United States of America v. Kamalu Gonzales

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KAMALU GONZALES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-10076
D.C. No.
2:12-cr-00080-GMN-CWH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2015**
San Francisco California
Before: McKEOWN, MURGUIA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Kamalu Gonzales appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
two counts of mail fraud, six counts of wire fraud, and two counts of money
laundering. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 17 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We affirm.
The district court did not err—and certainly did not clearly err, see United
States v. Aragbaye, 234 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in United States v. McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 899 n.8 (9th Cir.
2011)—in imposing a two-level enhancement on the basis that Gonzales’s offense
involved sophisticated means. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (2013). “Conduct need not involve highly complex schemes or
exhibit exceptional brilliance to justify a sophisticated means enhancement.”
United States v. Jennings, 711 F.3d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013). The district court’s
finding that Gonzales used shell corporations was sufficient to support imposition of
the enhancement. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B)
(2013). Additionally, in general, Gonzales’s conduct was comparable to conduct
that we have held sufficient to support imposition of the enhancement. See United
States v. Horob, 735 F.3d 866, 872 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Likewise, the district court did not err in imposing a two-level enhancement
on the basis that Gonzales abused a position of trust in a manner that significantly
facilitated his offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3 (2013).
As a loan officer, Gonzales enjoyed the kind of professional discretion—marked by,

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inter alia, “special knowledge [or] expertise”—that defines a position of trust. See
United States v. Laurienti, 731 F.3d 967, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2013). Having correctly
concluded that Gonzales’s position as a loan officer was a position of trust, the
district court did not clearly err in finding that abuse of this position significantly
facilitated Gonzales’s offense.
AFFIRMED.

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