City Wide Construction Products Company v. Teamsters Local Union No. 245

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1142
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City Wide Construction Products Company
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 245
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
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Submitted: November 20, 2025
Filed: February 18, 2026
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
City Wide Construction Products Company appeals the district court’s1 order
affirming an arbitrator’s award that favored Teamsters Local Union No. 245
(Union). City Wide asks us to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrator failed to
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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derive the award from the essence of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
We affirm.
I. Background
City Wide is a ready-mix concrete supplier that employs truck drivers to
deliver its product to its customers. The Union has been the long-time exclusive
bargaining representative for City Wide’s truck drivers. Because the parties’
previous agreement was set to expire, the Union and City Wide entered into a new
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Article V, Section 11 of the CBA requires
that “[a]ll drivers will be called in according to seniority and will be laid off and
recalled according to seniority.”
Two days after executing the CBA, the Union sent a grievance letter to City
Wide, stating the company had violated Section 11 of the CBA when it “began
releasing drivers from duty for the day out of seniority order” and requested that City
Wide cease this practice and compensate the affected drivers for the time they would
have worked had they been released in seniority order. The parties were unable to
resolve their dispute through the CBA’s preliminary grievance procedure.
Accordingly, the Union advanced the grievance to arbitration as required by the
CBA’s dispute resolution process. An arbitration hearing was held, and the
arbitrator subsequently issued a written decision and award that favored the Union.
The CBA gives the arbitrator “the right to construe the [CBA], but not to
change” it. The arbitrator’s award and decision stated that based on the CBA’s “clear
and basic” language, “Article V, Section [11] of the contract clearly and
undisputedly provides that all drivers ‘ . . . will be . . . called (into work) according
to seniority,’ as well as laid off and recalled by seniority.” The arbitrator concluded
this language “clearly and undisputedly” meant City Wide was required to call in
drivers and dismiss them at the end of each work day according to seniority. The
arbitrator then determined City Wide’s actions were “therefore clearly violative of
the express terms of Article V, Section [11] of the parties’ contract,” and ordered

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City Wide to “cease and desist in its improper actions in this area” and “pay impacted
employees back pay and lost benefits that they would have received but for [City
Wide]’s improper action here.”
Disagreeing with the arbitrator’s award, City Wide filed suit in federal district
court to vacate the award. In response, the Union filed a counterclaim to enforce the
award. After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the district court
granted the Union’s motion for summary judgment, affirmed the arbitration award,
and denied City Wide’s cross-motion. The district court determined the arbitrator
“dr[e]w from the essence of the CBA and . . . [i]t is clear from the [a]rbitrator’s
opinion that he based his conclusion off the plain meaning of Article V, Section 11.”
The district court entered judgment to enforce the award. City Wide appeals.
II. Analysis
Jurisdiction over City Wide’s action to vacate the arbitration award arises
under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185.
We review the district court’s findings of fact supporting its confirmation of an
arbitration award for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Excel Corp. v.
United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union, Loc. 431, 102 F.3d 1464, 1467 (8th Cir.
1996).
Our review of an arbitrator’s award is limited. We may only “review an
arbitrator’s award to determine whether: (1) the parties agreed to arbitrate; and (2)
the arbitrator had the power to make the award.” Id.
At issue here is whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority to enter the
award. We “accord ‘an extraordinary level of deference’ to the underlying award
itself.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers
(PACE), Loc. 7–0159, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Keebler Co. v.
Milk Drivers & Dairy Emps. Union, Loc. No. 471, 80 F.3d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1996)).
We uphold an arbitration award “so long as it draws its essence from the collective

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bargaining agreement.” United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960). Such an award draws its essence from the parties’ agreement if “it
is derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any
other indicia of the parties’ intention,” Boise Cascade Corp., 309 F.3d at 1080
(quoting Johnson Controls, Inc., Sys. & Servs. Div. v. United Ass’n of Journeymen,
39 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 1994)), and does “not ignore the plain language of the
contract,” PSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy,
Allied Indus. and Serv. Workers Intern. Union, Loc. No. 11–770, 763 F.3d 1005,
1009 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). “[S]o long as the arbitrator was arguably construing or applying
the contract,” we “cannot overturn an arbitrator's award,” even if we are “convinced
the arbitrator committed serious error.” Excel Corp., 102 F.3d at 1467.
Here, the arbitrator arguably construed and applied the CBA. The arbitrator
construed Section 11 to include the daily calling in and relieving of drivers, not
solely long-term or permanent layoffs of drivers. The arbitrator explained his
construction stemmed from the CBA’s “clear[] and undisputed[]” language, or in
other words, its plain meaning. Because the arbitrator’s award has “‘an interpretive
route’ from the contract to the arbitrator’s conclusion,” we conclude the arbitrator
did not exceed his authority to construe the CBA. See Indus. Steel Constr., Inc. v.
Lunda Constr. Co., 33 F.4th 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting CenterPoint Energy
Res. Corp. v. Gas Workers Union, 920 F.3d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir. 2019)).
City Wide disagrees, arguing the arbitrator ignored the CBA’s plain meaning.
It asserts the plain meaning of Section 11 can only refer to long-term or permanent
layoffs. City Wide points us to Article V, Section 12 of the CBA, which states that
employees who are working at a different plant than their home plant “shall be the
first employees relieved from duty for the day.” They argue that because Section 12
expressly discusses relieving employees “from duty for the day,” they intended for
“laid off” in Section 11 to mean something else. “[B]ut whether the arbitrator’s
interpretation is correct is not a question before this court.” Lunda Constr. Co., 33
F.4th at 1042. So even if City Wide’s reading of Section 11 is more plausible, that

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is not enough to convince us that the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the
CBA or failed to “derive its award from the essence of the agreement.” See Excel
Corp., 102 F.3d at 1467 (quoting Keebler, 80 F.3d at 287); Lunda Constr. Co., 33
F.4th at 1042.
Finally, City Wide points to extrinsic negotiations between the parties to
support its argument that the arbitrator ignored the mutual intent of the parties. City
Wide points to rejected draft provisions that were proposed in the process of
negotiating the CBA that more clearly describe how the drivers would be called-in
and relieved from work, compared to the CBA’s final language. This argument
requires us to speculate about how the arbitrator viewed the mutual intent of the
parties and extrinsic evidence, which we cannot do. See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co.
v. Payne, 374 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting the court does not substitute its
own judgment where the arbitrator chooses not to explain aspects of its award).
Here, the arbitrator stated his interpretation of Section 11 was based on the “clear[]
and undisputed[]” language of the CBA, and nothing in the record indicates the
arbitrator disregarded the parties’ mutual intent when construing Section 11, so we
will not speculate that the arbitrator’s reasoning was improper. Cf. Keebler, 80 F.3d
at 289 (vacating an arbitration award where the arbitrator determined the
agreement’s language was unambiguous yet subsequently relied on extrinsic
evidence to impose a new obligation on one of the parties that contradicted the
agreement).
In sum, the arbitrator construed the CBA’s plain language to determine that
“laid off” applies to the daily relieving of drivers from their duties. Because the
award “arguably constru[es and] appl[ies] the contract,” we “cannot overturn [the]
arbitrator's award.” See Excel Corp., 102 F.3d at 1467.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm.
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