United States of America v. Larry D. Moss

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-2611
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Larry D. Moss
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: May 18, 2026
Filed: May 22, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, SMITH, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Larry Moss appeals the judgment entered by the district court1 after he pleaded
guilty to a drug offense, pursuant to a plea agreement containing an appeal waiver.
1The Honorable Brian C. Buescher, United States District Judge for the District
of Nebraska.

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His counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the appeal waiver was not entered into knowingly
and voluntarily, and that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. Moss has not
filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite being granted an extension of time to do so.
After de novo review, we will enforce the appeal waiver. See United States v.
Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (standard of review); United States v. Andis,
333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). First, to the extent Moss challenges
the voluntariness of his appeal waiver, his claim is not cognizable on direct appeal
because he never moved in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea. See United
States v. Foy, 617 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2010). In any event, his statements
at the change-of-plea hearing, which carry a strong presumption of verity, contradict
the argument that he unknowingly or involuntarily entered into the plea agreement
or appeal waiver. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 890-91; United States v. Gray, 528 F.3d
1099, 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 2008); Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th
Cir. 1997). Second, his challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
falls within the scope of the unambiguous appeal waiver. See Scott, 627 F.3d at 704.
Third, no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the appeal waiver, and
his lack of legal experience does not justify expanding the scope of this narrow
exception. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891-92; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 835 (1975). Finally, having independently reviewed the record under Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal
outside the scope of the appeal waiver.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver, and we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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