United States v. 2013-04-16 | 12-30055 | USA V. MARK SKILES | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).1
See 18 U.S.C. § 371.2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) No. 12-30055
)
Plaintiff – Appellee, ) D.C. No. 3:11-cr-05232-BHS-2
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
MARK SKILES, )
)
Defendant – Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 5, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Mark Skiles appeals his conviction for unlicensed dealing in firearms and1
for conspiracy to so deal. We affirm.2
(1) Skiles first asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
FILED
APR 16 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(11)(A), (a)(21)(C), (a)(22), 922(a)(1)(A); Bryan v.3
United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–92, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1945, 141 L. Ed. 2d 197
(1998); United States v. Breier, 813 F.2d 212, 213–14 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Van
Buren, 593 F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
See supra note 3; 18 U.S.C. § 371; United States v. Rizk, 660 F.3d 1125,4
1134 (9th Cir. 2011).
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed.5
2d 560 (1979); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–65 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc). We note that because the issue was not properly preserved at trial, our
review is for plain error. See United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.
2009); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).
2
verdict. We disagree. We have carefully reviewed the record, and it is apparent
that the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the offenses of dealing
in firearms without a license and conspiracy so to do beyond a reasonable doubt.3 4 5
Simply put, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that Skiles willfully engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a
federal firearms license, and that he conspired to do so. It is apparent that the jury
credited the testimony of his former partner and the agents, together with the other
evidence, rather than his testimony. We reject his invitation to reject that jury
determination. See United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1201–02 (9th Cir.
2004); Leonard v. United States, 324 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1963). There was no
error, much less plain error.

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See United States v. Naghani, 361 F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 2004) (de novo6
review).
See United States v. Harris, 705 F.3d 929, __, 2013 WL 174372, at *2 (9th7
Cir. Jan. 14, 2013); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1979); see also Naghani, 361 F.3d at 1259–61.
3
(2) Skiles also claims that § 922(a)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague. On
this record, we are unable to say that as applied to the facts and circumstances of6
this case, the statute is unduly vague. Skiles was sufficiently informed of its7
standards; indeed, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he knew that his
activities were illegal.
AFFIRMED.

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