United States of America v. Jimmie Willis, also known as Jimbo, also known as Bo

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2383
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jimmie Willis, also known as Jimbo, also known as Bo
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: October 20, 2025
Filed: March 9, 2026
[Published]
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Before SMITH, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Jimmie Willis appeals his 240-month sentence of imprisonment. After careful
review, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

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I.
On March 15, 2024, Willis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846, and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). While executing a search warrant at Willis’s home, police
found, as relevant here, four firearms in the trunk of an Audi parked in a detached
garage. The Audi also had a counterfeit VIN, and the Presentence Investigation
Report (PSR) included allegations that Willis was “fraudulently cloning vehicles” in
connection with a used car lot he owned. Willis filed numerous objections to the
PSR. Among them, he objected to the recommendation that he receive an
enhancement in his offense level for his aggravating role, denied knowledge or
ownership of the firearms found in the Audi, and denied that he fraudulently cloned
vehicles.
Willis appeals only his sentence, arguing the district court made two
procedural errors: first, by applying a 2-level enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c)
and second, in considering the four firearms found in the detached garage when
imposing his sentence. He also argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We address each in turn.
II.
[W]e review a district court’s sentence in two steps: first, we review for
significant procedural error; and second, if there is no significant procedural error,
we review for substantive reasonableness.” United States v. Jones, 89 F.4th 681, 684
(8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088, 1094 (8th Cir.
2017)). “[I]n reviewing the sentence for procedural errors, we review a district
court’s interpretation and application of the guidelines de novo and its factual
findings for clear error.” Id. (quoting Godfrey, 863 F.3d at 1095).

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A.
Willis first challenges the imposition of a 2-level enhancement under USSG
§ 3B1.1(c) (“If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any
criminal activity other than described in subsection (a) or (b), increase [the offense
level] by 2 levels.”). “The government bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that [an] aggravating role enhancement is warranted.”
United States v. Lora-Andres, 844 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United
States v. Gaines, 639 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 2011)); see also United States v.
Whitworth, 107 F.4th 817, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2024) (addressing whether the
aggravated role enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c) was proven by a
preponderance of the evidence). “The district court’s determination of a participant’s
role in the offense is a factual finding that we review for clear error.” United States
v. Ellis, 129 F.4th 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Ayers, 138
F.3d 360, 364 (8th Cir. 1998)).
The district court concluded that the government failed to prove Willis acted
in a supervisory role sufficient to warrant a 3-level enhancement under USSG
§ 3B1.1(b), but found sufficient evidence in the record to support a 2-level
enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c). The undisputed facts in the PSR established
that Willis “utilized” another individual to transport “ice” methamphetamine from
Arizona to Iowa at least twice and that Willis “organized” these trips. One of these
shipments involved more than 300 pounds of the drug. See United States v. Heard,
91 F.4th 1275, 1279 (8th Cir. 2024) (“We construe the terms ‘manager’ and
‘supervisor’ liberally, affirming the enhancement even when the defendant managed
or supervised only one other participant during a single transaction.” (citing United
States v. Valencia, 829 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2016))).
The district court also noted the “scale and scope of the conspiracy,” “the
number of suppliers that [Willis] had,” and “the number of people [Willis] was
supplying” as support for the 2-level enhancement. Willis is right that the mere size
of a conspiracy or quantity of drugs involved is not sufficient factual information to

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support a role enhancement for an individual participant in the conspiracy. But we
see no clear error in the district court’s reliance on these factors here to appreciate
the type of organization necessary to operate what it found to be a large-scale drug
conspiracy and to understand Willis’s role within it.
The district court did not err in applying a 2-level enhancement under USSG
§ 3B1.1(c).
B.
Second, Willis argues that the district court procedurally erred when it relied
on evidence of the four firearms found in the Audi parked in the detached garage
when considering the § 3553(a) factors. A district court may not rely on objected-to
portions of the PSR during sentencing unless the government presents evidence to
prove the disputed facts. See United States v. Richey, 758 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted). Willis filed written objections asserting he never
possessed these firearms and had no knowledge of them. Here, it is undisputed that
the government offered no evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove Willis’s
ownership or control of these firearms.
As an initial matter, the government argues Willis waived this objection or,
“at minimum,” forfeited it because he did not renew his objection after the district
court identified the vehicle cloning allegation as the only remaining factual
objection. As the government notes, the court then clarified it would not rely on the
allegation that Willis was fraudulently cloning vehicles.
Immediately preceding in the colloquy, however, the district court asked
Willis if there were “any outstanding factual objections to the report.” Willis
responded that he “maintain[ed] the factual objections and clarifications that were
previously made.” He further stated, “Based on the fact that the [g]overnment is not
presenting any evidence today, I don’t believe a further record needs to be made on
that.” Shortly thereafter, the district court explained that it would “rely on the

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unobjected-to factual information contained in the presentence investigation report,”
and it expressly stated it was “not relying on any objected-to material” in the PSR.
The government faults Willis for not making any additional record on what facts the
district court intended to consider when imposing its sentence, but the district court
had made a clear ruling that it would not rely on objected-to facts. See Fed.R.Crim.P.
32(i)(3)(B). No additional objection was required.
When considering the § 3553(a) factors, the district court referred to the
firearms found in the Audi:
[I]n the garage, there is a loaded Beretta, a Springfield, and Glock that
had been altered to make it fully automatic. Two of the magazines were
capable of accepting more than 15 rounds of ammunition. Those are not
. . . run-of-the-mill guns, and there are many of them, and there’s no
adjustment to the guidelines for the number of guns possessed, the fact
that they were loaded, or the fact that they were stolen. So these are all
aggravating factors that are present here as part of this conspiracy . . . .
The court expressed particular concern about the type of firearms found in the
garage—a loaded gun, a gun “that had been altered to make it fully automatic,” and
large capacity magazines. It described them as “not run-of-the-mill guns” and
“aggravating factors.” Yet the government presented no evidence of Willis’s
connection to these firearms. See Richey, 758 F.3d at 1002 (“If the sentencing court
chooses to make a finding with respect to [any] disputed facts, it must do so on the
basis of evidence, and not the presentence report.” (quoting United States v.
Morehead, 375 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original))). “It is well
established that . . . basing a sentence on unproven, disputed allegations” is
procedural error. Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). The
district court ultimately imposed a sentence below the advisory Guidelines range,
“[b]ut we cannot rule out the possibility that the court might have reduced the
sentence even further” if not for this error. United States v. Combs, 44 F.4th 815,
818 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

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III.
We vacate Willis’s sentence. Because we remand to the district court, we
decline to address Willis’s argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
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