Gregory Allen Stanhope v. CHARLES RYAN, Director ADOC;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GREGORY ALLEN STANHOPE,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
CHARLES RYAN, Director ADOC;
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 08-16713
D.C. No. 4:07-cv-00002-DCB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Gregory Allen Stanhope appeals from the district
court’s order denying his motion to reconsider its judgment granting in part and
denying in part his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under
FILED
NOV 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
The scope of Stanhope’s appeal is limited to review of the district court’s
August 11, 2008, order denying his motion for reconsideration, as previously
ordered by this court, and by the district court’s order granting a certificate of
appealability as to whether Stanhope’s due process rights were violated when he
was not allowed to call live witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, see Hayward v.
Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (requiring a certificate of
appealability to challenge an administrative decision), overruled on other grounds
by Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011).
The district court concluded that Stanhope’s due process rights were violated
at one of his disciplinary proceedings, and ordered the state to remedy the violation
by either restoring the 60 days of early release credits (“ERCs”) forfeited in
connection with that proceeding, or by affording Stanhope a new hearing.
Stanhope contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for
reconsideration, which argued that the state should have been ordered to expunge
the disciplinary violation. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Stanhope’s motion for reconsideration because he did not identify any new
evidence, change in law, clear error, or manifest injustice regarding the habeas
relief ordered. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (authorizing federal courts to dispose of

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08-16713 3
habeas matters “as law and justice require”); Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,
775 (1987) (courts have broad discretion in selecting habeas remedies); School
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
By letter brief dated April 12, 2012, the state asserts that this appeal has
become moot because the Arizona Department of Corrections restored the ERCs
that Stanhope forfeited as a result of the disciplinary violation, and Stanhope has
been paroled from the sentence he was serving when he filed this action to a
consecutive term of imprisonment. We deny the state’s request to dismiss this
appeal as moot because Stanhope disputes whether it has complied with the district
court’s judgment. We express no opinion as to what remedies, if any, are available
to Stanhope to address the state’s obligations under the judgment.
We construe Stanhope’s additional arguments as a motion to expand the
certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R.
22-1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
The motion of John William Lovell, Esq., P.O. Box 1983, Tucson, Arizona
85702, (520) 829-4505, to withdraw is GRANTED. All other pending motions
are denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.

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