Michael A. Lujan v. BILL FORD, Individual Capacity &Official Capacity;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL A. LUJAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BILL FORD, Individual Capacity &Official
Capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-35638
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02015-MO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Michael A. Lujan appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law
claims arising from his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo the district court’s dismissal on the basis of the statute of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 27 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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limitations. Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047
(9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lujan’s action as time-barred because
Lujan filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run, and he did
not establish that equitable tolling or equitable estoppel applied. See Douglas v.
Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statute of
limitations for § 1983 actions is the state law statute of limitations for personal
injury actions, and that the applicable Oregon statute of limitations is two years);
see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.275(9) (two-year statute of limitations for actions
under Oregon law arising from “any act or omission of a public body or an officer,
employee or agent of a public body”); Luchini Vy & Through Luchini v. Harsany,
779 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (voluntary dismissal of prior action
does not toll statute of limitations); Gehrke v. CraftCo, Inc., 923 P.2d 1333, 1338
(Or. Ct. App. 1996) (elements of equitable estoppel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lujan’s motions for
reconsideration because Lujan failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See SEC
v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting
forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P.

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59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Lujan’s pending motion (Docket Entry No. 38) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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