Caroline Birk v. Royal Crown Bancorp, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLINE BIRK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROYAL CROWN BANCORP, INC.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-16737
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00446-KJM-
CMK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Caroline Birk appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging federal and state law claims relating to her loan and a
subsequent foreclosure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 16-16737
152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Birk’s action as barred by the doctrine
of res judicata because Birk’s claims arose from the same transactional nucleus of
facts and could have been raised in her prior action, which resulted in a final
judgment. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.
2005) (setting forth elements for res judicata and requirements for identity of
claims and final judgment on the merits).
Birk’s challenge to the district court’s denial of her motion for a temporary
restraining order is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d
1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the
reversal of a denial of preliminary injunctive relief would have no practical
consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).
AFFIRMED.

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