Anna Quinata v. Rhonda A. Nishimura, in her individual capacity;

13-17023Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit31.07.2015

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANNA QUINATA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RHONDA A. NISHIMURA, in her
individual capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-17023
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00339-JMS-RLP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 21, 2015**
Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Anna Quinata appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from state court proceedings to repossess an
automobile. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
FILED
JUL 31 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Knievel v. ESPN, 393
F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Quinata’s claims against Judge
Nishimura because Judge Nishimura is immune from liability. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (barring injunctive relief against judicial officers for their judicial conduct
“unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”);
Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (judges are absolutely
immune from suits for damages based on their judicial conduct except when acting
“in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Quinata’s claims against the remaining
defendants because Quinata failed to allege facts sufficient to show that those
defendants violated her rights by seeking an ex parte order for the immediate
possession of the automobile. See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ch. 654; Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605-07, 610 (1974) (upholding a sequestration statute that did
not require pre-deprivation notice or an opportunity to be heard where the statute
contained other procedural safeguards creating a “low risk of wrongful
determination of possession”).
AFFIRMED.
13-17023 2

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