and will reverse only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion which resulted
in severe or compelling prejudice.” Ruiz, 412 F.3d at 886 (cleaned up).
Marcellais argues that after the retaliation counts were dropped, the remaining
counts were not properly joined. An indictment may charge a defendant with
multiple offenses in separate counts if the offenses “are of the same or similar
character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). Here, the
indictment’s six counts were properly joined because they were of a similar
character, had a temporal connection, and involved overlapping motives and
witnesses. United States v. Rodgers, 732 F.2d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1984) (listing
factors to consider for Rule 8’s “same or similar character” standard); see also United
States v. Reeves, 143 F.4th 999, 1006 (8th Cir. 2025) (we “[l]iberally constru[e] the
rules in favor of joinder”). And though some of those counts were later dismissed,
we look at the face of the indictment to determine whether joinder was proper.
United States v. Reichel, 911 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2018).
1 The Honorable Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota.

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There is a “strong presumption against severing” properly joined counts, and
Marcellais has not shown that “severe prejudice” deprived her of “an appreciable
chance for an acquittal.” United States v. Garrett, 648 F.3d 618, 625–26 (8th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). Although she claims the jury was “more likely” to find her
guilty of child abuse after hearing about the assault and malicious mischief incident,
“an increased chance of acquittal” is not enough. United States v. Guy, 456 F.2d
1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1971). And the evidence does not suggest that separate trials
would have had different results. Video footage and testimony from multiple
witnesses provided overwhelming evidence of guilt on the child abuse and assault
counts. See United States v. Mann, 701 F.3d 274, 290 (8th Cir. 2012)
(overwhelming evidence of guilt favors finding no severe prejudice). The district
court also granted acquittal on one count, warned the jury not to “allow sympathy or
prejudice to influence [it],” and instructed the jury that the government had to prove
every element of each remaining count beyond a reasonable doubt. See United
States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 696 (8th Cir. 2013) (no abuse of discretion where
defendant did not allege that jury instructions failed to cure risk of prejudice).
Finally, even if the counts were severed and tried separately, at least some evidence
from the child abuse count would have been admissible to show motive or intent
during the assault and mischief trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); Reichel, 911 F.3d at
915 (defendant suffers no prejudice if evidence of one crime would be admissible at
separate trial for the other crime).
Affirmed.
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