Nathan Okpoti v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, a Political Subdivision, on behalf of…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATHAN OKPOTI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT, a Political Subdivision, on
behalf of State of Nevada; JOHN D.
BRANDON, Police Officer; CITY OF LAS
VEGAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-15584
D.C. No.
2:15-cv-00110-APG-CWH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 12, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: KLEINFELD and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and JACK,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Janis Graham Jack, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Plaintiff–Appellant Nathan Okpoti appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants City of Las Vegas (“CLV”), Officer
John D. Brandon, and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) on
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims after he was arrested for driving under the influence of
a controlled substance. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
Okpoti alleges Officer Brandon and the LVMPD violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs at the time of his arrest. We conclude that Okpoti’s booking photo and
medical records from one month after his arrest are not sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Officer Brandon “kn[ew] and disregard[ed]”
that Okpoti was experiencing a neurological episode. See Lolli v. Cty. of Orange,
351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); cf. Castro v. Cty. of Los
Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Los
Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Castro, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017) (setting forth standard for
Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claims).
Okpoti further alleges the CLV and LVMPD violated § 1983 by depriving
him of medical care and failing to implement a policy or procedure to respond to
“neurological emergencies.” See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). Okpoti fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as

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to whether any CLV employee acted with deliberate indifference to his medical
needs. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (inadequacy of
training “may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons”). Furthermore, Okpoti
presents no evidence of “a direct causal link between” the CLV’s lack of training
policy for neurological conditions and any deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Mendiola–Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted).
Officer Brandon had probable cause to arrest Okpoti based on Okpoti’s
driving behavior, field sobriety tests, and appearance, and he reasonably relied on
the Drug Recognition Expert’s field evaluation when concluding Okpoti was
driving under the influence. See Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049,
1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person
to believe that a crime has been committed.”) (citation omitted); see also United
States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 705 (9th Cir. 2005) (probable cause may be based
on “the collective knowledge of all of the agents involved in [an] investigation”)
(citation omitted). Officer Brandon is therefore entitled to qualified immunity
against the claim of false arrest. See Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. __, __
(2018) (slip op., at 15–16); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).

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AFFIRMED.

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