Paula Sutton v. Ryan Zinke, Department of Interior (Bureau of Indian Affairs), agency

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAULA SUTTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ryan Zinke, Department of Interior (Bureau
of Indian Affairs), agency,*
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-35511
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00096-TMB
MEMORANDUM**
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2017***
Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Paula Sutton appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in her
employment action alleging sex, age, and disability discrimination in violation of
* Ryan Zinke has been substituted for his predecessor, Sally Jewell, as
Secretary of the Interior under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 6 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 16-35511
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the
Rehabilitation Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sutton’s sex and
age discrimination claims because Sutton failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
not hiring Sutton were pretextual. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281
F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth framework for Title VII sex
discrimination claim and explaining that summary judgment is appropriate where
plaintiff did not establish “a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or . . . that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Sangvhi v. City of
Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 536 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (Title VII and ADEA claims are
analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sutton’s disability
discrimination claim because Sutton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether her hearing loss constituted a disability. See 42 U.S.C.

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3 16-35511
§ 12102(1) (defining “disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”)); Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007)
(standards provided by ADA apply to claims brought under the Rehabilitation
Act).
The parties’ joint motion to submit the case on the briefs (Docket Entry No.
30) is granted.
AFFIRMED.

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