Cynthia L. Anderson v. City of Bainbridge Island, a municipal corporation

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND, a
municipal corporation; JAMES MARK
DUNCAN, in his capacity as a police
officer for the City of Bainbridge Island
and as an individual; SUSAN J. SHULTZ,
in her capacity as a police officer for the
City of Bainbridge Island and as an
individual; BAINBRIDGE ISLAND
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35422
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05004-RBL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 9, 2012
Seattle, Washington
FILED
OCT 15 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 4 --

The Honorable Susan H. Black, United States Senior Circuit Judge for**
the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
2
Before: BLACK**, GRABER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Cynthia L. Anderson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Defendants City of Bainbridge Island, Officer James Mark Duncan,
Officer Susan J. Shultz, and Bainbridge Island Police Department. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the district court.
The district court did not err in finding that Officer Duncan had probable
cause to take Anderson into custody for an involuntary mental health assessment.
Although the district court improperly relied on disputed statements and events that
occurred after Anderson was taken into custody, we review de novo and affirm the
district court’s conclusion. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger,
556 F.3d 950, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). The undisputed facts in the record, viewed in
the light most favorable to Anderson, show that at the time Anderson was taken
into custody, Officer Duncan had probable cause to believe Anderson suffered

-- 2 of 4 --

We note that we may rely on the deposition testimonies of Scott and1
Cynthia Anderson in affirming summary judgment. The Andersons’ subsequent
declarations, while inconsistent with the depositions, do not create a genuine issue
of material fact. See Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 544
(9th Cir. 1975); see also Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266–67
(9th Cir. 1991).
The preferred practice, however, is for the district court to address the2
merits of each claim specifically.
3
from a mental disorder and presented an imminent likelihood of serious harm.1
See Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2010).
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Anderson’s
substantive due process claim. There is no legal basis for Anderson’s argument
that Defendants unconstitutionally interfered with her marriage by investigating the
circumstances of the domestic disturbances involving her family.
We decline to remand Anderson’s claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.
Although the district court failed to address the claims specifically, the reasoning
of the summary judgment order and the entry of final judgment on all claims
demonstrate that the district court effectively decided the negligence and emotional
distress claims as a matter of law. Moreover, upon de novo review, we find no2
reason that Defendants should be denied summary judgment on the claims and thus

-- 3 of 4 --

4
affirm the district court. See Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 562 (9th Cir.
2009).
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --