Norena Burgess v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC; Pra Group, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NORENA BURGESS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY
ASSOCIATES, LLC; PRA GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-55408
D.C. No.
2:16-cv-01463-DSF-FFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 5, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: FERNANDEZ and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,***
District Judge.
FILED
JUN 12 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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Plaintiff-Appellant Norena Burgess appeals a district court order entering
summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC and PRA Group, Inc. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we review de novo. Folkens v. Wyland Worldwide, LLC, 882 F.3d
768, 773 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.1
1. We affirm summary judgment on Burgess’s claim for a violation of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s (FDCPA) ban on harassment or abuse in
connection with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Under the FDCPA,
“[t]he term ‘debt’ means any obligation . . . of a consumer to pay money arising
out of a transaction in which the [subject of the transaction is] primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Here,
Burgess points to no evidence that the linked accounts are debts within the
meaning of the FDCPA, so calls made in connection with those accounts cannot
support liability under § 1692d on this record. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (banning
harassment or abuse “in connection with the collection of a debt”). Viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Burgess, she has evidence of a single call in
connection with a debt, placed roughly two years after she told Defendants she
1 Because we conclude that summary judgment was proper on both
claims Burgess pursues on appeal, we need not address PRA Group’s alternative
argument that it is not a “debt collector” subject to liability under the FDCPA.
2

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could not pay. She cites no authority suggesting that such a call is unlawful under
§ 1692d.
2. We also affirm summary judgment on Burgess’s claim for a violation
of the FDCPA’s ban on false or misleading representations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
Applying the “least sophisticated debtor” standard, we conclude that the dunning
letter Burgess received was not unlawfully misleading for four reasons. See Davis
v. Hollins Law, 832 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 2016). First, the dunning letter did not
contain implied threats of litigation or an indication that the debt was legally
enforceable. The letter Burgess received adequately disclosed that the debt was
time-barred. Second, the letter’s offer to pay the debt at a discount was not illusory
because Burgess may have been able to benefit by eliminating a delinquent account
from her credit report. Third, Burgess cites nothing to suggest that enrolling in
LifeCents revives the statute of limitations in whole or part. Finally, the “least
sophisticated debtor” is presumed to read documents with care, Davis, 832 F.3d at
964, so we reject Burgess’s attempt to fault Defendants for the fact that she tore the
dunning letter inadvertently.
AFFIRMED.
3

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