United States of America v. MICHAEL J. CARROLL, AKA tobor11313@yahoo.com

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL J. CARROLL, AKA
tobor11313@yahoo.com,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-30117
D.C. No. 3:12-cr-00021-RRB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 13, 2015
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
A jury found Michael Carroll guilty of one count of advertising child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(d)(1)(A), (e), and two counts of
distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (b)(1).
The district court sentenced Carroll to a total term of imprisonment of twenty-six
FILED
SEP 03 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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years, which included 180 months on the advertising count and 132 months for
each distribution count. Carroll appeals his sentence on all counts. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Carroll argues that the district court erred by imposing an obstruction
of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 without making explicit findings of
willfulness or materiality. Because Carroll did not object to this enhancement in
the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Ayala-Nicanor,
659 F.3d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2011). Under that standard of review, even
assuming that the district court plainly erred, reversal is not warranted because
Carroll’s substantial rights were not affected. See United States v. Teague, 722
F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2013). The maximum offense level under the Guidelines
is 43. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. Without the two-point obstruction of justice
enhancement, Carroll’s adjusted total offense level would have been 47, which still
would have been treated as an offense level of 43 under the Guidelines. See id.
cmt. n.2.
2. Carroll also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Carroll’s sentence. See
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007). The district court permissibly
based its sentencing decision on the evidence before it, the statements of counsel
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and Carroll, and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Carroll’s
twenty-six year sentence, which is forty-four years below the statutory maximum
and fourteen years below the Government’s recommendation, is substantively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51.
AFFIRMED.
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