United States of America v. Raven Damien Meader Burkhow

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-3002
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Raven Damien Meader Burkhow
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
____________
Submitted: May 14, 2026
Filed: May 19, 2026
[Unpublished]
____________
Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Raven Burkhow appeals the denial of two pro se motions urging the district
court1 to compel the government to return certain property seized in 2019. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendation of the

-- 1 of 2 --

-2-
Upon careful review, this court concludes that Burkhow cannot move for the
return of the property under both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and 18
U.S.C. § 983(e) because he agreed to waive and abandon any interest in the sought
property in his plea agreement. See United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 254
F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (in governmental forfeiture context, claimant must
have ownership interest in property); Jackson v. United States, 526 F.3d 394, 396
(8th Cir. 2008) (movant under Rule 41(g) must establish lawful entitlement to
property); 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1) (movant under § 983(e) may set aside
administrative forfeiture only “with respect to that person’s interest in the property”).
Furthermore, this court concludes the abandonment-of-interest provisions in
the plea agreement are valid and enforceable, as Burkhow confirmed at the change-
of-plea hearing that he had read, understood, and agreed to the terms of the plea
agreement and that his decision was voluntary. See Libretti v. United States, 516
U.S. 29, 42 (1995) (upholding plea agreement’s forfeiture provisions when they are
knowing and voluntary); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890–91 (8th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (one important way district court can ensure plea agreement is
knowing and voluntary is to question defendant about decision to enter into
agreement); see also United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 1998)
(plea agreement waivers are “strongly supported by public policy”); Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (noting it is “well settled that plea bargaining
does not violate the Constitution”).
Because the district court did not err in denying Burkhow’s motions, this court
affirms.
______________________________
Honorable Mark A. Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.

-- 2 of 2 --