United States of America v. Anthony Ray Escobar

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY RAY ESCOBAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-30192
D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00017-RMP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Ray Escobar appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 7-month sentence and 35-month term of supervised release imposed
upon his second revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 13 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 2 --

2 17-30192
Escobar contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because a
time-served sentence, or a 7-month sentence with no supervised release term to
follow, would have been sufficient to meet the goals of sentencing. The district
court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The fact that a different sentence might also have been
reasonable is not grounds for reversal. See id. Moreover, contrary to Escobar’s
contention, the record reflects that the district court adequately considered and
addressed his arguments for a lesser sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d
984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.

-- 2 of 2 --