United States of America v. MARCO ANTHONY GOMEZ, Jr., a.k.a. Silky

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARCO ANTHONY GOMEZ, Jr., a.k.a.
Silky,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10224
D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00248-WBS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Marco Anthony Gomez, Jr. appeals from the district court’s order denying
his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review discretionary denials of sentence
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Because we affirm the district
court’s denial of Gomez’s motion, we need not reach his reassignment argument.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-10224
reduction motions for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Chaney, 581 F.3d
1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
The parties agree that Gomez is statutorily eligible for a sentence reduction
under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Gomez argues that the
district court erred by failing to consider adequately the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors and to explain sufficiently its discretionary decision not to
reduce his sentence. The judge who originally sentenced Gomez after holding an
evidentiary hearing and issuing detailed findings regarding Gomez’s role in the
offense, was the same judge who denied his section 3582(c)(2) motion. Although
the judge’s explanation was brief, in this instance we conclude it was sufficient.
See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1966-67 (2018) (record as a
whole, including what was considered in the original sentencing proceedings, was
sufficient to demonstrate consideration of the parties’ arguments and a reasoned
basis for deciding the section 3582(c)(2) motion). The district court did not abuse
its discretion in light of the section 3553(a) factors and the totality of the
circumstances. See United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir.
2013).
AFFIRMED.

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