United States of America v. Juan Carlos Martinez- Carranza

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ-
CARRANZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-16059
D.C. Nos. 1:15-cv-00206-AWI
1:13-cr-00107-AWI-
BAM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 13, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and FOGEL,*** District
Judge.
Juan Carlos Martinez-Carranza pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Jeremy D. Fogel, Senior United States District Judge
for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2
He appeals the district court’s order denying his post-conviction motion to set
aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting that he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held that Martinez-Carranza
had waived in his plea agreement his right to file such a motion. We review de
novo, United States v. Aguirre-Ganceda, 592 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010), and
affirm.
We need not decide whether the waiver is enforceable. See United States v.
Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the
enforceability of a waiver is not a jurisdictional question). Even assuming that the
waiver is not enforceable, Martinez-Carranza’s underlying ineffective assistance
claim is not viable.
Preliminarily, we expand the certificate of appealability to encompass the
merits of Martinez-Carranza’s ineffective assistance claim. See Valerio v.
Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (noting that we have
authority to expand a certificate of appealability “to include additional issues when
the district court has granted a [certificate] as to some but not all issues”).
Although a respondent is ordinarily afforded an opportunity to brief any uncertified
issues raised in a petitioner’s opening brief, see 9th Cir. R. 22-1(f), we need not
obtain additional briefing here, as both parties have already fully briefed the merits
of Martinez-Carranza’s ineffective assistance claim.

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3
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel can succeed only if the
attorney’s performance was objectively deficient and prejudicial. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984). Martinez-Carranza argues that his
attorney’s representation was deficient because competent counsel would have
explained more clearly that, under the plea agreement here, Martinez-Carranza was
not obligated to offer substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), but only to
disclose information about his own wrongdoing under § 3553(f), sometimes called
the “safety-valve” provision, see United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th
Cir. 1996). His theory relies on the assumption that he would have remained
eligible for a safety-valve reduction by disclosing his own involvement in the
crime but by withholding any information he has about others’ involvement. That
assumption is incorrect. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (requiring the defendant to
disclose “all information and evidence [he has] concerning the offense or offenses
that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan”).
Nor does Martinez-Carranza explain what additional information he would have
disclosed had his attorney explained the plea agreement more clearly or why he
believes the Government would have recommended a reduction at all if he had
refused to say anything that risked implicating another person. He therefore cannot
show that his counsel’s performance was deficient or that any deficient
representation was prejudicial.

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4
AFFIRMED.

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