American Sentinel Insurance Company v. Day & Night Trucking, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3363
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American Sentinel Insurance Company
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Day & Night Trucking, Inc.
Defendant
Total Quality Logistics, LLC
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
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Submitted: November 18, 2025
Filed: January 27, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
A multi-vehicle accident involving a tractor-trailer owned by Day & Night
Trucking, Inc. (D&N) occurred in Missouri. At the time of the accident, D&N’s

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tractor-trailer was covered by an auto liability policy issued by American Sentinel
Insurance Company (ASI). After the accident, ASI received competing claims to
the policy’s proceeds, so it filed an interpleader in Missouri state court and deposited
the policy limit into the court’s registry. Ultimately, the parties to the interpleader
“stipulated to and agreed upon[] disbursement of the” policy limit, and the state court
entered a judgment disbursing the funds according to their agreement.
ASI then filed this declaratory judgment action against D&N and Total
Quality Logistics, LLC (TQL), the entity that brokered the load D&N’s tractor-
trailer was hauling when the accident occurred, in federal court. ASI argued its
policy limit was exhausted when the state court disbursed the proceeds in the
interpleader and that it, therefore, does not owe further duties under the policy. The
district court1 agreed and granted ASI summary judgment. TQL appeals.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment, and its
interpretation of state insurance law, de novo.” Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. United
Fire & Cas. Co., 571 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2009). The parties agree Missouri law
applies to their dispute. Thereunder, unambiguous insurance policies “will be
enforced as written,” and ambiguous policies will be interpreted “in favor of the
insured.” Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. 2007).
“Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law,” Martin v. U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. 1999), and “[c]ourts may not unreasonably
distort the language of a policy or exercise inventive powers for the purpose of
creating an ambiguity when none exists.” Todd, 223 S.W.3d at 163.
The policy states ASI’s “duty to defend or settle ends when the Covered Autos
Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by payment of judgments
or settlements.” In its order granting summary judgment to ASI, the district court
explained ASI’s “duty to defend or indemnify any insured has ended because the
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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policy limits [were] exhausted” when they were “disbursed to the various claimants”
in the interpleader. We agree. The language of the policy clearly and
unambiguously states that it may be “exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements,” and that is what happened here. Indeed, the state court entered a
judgment in the interpleader disbursing the limit of ASI’s policy according to the
parties’ stipulated agreement. Moreover, both in its opposition to ASI’s motion for
summary judgment, and again at oral argument, TQL conceded that this was
sufficient to exhaust ASI’s policy. Consequently, ASI’s policy has been exhausted.
TQL argued below that despite its concession, ASI was not entitled to
summary judgment because it presented no evidence from which the district court
could find it “acted in good faith when it exhausted its policy limit” and summary
judgment was premature, both because D&N did not participate in this litigation and
discovery had not concluded. In granting ASI’s motion, the district court rejected
these arguments, and TQL does not ask us to review them on appeal. Instead, TQL
now argues (1) the policy does not explicitly state it can be exhausted by
interpleading the policy limit, (2) Missouri’s interpleader statute, Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 507.060.4, imposes extra-contractual obligations on insurers that ASI failed to
comply with, and (3) the policy’s “Supplementary Payments” provision imposes
“independent indemnity obligations” on ASI. However, as TQL conceded in its
reply brief and at oral argument, it did not raise these issues — much less develop
them — when this case was before the district court.
We have occasionally “consider[ed] newly raised issues ‘where the proper
resolution is beyond any doubt, or where injustice might otherwise result, or when
the argument involves a purely legal issue in which no additional evidence or
argument would affect the outcome of the case.’” Scott C. ex rel. Melissa C. v.
Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1078, 1082 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Universal Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1314–15 (8th Cir. 1991)).
But “[a]s a general rule, we do not consider issues that are raised for the first time
on appeal.” Id.; accord Perry v. Precythe, 121 F.4th 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2024). “The
matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal

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is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the
facts of individual cases.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976); accord
Wiser v. Wayne Farms, 411 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2005).
Having considered TQL’s briefs and its submission at oral argument, we will
not resolve TQL’s new arguments for several reasons. First, aside from stating its
new arguments were encompassed within its “general argument below that [ASI]
did not meet its summary judgment burden,” TQL did not offer any explanation for
its failure to raise these arguments, which are not based on new developments, to the
district court. Every litigant that opposes a motion for summary judgment
necessarily contends the movant failed to meet its burden. See, e.g., Torgerson v.
City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042–43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). So more than
TQL’s blanket opposition to summary judgment was required to preserve its new
arguments for appeal. Second, TQL has not shown “beyond any doubt” that its new
arguments have merit. And third, TQL has not demonstrated injustice will stem
from our decision not to consider its new arguments, especially given that ASI has
already expended its policy limit in the interpleader.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.2
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2 TQL’s motions asking us to take judicial notice are denied as moot.

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