Floydell Nunn, Jr. v. William Downward, individually and in their official capacity;

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FLOYDELL NUNN, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
MICHAEL ADAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM DOWNWARD, individually
and in their official capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
COUNTY OF ORANGE; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 11-56913
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-02275-AG-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
FILED
JUN 10 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2
Submitted March 20, 2013**
San Francisco, California
Before: KLEINFELD, LUCERO *** , and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the lodestar
amount for the award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). It properly
determined reasonable hourly rates and a reasonable number of hours and
“exclude[d] hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’”
McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). Nor did the district court abuse
its discretion by reducing the award of attorney’s fees because of the “limited
success” and lack of “meaningful public benefit.” Id. at 1103. The “amount [was]
reasonable and the court fully explain[ed] its reasoning,” so there was no abuse of
discretion. Id. at 1102.

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3
The district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Plaintiff’s
counsel. See De Dios v. Int’l Realty & Invs., 641 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011).
The record supports the court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel acted intentionally
in violating court orders and rules, which justified the court’s use of its inherent
authority to award sanctions. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff’s opening brief failed to adequately argue the issues of costs and the
motion for judgment as a matter of law, so we need not and do not reach those
issues. Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002).
AFFIRMED.

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